Japan and Taiwan Pushing the Limits Brian Bridges

Legacies of History 1. First step in Japanese colonial empire: - modernity but exploitation - ‘Japanization’ but Taiwanese consciousness stimulated Japan-ROC Peace Treaty – tourism and trade 3. ‘Nixon shock’ and Japanese recognition of PRC – strategic and economic concerns

Informal Relations Economic and human ties remained, even though diplomatic set-back for Taiwan Japan kept ‘working relations of a non- governmental nature’, using Japan Interchange Association as ‘embassy’ Politicians’ contacts between Kuomintang (KMT) and Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

Taiwanese Dynamics (I) Rise of locally-born Taiwanese within KMT, leading to Lee Teng-hui becoming President – strong personal links to Japan -encouraged economic and cultural links with Japan -charm offensive

Taiwanese Dynamics (II) From 2000, Chen Shui-bian as President – nostalgic view of Japan from pro-independence supporters (DPP) - more ‘assertive’ approach to pull Japan to Taiwan’s side, even suggesting a Japanese version of the US’s Taiwan Relations Act and a ‘semi- strategic partnership’ – shared - Taiwanese public’s preference for status quo but with more international space

Quietly Up-grading Relations Politicians and officials visiting each way more frequently and at higher level of seniority From 2003 Interchange Association in Taipei formally celebrated Emperor’s birthday Unofficial defence/military contacts through ‘academic’ conferences

The Japanese Approach After 1972, Japan pursued ‘official’ relations with PRC and ‘unofficial’ relations with Taiwan (ROC). Japan promoted a ‘one China’ policy, but was reluctant to sign up to the so-called ‘three nos’ Japan had no wish for Taiwan to be absorbed into PRC, but did not want to be directly entangled

Japan’s Interests in Better Contacts (I) ‘Pro-Taiwan’ politicians within LDP rising to greater prominence Decline of ‘pro-PRC’ opposition parties (and new major party, Democratic Party, also favourable to Taiwan) Japanese sympathy for Taiwanese democracy Trade/investment benefits from Taiwan market for Japanese companies rising

Japan’s Interests in Better Contacts (II) Japanese media more active – and growing popular Japanese interest in Taiwanese food and tourism Greater concern about peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits – wake-up call of crisis – 1997 guidelines for Japan-US defence cooperation – 2005 Japan-US statement – pushing against the constitutional limitations

Limitations and Constraints (I) The China factor For PRC a strengthened Japan-Taiwan relationship encourages Taiwanese independence tendencies – warnings to Japan not to ‘cross the line’ in contacts Sino-Japanese relations becoming increasingly complex and during Koizumi era characterised by ‘economically hot, politically cold’ – but Japan needs China market more ?

Limitations and Constraints (II) The US factor Influence of US Asian policy on Japan’s foreign policy – US wishes to maintain a balance across the Taiwan Straits and does not want to see either Taiwan or PRC (or Japan) upset that situation Any military confrontation across the Straits would bring in Japan – bases on Japanese soil would be used by any US forces involved

Japanese Policy Perspectives Form of ‘quasi-alignment’ with Taiwan - Japan wishes to show support for Taiwan, but not in such an unambiguous manner that Taiwanese expectations are of Japanese support in any circumstances - No alliance despite both sides sharing a common ‘adversary’ and a close relationship with a common fourth power

Two Sides of the Same Coin? In March 2006, Chen said that Taiwan- Japan relations were at their closest since the two sides broke official relations in The previous April (2005) a senior Chinese official said that Sino-Japanese relations were at their lowest level since 1972.

Going Forward Domestic change in both Japan and Taiwan - Abe – pragmatism and power (‘normal’) - March 2008 Taiwanese presidential elections (Ma and KMT to win?) – ongoing debate on Taiwanese ‘identity’ Chinese leaders’ perspectives - cannot allow Taiwan to ‘slip away’ US presidential changes (US-China tension?)