RSA SecurID ® Authentication Ellen Stuart CS265 Cryptography and Computer Security Fall 2004

E.Stuart2 11/24/2004 Agenda Introduction Components  Tokens  Server  Algorithm Weaknesses Comparison Conclusion

E.Stuart3 11/24/2004 Introduction RSA SecurID ® Authentication  History of the RSA and SecurID ®  Two Factor Authentication  Customer List NSA CIA White House

E.Stuart4 11/24/2004 Components of the SecurID ® System Tokens Authentication Server Algorithm

E.Stuart5 11/24/2004 Components of the SecurID ® System Tokens  Issued to users  Each token had a unique 64 bit seed value  “Something the user has” Key Fob User required to login in with PIN and displayed pass code Hardware Token User required to login in with PIN and displayed pass code PINPAD User required to use PIN to access pass code Software Token Does not require separate Device User required to use PIN to access pass code

E.Stuart6 11/24/2004 Components of the SecurID ® System Authentication Server  Maintains database of user assigned tokens  Generates pass code following the same algorithm as the token  Seed – similar to symmetric key

E.Stuart7 11/24/2004 SecurID Login Users issued tokens Internet RSA Authentication Server

E.Stuart8 11/24/2004 Components of the SecurID ® System Algorithm  Brainard’s Hashing Algorithm  AES Hashing Algorithm

E.Stuart9 11/24/2004 Components of the SecurID ® System  Brainard’s Hashing Algorithm Secret key := unique seed value Time := 32 bit count of minutes since January 1, 1986

E.Stuart10 11/24/2004 Components of the SecurID ® System  ASHF description of Brainard’s Hashing Algorithm Each round -> 64 sub-rounds

E.Stuart11 11/24/2004 Weaknesses of the SecurID ® System  Violation of Kerckhoff’s Principle  Publication of the alleged hash algorithm  Key Recovery Attack (Biryukov, 2003; Contini, 2003)  AES Implementation  Human Factors

E.Stuart12 11/24/2004 Comparison to Password Systems Password systems are built-in, no additional implementation cost?  Administration Costs  Security Costs SecurID  No need to regularly change passwords  No changes as long as tokens uncompromised (and hash function)

E.Stuart13 11/24/2004 Conclusion Former implementation of SecurID supports Kerckhoff’s principle RSA phasing out versions with Brainard’s Hash Function

E.Stuart14 11/24/2004 References Mudge, Kingpin, Initial Cryptanalysis of the RSA SecurID Algorithm, January V. McLellan; Firewall Wizards: RE: securid AES tokens, Apr , retrieved November 2004 F. Muhtar, Safer means to use passwords, Computimes, NSTP, Feb 13th 2003, retrieved November 2004 from S. Contini, Y.L. Yin, Improved Cryptanalysis of SecurID, Cryptology ePrintArchive, Report 2003/205, October 21, V. McLellan, Re: SecurID Token Emulator, post to BugTraq, stuttgart.de/archive/bugtraq/2001/01/msg00090.html I.C. Wiener, Sample SecurID Token Emulator with Token Secret Import, post to BugTraq, The Authentication Scorecard, White Paper, RSA Security, Inc, retrieved November Protecting Against Phishing by Implementing Strong Two-Factor Authentication, White Paper, RSA Security, Inc, retrieved November Are passwords Really Free? A closer look at the hidden costs of password security, White Paper, RSA Security, Inc, retrieved November RSA Laboritories, FAQ Version 4.1, May 2000 RSA Security, Inc, G. Welsh; Breaking the Code, Macquarie University News Feature, March Retrieved November 2004, from Biryukov, J. Lano, and B. Preneel; Cryptanalysis of the Alleged SecurID Hash Function (extended version), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, RSA security website,