Veto Power II Last time: introduction to Veto power Today: bargaining before an audience

2nd Essay assignment Write no more than 3 double-spaced pages (exclusive of title/abstract page and references page) on the following: –Where are the president’s persuasive powers greatest in the legislative process and why? Discuss presidential use of positive agenda powers vis-à-vis different kinds of issues in the legislative process, illustrating your conclusions with some details from a specific legislative initiative from the last four years. Include a one-paragraph (short!) abstract on a separate title page, summarizing your answer 3-paragraph introduction: hook, thesis, roadmap Due in class Nov. 15

Last time: asymmetric veto power Negative agenda power is the ability to reject policy changes. Key questions: –what is reversionary policy? –what do legislators and executives know about each others’ interests? Model 1: single-shot, take-it or leave-it offers. –the setter model –if prez threats are cheap talk, should anyone pay attention? –prez should veto bills that make him worse off than reversionary policy, Congress should try to anticipate and optimize –veto power should be asymmetric

Odysseus and the Sirens Model 2: presidential commitment Hypothesis that president can credibly pre-commit to vetoing a bill, even if signing makes him better off –reduces asymmetry, but not “subgame perfect” in single- shot games –in equilibrium, Congress overrides all vetoes –suppose president and Congress can send signals to the audience: the “Going Public” variant (president has asymmetric ability to prime/frame issues for the public, thereby affecting legislators’ induced preferences)

More veto models Veto bargaining and incomplete info: MCs have to guess what prez would accept –vetoes happen and are not overridden in eq. –but MCs never intend to be vetoed “Blame Game”: bargaining before a moderate audience –assume president wishes to appear more moderate than his true preferences; MCs want him to appear extreme; actions entail audience costs –Cong & Prez know each others’ prefs, but voters don’t –Groseclose and McCarty model prez approval prez taste for voter approval gives Congress leverage to do better than in the standard setter model when reversionary policy is bad, but “favors” the prez