Computer-Mediated Communication Collective Action and Public Goods

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Public Good 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore The Tragedy of the “Commons” 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Cornucopia of the Commons? (Bricklin 2001) 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Private versus Public Good The Free-Rider Problem Individual interests tend to make non-contribution tempting, especially if other people will do the work. In collective action, we can view this as an n-person prisoner’s dilemma (more on that in a moment…) 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Free-Riding and the Logic of Collective Action “If all individuals refrained from doing A, every individual as a member of the community would derive a certain advantage. But now if all individuals less one continue refraining from doing A, the community loss is very slight, whereas the one individual doing A makes a personal gain far greater than the loss that he incurs as a member of the community.” (Pareto 1935, vol. 3, sect. 1496, pp. 946-7) 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Public Goods Non-Rival Goods (Jointness of Supply) Non-Excludability 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Fallacy of Individuals and Collectives See: Mancur Olson (1965) “The Logic of Collective Action” 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma The situation: 1) Each person has 2 options: cooperate or defect. 2) defection is the dominant strategy. 3) The dominant strategies (defection) intersect at a deficient equilibrium point.   Coop Defect 3,3 (R) 0,5 (S) 5,0 (T) 1,1 (P) T > R > P > S 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Explaining Collective Action Selective Incentives Self-Interest 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Self-Interest in Small versus Large Groups 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Repeated Interactions in Public Goods and Collective Action Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? Respect my authoritaah! Life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1651) 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

The Emergence of Cooperation Consider two individuals who interact repeatedly over time No mechanisms for enforceable commitments. No way to be sure what the other will do on each ‘turn’. No way to eliminate the other player or leave the interaction. No way to change the other player’s payoffs. 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Strategizing 101 Always defect! Always cooperate! Randomly cooperate! Do whatever your partner just did! Mostly cooperate, randomly defect! 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore Can cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore For Thursday… No reading, but please try to show up on time so that we can get started ~ 12:40 Problem Statements and Advising 4/17/2017 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore