On the Variance of Electricity Prices in Deregulated Markets

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Lecture #11: Introduction to the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) - What is the old empirical IO? The old empirical IO refers to studies that.
Advertisements

Authors: J.A. Hausman, M. Kinnucan, and D. McFadden Presented by: Jared Hayden.
Pablo Serra Universidad de Chile Forward Contracts, Auctions and Efficiency in Electricity Markets.
Preliminary Impacts of Wind Power Integration in the Hydro-Qubec System.
The Competitive Effects of Ownership of Financial Transmission Rights in a Deregulated Electricity Industry Manho Joung and Ross Baldick Electrical and.
1/22 Competitive Capacity Sets Existence of Equilibria in Electricity Markets A. Downward G. ZakeriA. Philpott Engineering Science, University of Auckland.
Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
© 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 1 Participating in Electricity Markets.
Valuing Load Reduction in Restructured Markets Supply Cost Curve Regressions Market Price vs. Value of Load Reduction Photovoltaic Case Study William B.
Bertrand Model Matilde Machado. Matilde Machado - Industrial Economics3.4. Bertrand Model2 In Cournot, firms decide how much to produce and the.
Consumption, Production, Welfare B: Monopoly and Oligopoly (partial eq) Univ. Prof. dr. Maarten Janssen University of Vienna Winter semester 2013.
Chapter 7 In Between the Extremes: Imperfect Competition.
Congestion Pricing: Competitive Locational Prices of Power Stoft (2002)
A Heuristic Bidding Strategy for Multiple Heterogeneous Auctions Patricia Anthony & Nicholas R. Jennings Dept. of Electronics and Computer Science University.
Antitrust Analysis Using Calibrated Economic Models Gregory J. Werden Senior Economic Counsel Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice The views expressed.
AN INTRODUCTION TO PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
6 © 2004 Prentice Hall Business PublishingPrinciples of Economics, 7/eKarl Case, Ray Fair The Production Process: The Behavior of Profit-Maximizing Firms.
1 A Look at Simple, Learnable Pricing Policies in Electricity Markets Steve Kimbrough Fred Murphy INFORMS, November 2005 File: sok-murphy-informs-2005.ppt.
Chapter 6 An Introduction to Portfolio Management.
A Comparison of Price Patterns in Deregulated Power Markets Discussion: Christopher Knittel UC Davis.
1 Market Outcomes and Generator Behaviour in the England and Wales Electricity Wholesale Market Andrew Sweeting, MIT 22 March 2002 UCEI, Berkeley.
Market Overview in Electric Power Systems Market Structure and Operation Introduction Market Overview Market Overview in Electric Power Systems Mohammad.
AN INTRODUCTION TO PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
Generation Expansion Daniel Kirschen 1 © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington.
Computing Equilibria in Electricity Markets Tony Downward Andy Philpott Golbon Zakeri University of Auckland.
Network Competition IS250 Spring 2010
Deregulated Power, Pollution, and Game Theory Frank Deviney 11/16/05.
©2003 PJM Factors Contributing to Wholesale Electricity Prices Howard J. Haas Market Monitoring Unit November 30, 2006.
Portfolio Management-Learning Objective
Lecture Presentation Software to accompany Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management Seventh Edition by Frank K. Reilly & Keith C. Brown Chapter 7.
Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management Chapter 7.
© 2009 Pearson Education Canada 8/1 Chapter 8 The Theory of Perfect Competition.
Copyright © 2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin 12 Financial and Cost- Volume-Profit Models.
STDM - Linear Programming 1 By Isuru Manawadu B.Sc in Accounting Sp. (USJP), ACA, AFM
Lecture 10 The Capital Asset Pricing Model Expectation, variance, standard error (deviation), covariance, and correlation of returns may be based on.
Chapter 7 – Risk, Return and the Security Market Line  Learning Objectives  Calculate Profit and Returns  Convert Holding Period Returns (HPR) to APR.
Colombian Firm Energy Market: Discussion and Simulation Peter Cramton (joint with Steven Stoft and Jeffrey West) 9 August 2006.
The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 2006McGraw-Hill/Irwin 12 Financial and Cost- Volume-Profit Models.
Peak Shaving and Price Saving Algorithms for self-generation David Craigie _______________________________________________________ Supervised by: Prof.
Fundamentals of Futures and Options Markets, 5 th Edition, Copyright © John C. Hull Value at Risk Chapter 18.
Lecture 12Slide 1 Topics to be Discussed Oligopoly Price Competition Competition Versus Collusion: The Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Leader-Follower Framework For Control of Energy Services Ali Keyhani Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering The Ohio State University
Value at Risk Chapter 16. The Question Being Asked in VaR “What loss level is such that we are X % confident it will not be exceeded in N business days?”
PJM©2013www.pjm.com Economic DR participation in energy market ERCOT April 14, 2014 Pete Langbein.
1 of 32 © 2014 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall CHAPTER OUTLINE 7 The Production Process: The Behavior of Profit-Maximizing Firms The.
Use, duplication or disclosure of this document or any of the information contained herein is subject to the restrictions on the title page of this document.
6 © 2004 Prentice Hall Business PublishingPrinciples of Economics, 7/eKarl Case, Ray Fair The Production Process: The Behavior of Profit-Maximizing Firms.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2008 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. Capital Asset Pricing and Arbitrage Pricing Theory CHAPTER 7.
Pricing with Markups in Competitive Markets with Congestion Nicolás Stier-Moses, Columbia Business School Joint work with José Correa, Universidad Adolfo.
Risk and Return: Portfolio Theory and Assets Pricing Models
Financial Risk Management of Insurance Enterprises
The Impact of Intermittent Renewable Energy Sources on Wholesale Electricity Prices Prof. Dr. Felix Müsgens, Thomas Möbius USAEE-Conference Pittsburgh,
5-1 “Modern” Finance? u “Modern Finance Theory” has many components: u Sharpe’s “Capital Asset Pricing Model” (CAPM) u Modigliani-Miller’s “Dividend Irrelevance.
Pricing of Competing Products BI Solutions December
> > > > The Behavior of Profit-Maximizing Firms Profits and Economic Costs Short-Run Versus Long-Run Decisions The Bases of Decisions: Market Price of.
The analytics of constrained optimal decisions microeco nomics spring 2016 the oligopoly model(II): competition in prices ………….1price competition: introduction.
Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations Pär Holmberg Department of Economics, Uppsala University David Newbery Faculty.
Pricing Strategy. Price strategy One of the four major elements of the marketing mix is price. Pricing is an important strategic issue because it is related.
Supplementary Chapter B Optimization Models with Uncertainty
Types of risk Market risk
Jeopardy Example A merger between firms in the same industry
Financial Risk Management of Insurance Enterprises
TOPIC 3.1 CAPITAL MARKET THEORY
On Learning in Policy Space by Oligopolists in Electricity Markets
Types of risk Market risk
Homework Ch 13 Electricity Restructuring
Short-term uncertainty in investment models
Generation Expansion Daniel Kirschen
Strategic Bidding in Competitive Electricity Markets
Deregulated Power, Pollution, and Game Theory
Presentation transcript:

