Presentation by Christine McElroy Electronic Voting Presentation by Christine McElroy

What is Electronic Voting? Also known as e-voting Not the same as Internet voting or I-voting Involves paper-based and electronic voting systems

Paper-Based Voting Systems According to Wikipedia:“A paper-based voting system records votes, counts votes, and produces a tabulation of the vote count from votes cast on paper cards or sheets.”

Includes: Marksense a.k.a. optical scan systems where an individual marks their vote directly on the ballot with a pencil next it is processed by a scanner that electronically records the result. “There have been cases of these scanners malfunctioning and recording the election as a victory for the wrong candidate. In theory the ballot papers can always be counted by hand if a result is disputed. Astonishingly, however, some officials have simply run the same papers through the same machines, so if the machine is faulty in a consistent way the original result will be confirmed (Luntz, 2004, Punchcards and Optical Scanners section,¶ 1).

And . . . Punch card ballot systems Currently being phased out the U.S. as a direct result of problems incurred in the 2002 Presidential election i.e. hanging chads Voters punch holes in their ballots next to the candidate they support, and machines tally the number of holes. The system runs into trouble when the punch fails to fully remove the bit of paper, leaving a "hanging chad". In Florida in 2000 a suspicious number of overcounts and undercounts were observed where voters appeared either to have voted for more than one candidate, or for none at all” (Luntz, 2004, Punchcards and Optical Scanners section,¶ 1).

Electronic Voting Is being introduced in many American states. “Voters turn up to a polling place but, instead of being given a paper ballot, they are given a card or password that allows them to access a computerized system on which they vote” (Luntz, 2004, Electronic and Internet Voting Section, ¶1).

Direct-Recording Electronic Voting System (DRE) According to Wikipedia: “Records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical components that can be activated by the voter.” “Process data by means of a computer program.” “Records voting data and images in memory components” while producing “a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and as printed copy.”

Federal Help America Vote Act Problems in the 2000 election led directly its enactment in October 2002 . . . “A major purpose of HAVA was to provide money for counties that wanted to "upgrade" their voting systems. The total amount approved was $3.9 billion and much of that was for the states to improve their election systems. [average of $80Milper state]” (Thiesen, 2005, A Little Background section, ¶1). “In addition to providing funding for improvements, HAVA mandated some requirements for all voting systems used in federal elections. One of those — the most widely publicized — is the requirement that all jurisdictions provide a method by which disabled individuals can vote unassisted” (Thiesen, 2005, A Little Background section, ¶1).

Advantages of E-Voting Provides a faster method than hand counting for delivering election results Limits cost by limiting need for specially printed ballots Machines can be equipped in ways that allow full accessibility for persons with disabilities Optical scan and marksense voting systems are not fully accessible by the visually impaired and blind Those with limited mobility and strength may have difficultly operating lever machines Machines can be programmed to display ballots in a diversity of languages Especially helpful in counties where demographics require under U.S. federal election law that ballots are available in different languages i.e. King County Washington ballots must be provided in Chinese

Opposition to Electronic Voting: Theoretical Problems . . . According to Rebecca Mercuri a leading expert electoral fraud is the biggest concern . . . "Any programmer can write code that displays one thing on a screen, records something else and prints yet another result." "There is no known way to ensure that this is not happening inside of a voting system," because hackers might get into a particular machine and change the votes recorded. "Electronic balloting and tabulation makes the tasks performed by poll workers, challengers and election officials purely procedural, and removes any opportunity to perform bipartisan checks," Mercuri says. "Any computerized election process is thus entrusted to the small group of individuals who program, construct and maintain the machines." Three companies provide testing services for the machines, but have confidentiality agreements with the manufacturers. This means that they won't reveal their testing methods or whether any machines failed the tests, only that they have approved certain machines.” (Luntz, 2004, Electronic and Internet Voting section, ¶ 1-3).

Opposition to Electronic Voting: Observed Problems . . . Privatization of manufacturers and software code prohibits outside auditors from truly accessing security risks Lack of paper trail on some machines is very concerning . . . Resulting in difficulties in the re-count of votes to verify that the hardware/software involved performed its task correctly. Report published by Harri Hursti in conjunction w/ blackbox.org outlining problems with Diebold’s TSx DRE noted problems from machines being unplugged to internal printers jamming to memory discrepancies (Hurtsi, 2006)

There is a lot to be worked out when it My Opinion There is a lot to be worked out when it comes to e-voting . . . I prefer to vote with paper and pencil All DREs must be equipped with a working voter verified paper trail audit system “Attaching printers to Touchscreen or DRE electronic voting machines, which print paper receipts and store these with the machine. Such designs usually present the receipt to the voter behind a glass screen (known as the "Mercuri method"), so that the voter can verify that the receipt matches the vote” (Wikipedia, 2006) Code must be publicly available for inspection if not open source voting machine software

A surprising statistic . . . A recent ITAA survey showed that 77 percent of registered voters are unconcerned about the security of e-voting systems (Rothke, 2004) Are you concerned with issues of security? How do you feel about electronic voting? To the risks out way the benefits?

Source List Miller, H. (2004, September 13). E-Voting Does Work. Retrieved May 13, 2006, from http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1645028,00.asp Carlson , C. (2004, July 19). Opposition Grows to Paperless Voting . Retrieved May 1, 2006, from http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1624297,00.asp Rothke, B. (2004, August 23). E-Voting: It's Security, Stupid. Retrieved May 15, 2006, from http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1638619,00.asp Hursti, H. (2006, May 22). Diebold TSx Evaluation . Retrieved May 28, 2006, from http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy-supp.pdf Levy, S. (2006, May 29). Should We Trust Electronic Voting? Newsweek. Retrieved May 29, 2006, retrieved from ProQuest database (Document ID: 1040737721). Luntz, S. (2004, October). THE PERILS of ELECTRONIC VOTING. Australian Science, 25(9), 14-18. Retrieved April 21, 2006, from ABI/INFORM Global Database. (Document ID: 655360611). Theisen , E. (2005, June 18). The Privatization of United States Elections . Retrieved May 8, 2006, from http://www.votersunite.org/info/PrivatizationOfElections.pdf Wikipedia (n.d.). Voter Verified Paper Trail . Retrieved March 21, 2006, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter_Verified_Paper_Audit_Trail