Local Connection Game. Introduction Introduced in [FLMPS,PODC’03] A LCG is a game that models the creation of networks two competing issues: players want.

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Presentation transcript:

Local Connection Game

Introduction Introduced in [FLMPS,PODC’03] A LCG is a game that models the creation of networks two competing issues: players want to minimize the cost they incur in building the network to ensure that the network provides them with a high quality of service Players are nodes that: pay for the links benefit from the short paths [FLMPS,PODC’03]: A. Fabrikant, A. Luthra, E. Maneva, C.H. Papadimitriou, S. Shenker, On a network creation game, PODC’03

The model n players: nodes in a graph to be built Strategy for player u: a set of undirected edges that u will build (all incident to u) Given a strategy vector S, the constructed network will be G(S) player u’s goal: to make the distance to other nodes small to pay as little as possible

The model Each edge costs  dist G(S) (u,v): length of a shortest path (in terms of number of edges) between u and v Player u aims to minimize its cost: n u : number of edges bought by node u cost u (S) =  n u +  v dist G(S) (u,v)

Remind We use Nash equilibrium (NE) as the solution concept To evaluate the overall quality of a network, we consider the social cost, i.e. the sum of all players’ costs a network is optimal or socially efficient if it minimizes the social cost A graph G=(V,E) is stable (for a value  ) if there exists a strategy vector S such that: S is a NE S forms G Notice: SC(G)=  |E| +  u,v dist G (u,v)

Example  (Convention: arrow from the node buying the link) ++ c u =  +13 c u =2  +9 u

Some simple observations In SC(G) each term dist G (u,v) contributes to the overall quality twice In a stable network each edge (u,v) is bough at most by one player Any stable network must be connected Since the distance dist(u,v) is infinite whenever u and v are not connected Social cost of a network G: SC(G)=  |E| +  u,v dist G (u,v)

Our goal to bound the efficiency loss resulting from stability In particular: To bound the Price of Stability (PoS) To bound the Price of Anarchy (PoA)

Example Set  =5, and consider: That’s a stable network!

How does an optimal network look like?

Some notation K n : complete graph with n nodes A star is a tree with height at most 1

Il  ≤2 then the complete graph is an optimal solution, while if  ≥2 then any star is an optimal solution. Lemma proof Let G=(V,E) be an optimal solution; |E|=m and SC(G)=OPT LB(m) OPT≥  m + 2m + 2(n(n-1) -2m) Notice: LB(m) is equal to SC(K n ) when m=n(n-1)/2 and to SC of any star when m=n-1 =(  -2)m + 2n(n-1)

proof G=(V,E): optimal solution; |E|=m and SC(G)=OPT LB(n-1) = SC of any star OPT≥ min LB(m) ≥ LB(m)=(  -2)m + 2n(n-1) m LB(n(n-1)/2) = SC(K n )  ≥ 2 min m  ≤ 2 max m

Are the complete graph and stars stable?

Il  ≤1 the complete graph is stable, while if  ≥1 then any star is stable. Lemma proof If a node v cannot improve by saving k edges  ≤1  ≥1 c c has no interest to deviate v buys k edges… …pays  k more… …saves (w.r.t distances) k… v

For  ≤1 and  ≥2 the PoS is 1. For 1<  <2 the PoS is at most 4/3 Theorem proof …K n is an optimal solution, any star T is stable…  ≤1 and  ≥2 1<  <2 PoS ≤ SC(T) SC(K n ) = (  -2)(n-1) + 2n(n-1)  n(n-1)/2 + n(n-1) ≤ -1(n-1) + 2n(n-1) n(n-1)/2 + n(n-1) = 2n - 1 3/2n = 4n -2 3n < 4/3 …trivial! maximized when   1

What about price of Anarchy? …for  <1 the complete graph is the only stable network, (try to prove that formally) hence PoA=1… …for larger value of  ?

Some more notation The diameter of a graph G is the maximum distance between any two nodes diam=2 diam=1 diam=4

Some more notation An edge e is a cut edge of a graph G=(V,E) if G-e is disconnected G-e=(V,E\{e}) A simple property: Any graph has at most n-1 cut edges

The PoA is at most O(  ). Theorem proof It follows from the following lemmas: The diameter of any stable network is at most 2  +1. Lemma 1 The SC of any stable network with diameter d is at most O(d) times the optimum SC. Lemma 2

proof of Lemma 1 Consider a shortest path in G between two nodes u and v G: stable network u v 2k≤ dist G (u,v) ≤ 2k+1 for some k k vertices reduce their distance from u from ≥2k to 1  ≥ 2k-1 from ≥2k-1 to 2  ≥ 2k-3 from ≥ k+1 to k  ≥ 1 ● ● ●  (2i+1)=k 2 i=0 k-1 …since G is stable:  ≥k 2 k ≤  dist G (u,v) ≤ 2  + 1

Let G be a network with diameter d, and let e=(u,v) be a non-cut edge. Then in G-e every node w has a distance at most 3d from u Proposition 1 Let G be a stable network, and let F be the set of Non-cut edges paid for by a node u. Then |F|≤(n-1)3d/  Proposition 2

Lemma 2 The SC of any stable network G=(V,E) with diameter d is at most O(d) times the optimum SC. proof OPT ≥  (n-1) + n(n-1) SC(G)=  u,v d G (u,v) +  |E| ≤dn(n-1) ≤d OPT  |E|=  |E cut | +  |E non-cut | ≤n(n-1)3d/  Prop. 2 ≤(n-1) ≤  (n-1)+n(n-1)3d≤OPT+3d OPT ≤d OPT+OPT+3d OPT=(4d + 1) OPT