On the Variance of Electricity Prices in Deregulated Markets Ph.D. Dissertation Claudio M. Ruibal University of Pittsburgh August 30, 2006

Agenda Characteristics of electricity and of its price Object of study and uses Electricity markets Pricing models Mean and variance of hourly price Mean and variance of average price Conclusions and contributions of this work Recommendations for future work

Characteristics of electricity Electricity is not storable. Electricity takes the path of least resistance. The transmission of power over the grid is subject to a complex series of interactions (e.g., Kirchhoff’s laws). Electricity travels at the speed of light. Electricity cannot be readily substituted. It can only be transported along existing transmission lines which are expensive and time consuming to build.

Goals of competition in electricity markets through deregulation Improving efficiency in both supply and demand side. Providing cost-minimizing incentives Stimulating creativity to develop new energy-saving technologies. Making better investments. Promoting energy conservation. But as a consequence electricity prices show an extremely high variability.

Comparing prices of five days Source: PJM Interconnection, Hourly Average Locational Price

Comparing load of five days Source: PJM Interconnection, Hourly Load

Two months Source: PJM Interconnection, Hourly Average Locational Price

A year Source: PJM Interconnection, Hourly Average Locational Price

Object of study The expected value and variance of hourly and average electricity prices with a fundamental bid-based stochastic model. Hourly price: the price for each hour. Average price: a weighted average of the hourly prices in a period (e.g., on-peak hours, a day, a week, a month, etc.)

Uses of the variances Hourly prices Pricing: decisions on offer curves Measuring profitability of peak units Scheduling maintenance Determining the type of units needed for capacity expansion.

Uses of the variances Average Prices Prediction of prices Budgeting cash flow Calculating Return over Investment (ROI) Managing risk Valuation of derivatives Calculation of VaR and CVaR Computation of the expected returns -variance of returns objective function.

Electricity marketplace Transmission Companies Retail Companies Charge a fee for the service of transmitting electricity Charge a fee for the service of connecting, disconnecting and billing Retailing Generation Companies Distribution Companies End users Transmission process Distribution process Retail Marketplace Wholesale Marketplace

Electricity Market at work

Real time market Today's Outlook

Energy risk management There is a need for the firms to hedge the risk associated with variability of prices. Derivatives prices depend on the variance. Value-at-Risk and Conditional Value-at-Risk (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000). Expected returns – variance of returns objective function (Markowitz, 1952)

Value-at-Risk and Conditional Value-at-Risk mean CVaR Figure extracted from http://www.riskglossary.com/link/value_at_risk.htm

Markowitz’s Expected return-variance of returns Variances Attainable E,V combinations Efficient E,V combinations Expected values

Electricity price models Game theory models Study the agents’ strategic behavior Production-cost models Simulate energy production and market processes Time series model Perform statistical analysis on price data

Electricity market modeling trends Technique Applied to Comments Optimization models Profit maximization of one firm Well known and robust algorithms Equilibrium models Simplified overall markets Cournot: tractable SFE: more realistic Simulation models Complex overall markets Capture iterative characteristic of markets

The model selected Combined imperfect-market equilibrium/ stochastic production-cost model. Based on fundamental drivers of the price. It considers uncertainty from two sources: Demand Units’ availability It compares three equilibrium models: Bertrand Cournot Supply Function Equilibrium

Bidding behavior Type of Competition Strategies Equilibrium Bertrand prices Marginal cost Cournot quantities Marginal cost plus a term depending on price elasticity of demand Supply Function Equilibrium supply functions Marginal cost plus a term

Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) Klemperer and Meyer (1989) Green and Newbery (1992) Supply function equilibria for a symmetric duopoly are solutions to this differential equation: Here, p is bounded by to satisfy the non-decreasing constraint.

