1 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Firewalls and Firewall Testing Techniques Sonia Fahmy Department of Computer Sciences Purdue University

2 Sonia FahmyPurdue University q What is a firewall? q Firewall types and architectures q Firewall operations q Firewall testing Overview

3 Sonia FahmyPurdue University What is a Firewall? q A firewall is a method of achieving security between trusted and untrusted networks q The choice, configuration and operation of a firewall is defined by policy, which determines the the services and type of access permitted q Firewall = policy+implementation q Firewall = “zone of risk” for the trusted network Gateway (DMZ)

4 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Firewalls Should… q Support and not impose a security policy q Use a “deny all services except those specifically permitted” policy q Accommodate new facilities and services q Contain advanced authentication measures q Employ filtering techniques to permit or deny services to specific hosts and use flexible and user-friendly filtering q Use proxy services for applications q Handle dial-in q Log suspicious activity

5 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Firewalls Cannot… q Protect against malicious insiders q Protect against connections that do not go through them (e.g., dial-up) q Protect against new threats or new viruses

6 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Firewalls in Relation to 7 Layers Application Layer Presentation Layer Session Layer Transport Layer Network Layer Link Layer Physical Layer Packet Level Filter Application Level Filter

7 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Simple Packet Filters q Example: q InterfaceSourceDest.Prot.SPortDport q 2**TCP*21 (FTP) q *.**TCP*25 (SMTP) Internal network Filter Internet Internal 12 Difficult to handle X-Windows, RPC (including NFS and NIS), rlogin, rsh, rexec, rcp, and TFTP

8 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Stateful Inspection q Also known as dynamic packet filtering (dynamic rule set) q Requires storing state for each stream, assuming: q If there is one packet, there will be more q If there is one packet, responses will be returned q Prime candidate for resource starvation attacks q What should be done when table is full? q Least recently used q Random early drop q Time out entries q Wait for FIN messages, etc.

9 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Bastion Host q Inside users log onto the bastion host to use outside services q Outside snoopers cannot see internal traffic even if they break in the firewall (perimeter = stub network = DMZ) R1 R2 Internet Internal

10 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Firewall Architectures q Screened host: Bastion host and exterior router q Screened subnet: Exterior and interior routers q Multiple bastion hosts, multiple interior routers, multiple exterior routers, multiple internal networks (with/without backbone), multiple perimeter networks q Merged interior and exterior routers, bastion host and exterior router and bastion host and interior router (not recommended) R1 R2 Internet Internal

11 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Dual-homed Host q The dual-homed host is the firewall in this case Internet Internal

12 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Application-Level Gateways q Specialized programs on bastion host relay requests and responses, enforcing site policies (refusing some requests) q Sometimes referred to as “proxy servers” q Transparent with special “proxy client” programs q Full protocol decomposition, e.g, Raptor, or “plug mode” e.g., Firewall-1 and PIX Internet Dual-homed Host and Proxy Server Server Client

13 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Policies q Network service access policy q Defines which services are to be explicitly allowed or denied+ways in which these services are to be used q Firewall design policy q Defines how the firewall implements restricted access and service filtering specified by the NSAP q FDP must be continuously updated with new vulnerabilities

14 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Packet Traversal in a Firewall Packet receipt by firewall Link layer filtering Dynamic ruleset (state) Packet legality checks IP and port filtering NAT/PAT (header rewrite) Packet reassembly Application level analysis Routing decision Dynamic ruleset (state) Packet sanity checks IP and port filtering Packet release Packet flow Packet may be dropped Stream may be dropped Optional outbound filtering Bypass On Match

15 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Firewall Testing q Vulnerabilities = design or coding flaws = invalid assumptions, e.g., insufficient verification, memory available, user data, trusted network object, predictable sequence, etc. q Develop a vulnerability-operation matrix q Place Common Vulnerabilities Exposure (CVE), and its candidates (CAN), and other known and new firewall problems in appropriate matrix cell q Find clusters in matrix q Predict problems q Automate firewall testing through focusing on common problems

16 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Example q CVE q Cisco PIX firewall manager (PFM) allows retrieval of any file whose name and location is known q PIX proxy’s verification failure q Application level q Insufficient verification

17 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Key Points q Firewalls can employ: q Packet filters q Stateful inspection q Application-level gateways (many types) q Also circuit-level q Large variations, e.g., Raptor, PIX, Firewall-1, Gauntlet q Several architectures to prevent all-or-nothing effect q Importance of policy q Firewall testing automation underway

18 Sonia FahmyPurdue University References q RFC 2647, “Benchmarking” + drafts q Simonds, “Network Security”, 1996 q Hunt, “Internet/Intranet firewall security”, Computer Communications, 1998 q Frantzen et al, “A framework for understanding vulnerabilties in firewalls using a dataflow model of firewall internals”, in preparation q Kamara et al, “Testing firewalls”, in preparation q Chapman, “Network (In)Security through IP packet filtering” q q Web pages and mailing lists

19 Sonia FahmyPurdue University Thank You! Questions?