From Natural to Artificial Systems Models of Competition and Cooperation By Rob Cranston, Walter Proseilo, Chau Trinh & Owen Pang.

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Presentation transcript:

From Natural to Artificial Systems Models of Competition and Cooperation By Rob Cranston, Walter Proseilo, Chau Trinh & Owen Pang

Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Modeling a Society of Mobile Heterogeneous Individuals 3. Transmitting Culture 4. Deciding Whether to Interact 5. Choosing How to Behave 6. Summary

v An agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors and acting upon that environment through effectors. (from Intelligent Agents by Dr. Jacob) Introduction What is an agent?

Introduction (cont.) Competition – event in which persons compete Cooperation – association of persons for common benefit

Mathematica v Powerful Multi-Use Tool. v Thousands of built in functions. v Easy to use programming tool. v Used for all simulations in this presentation.

Mathematica As A Programming Language v Rule based language – good for simulations v Very strong pattern matching v Rules for our simulations rely on this. The pattern matching is used to determine which rule is carried out on the agent

Mathematica Toolkit Simulating Society v “Simulating Society” by Gaylord & D’Andria v Simulations involving groups of agents v Builds on others work and uses Mathematica as the tool for the simulations v All simulations in our presentation are from this book

Modeling a Society of Mobile Heterogeneous Individuals Overview of the system v Decentralized v Discrete v Dynamic

Modeling a Society of Mobile Heterogeneous Individuals Discrete dynamical system properties v Space is represented in 2-D v Each cell is defined as a state v The system evolves over time v Cells updated using rules

Modeling a Society of Mobile Heterogeneous Individuals Simulation v Square n x n lattice v Population of density - p v The system evolves time steps - t

Modeling a Society of Mobile Heterogeneous Individuals Populating Society v An empty site has a value of 0 v A site occupied by an individual has a value which is a list Note: it is useful to focus on the lattice sites rather than on the individuals.

Modeling a Society of Mobile Heterogeneous Individuals Executing a Time Step v Time step is executed in two or more consecutive partial-steps v In each partial-step, a set of rules is applied to each site in the lattice

Modeling a Society of Mobile Heterogeneous Individuals Movement v One agent per cell v Neighborhood v Direction v Walk rules for updating a lattice site have the form: walk[site, N, E, S, W, NE, SE, SW, NW, Nn, Ee, Ss, Ww] WwEe Nn Ss SW NWNE W S N E SE 

Modeling a Society of Mobile Heterogeneous Individuals Each lattice occupied by an agent becomes empty unless: Cell remains occupied by the agent, who chooses a random direction to face Scenario #1Scenario #2     

Modeling a Society of Mobile Heterogeneous Individuals Interaction v Person to Person v Person to Group Evolving the System v The system evolves over t time steps, starting with the initial lattice configuration and society

Modeling a Society of Mobile Heterogeneous Individuals Running the Simulation: Random Walkers Step 1Step 2Step 3Step 498Step 499

Transmitting Culture What is Cultural Transmission? Axelrod’s Model of Transmission of Culture

Transmitting Culture Axelrod’s Model v Consists of a Meme list of Features and Traits v A = {3, 2, 1, 7, 5} v N = {4, 8, 1, 2, 5} A N

Transmitting Culture The System v A = {3, 2, 1, 7, 5} v N = {4, 8, 1, 2, 5} Cultural Exchange v A = {3, x, 1, 7, 5} v N = {4, 8, 1, 2, 5} Where x is a randomly chosen integer between 2 and 8. A N

Transmitting Culture Modification to Axelrod’s Model v Incorporating mobility v Incorporating bilateral cultural exchange Other Models v Social Status and Role Models Bill Gates

Transmitting Culture Running the Simulation

Deciding Whether to Interact To Interact or Not to Interact v Good behavior versus bad behavior The Prisoner’s Dilemma [Revisited] v Payoffs resulted from interaction v Benefit if positive payoff v Cost if negative payoff

Deciding Whether to Interact The System v Square n by n lattice Populating Society v Empty site has 0 v Good & Bad guys v Site occupied by an individual has a list I = {a, b, c, d, e} I

Deciding Whether to Interact Executing the Interaction Partial-Step v Memory Checking v Refuse or Accept Interaction v Update List

Deciding Whether to Interact Running the Simulation Graph of Good Guy vs. Bad Guy

Deciding Whether to Interact Public Knowledge Graph of Good Guy vs. Bad Guy

Deciding Whether to Interact Public Knowledge Graph of Good Guy vs. Bad Guy

Deciding Whether to Interact Signals “I suggest you deactivate your emotion chip for now.” Patrick Stewart in Star Trek: First Contact (1996)

Deciding Whether to Interact Use of Vibes Graphs of Good Guys and Bad Guys

Deciding Whether to Interact Study - The UNIX Case:  Introduction  Too many variations of UNIX  Setting a Standard  UNIX International Inc. (UII)  Open Software Foundation (OSF)  Two types of Companies

Deciding Whether to Interact Study - The UNIX Case:  Uses Landscape Theory  size: s i  propensity: p ij  configuration: X  distance: d ij  frustration: F i (X)  energy: E(X)

Deciding Whether to Interact Study - The UNIX Case:  Assumptions  Cooperation  Competition v Additional parameters  and  used to indicate close rivals v Nash Equilibrium

Deciding Whether to Interact Study - The UNIX Case:  Results: Only two configurations that were also Nash Equilibriums

Choosing How to Behave Introduction  Being good vs. being bad  Adaptation  Introspection

Choosing How to Behave Choosing One’s Interaction Behavior with Another Individual  Based on the Behavioral History of the Other Individual  Reciprocity

Choosing How to Behave Stebbins’ Model  Pollyanna  Sociopath  Nice retaliator  Mean retaliator

Choosing How to Behave The System  Square n by n lattice Populating Society  Empty site has 0  Site occupied by an individual has a list I = {a, b, c, d, e} I

Choosing How to Behave Executing a Time Step  Deciding  Interacting  Moving

Choosing How to Behave Graph of the Four Behavior Strategies

Choosing How to Behave Posch’s Model  Introspective model  Satiation Graph of Posch’s Model

By Rob Cranston, Walter Proseilo, Chau Trinh & Owen Pang From Natural to Artificial Systems v Summary v Questions v Webnotes:

The End March 27th Revision 4