Allowable Supply Functions

Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen (1998) Assumptions: step-wise supply functions n identical generating firms Dp = 0 (which zero price-elasticity of demand) perfect information equal accuracy in predicting demand taking the lowest SFE which means that the price at peak demand equals marginal cost, i.e. p(Q*) = dM The Nash Equilibrium solution to the differential equation is:

Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen’s supply functions

Modeling supply The system consists of N generating units dispatched according to the offered prices (merit order). The jth unit in the loading order has cj capacity (MW) dj marginal cost ($/MWh) pj = j /(j+j) proportion of time that it is up j failure rate j repair rate There exists the possibility of buying energy outside the system, which is modeled as a (N+1)th generating unit, with large capacity and always available.

Operating state of the units The operating state of each generating unit j follows a two-state continuous time Markov chain Yj(t), For i  j, Yi(t) and Yj(s) are statistically independent for all values of t and s.

Mean and variance of the hourly price where:

Probability distribution of the marginal unit The following events are equivalent: and So, to know the distribution of J(t), we should evaluate the argument of the RHS for all j:

Auxiliary variable Excess of load Xj(t) that is not being met by the available generated power up to generating unit j, with a cumulative distribution function Gj(x:t).

Edgeworth expansion Where:

Equivalent load price It captures the uncertainty of demand and of units’ availability at the same time p(t) Missing ci quantity L(t) Equivalent L(t) This approach is useful to determine the price and the marginal unit.

Modeling electricity prices under Bertrand model

Modeling electricity prices under Cournot model

Approximation of the equivalent load expected value

Modeling electricity prices under Supply Function Equilibrium

Average electricity price Daily load profile considered to be deterministic. Joint probability distribution of marginal units at two different hours. Expressions for the expected values and variances for the three models: Bertrand, Cournot and Rudkevich.

Daily load profile

Expected value and variance of hourly load

Covariance of prices

Joint probability distribution of marginal units at two hours

Bivariate Edgeworth expansion

Bertrand model

Cournot model

Rudkevich model

Numerical results Supply model: 12 identical sets of 8 units. Load model: data from PJM market, Spring 2002, scaled to fit the supply model. Sensitivity analysis on: Number of competing firms: 3 to 12 Slope of the demand curve Dp: -100 to -300 (MWh)2/$ Anticipated peak demand as percentage of total capacity: 60% to 100%.

Hourly prices (Cournot)

Hourly prices (Rudkevich)

Rudkevich supply functions (6 firms)

Rudkevich supply functions (12 firms)

Rudkevich supply functions (3 firms)

Average hours13-16

Average hours 3-6

Stochastic model of the load So far, hourly loads were considered normally distributed (load model 1). The effect of temperature on the load is studied in models 2 and 3. The remaining term, after removing the effect of temperature, is considered as: Normally distributed (load model 2) Time series (load model 3) Results for a data set for Spring–Summer 1996 are shown to compare models.

Correlation load-temperature

Load model 2 where L(t) is the load at hour t f(t) accounts for part of the load that is ascribed to the ambient temperature t. x(t) is normally distributed, not independent

Load model 3 where L(t) is the load at hour t f(t) accounts for part of the load that is ascribed to the ambient temperature t. xt follows an ARIMA (1,120,0) process zt is a Gaussian white noise with mean zero and standard deviation z

Actual and expected load (3 models)

Variance of hourly load (3 models)

Probability distribution marginal unit (load model 1)

Probability distribution marginal unit (load model 2)

Probability distribution marginal unit (load model 3)

Joint probability (model 1)

Joint probability (model 2)

Hourly prices (3 models)

Average prices (3 models, hours 13-18)

Conclusions The number of firms in the market is an important factor for the mean and variance of prices. Increasing elasticity will bring down prices and variances significantly. Rudkevich model presents a nice trade off between excess capacity and price. Being tight to full capacity brings prices up. An accurate forecast of temperature can reduce significantly the prediction error of prices. A rigorous time series analysis of the load does not increase the accuracy of prediction.

Contributions of this work It is new model for electricity prices combining a statistical approach and a game theory viewpoint. The expected values and variances of hourly and average prices can be computed with closed form expressions. The covariances of hourly prices have been calculated.

Recommendations for future research Calibrating the model for a real market Incorporating fuel cost as another source of uncertainty Extending the model for asymmetric firms Incorporating transmission constraints Incorporating the unit commitment problem

Thank you!