The Political Economy of Population: Trade, Treaties, and the Fertility Transition John A. Doces Bucknell University International Political Economy Society Annual Conference 2009

Why has fertility fallen?

My answer Rise of international trade Ratification of the U.N.’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

Portugal

The demographic transition

The fertility transition Biological component – age of menstruation Social component – institutions – economic development – cultural values – modernization

Determinants of the fertility transition Infant/child mortality (demographic transition model) Relative cohort size, The Easterlin Hypothesis Income per person Female literacy Female access to education Birth control Abortion legalization Age of marriage

Where does fertility fit into IPE? Central to the study of classical political economy. – Malthus Associated with conflict/security Associated with economic growth and development Associated with democracy/political stability

Trade and CEDAW Ratification Gray et al. (IO 2006) – TSCS analysis – international trade and ratification are associated with women’s empowerment Richards and Gelleny (ISQ 2007) – TSCS analysis – international trade improves women’s status

A simple logic International Trade If trade empowers women then it should be inversely associated with fertility. Galor and Mountford (2008), in a cross-section analysis of the OECD, find international trade is inversely associated with fertility. CEDAW ratification If ratification empowers women then it should be inversely associated with fertility.

Theory I build a supply-demand framework of fertility based on Easterlin’s (1985, 2001) work. Components – demand for children – potential supply of children – regulation costs

Theory

Theory: International Trade **Decreases price of substitute goods** Also, – increases women’s employment opportunities – increases household’s real income – encourages urbanization Therefore, trade reduces demand for children

Theory: CEDAW Ratification Increases female literacy – Earlier onset of the mortality revolution – Thus, potential supply begins to increase at an earlier point in time

Theory

Hypotheses International trade is inversely associated with fertility CEDAW ratification is inversely associated with fertility Trade and ratification increase the probability of the fertility transition

Empirical Analysis Time-series cross-section of the OECD from 1960 to 2002 Dependent variables – total fertility rate – fertility transition: 1 if TFR≤2.1 and 0 otherwise Test variables – level of trade openness – year after CEDAW ratification Control variables – relative cohort size (-) – income per capita (-) and income per capita squared (+) – infant mortality (+) – population size (-) – abortion legalization (-) – lagged fertility (-)

Summary of Empirical Results International trade – inverse effect on fertility – direct effect on fertility transition – 50% increase in trade reduces fertility by about.12 children per woman CEDAW ratification – inverse effect on fertility – direct effect on fertility transition – ratification reduces fertility by about.07 children per woman

Summary of Empirical Results The Easterlin hypothesis – Relative cohort size has inverse effect Infant mortality – As predicted by the DT, directly associated with fertility Abortion legalization – Reduces fertility and thus youth bulges Consistent with research arguing legalization of abortion reduces crime

Implications Population growth

Implications Reconsideration of the liberal peace thesis – more trade means less population pressure/s and less conflict Women’s empowerment – open trade and CEDAW ratification (and similar policy) are good ideas for women’s empowerment Developing world? – UN’s population predictions for sub-Saharan Africa (2050): low-variant fertility: 1.5 billion medium-variant fertility: 1.75 billion high-variant fertility: 2.0 billion

Thank you Questions?

Appendix: Regression Results

Appendix: Fixed-Effects

Appendix: Fertility Transition

Appendix: Literature Citations Conflict – Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2005; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Eichenburg 2003; Melander 2005a, 2005b; Shapiro and Mahajan Economic growth – Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1999; Bloom and Williamson 1998; Carter and Sutch 2003; Easterlin and Crimmins 1985, 2001; Ray 1998; Simon 1998; Weil Democracy/political stability – Feng et al. 1999, 2000; Przeworski et al. 2000