Toyohiro Tsurumaru (Mitsubishi Electric Corporation) Masahito Hayashi (Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University / CQT National University.

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Presentation transcript:

Toyohiro Tsurumaru (Mitsubishi Electric Corporation) Masahito Hayashi (Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University / CQT National University of Singapore) arXiv: Dual universality of hash functions and its applications to classical and quantum cryptography

Outline We introduce the concept of (dual) universal 2 hash function family , and (dual) universal 2 code family –By analogy and as an extension of universal 2 hash functions. ε-almost universal 2 codes are a good classical error correcting code –They achieve the Shannon limit. Extension of hash functions used for QKD –QKD systems using universal hash functions can be shown secure even in Shor-Prekill argument, or in Koashi’s argument. –More generally, ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions can be used. We also show applications to the classical wiretap channel and the classical randomness extraction

(Dual) Universal 2 Hash Functions and (Dual) Universal 2 Codes

Universal 2 Hash Functions A family of functions f r : A → B is ε-almost universal 2 def Weaker condition than the completely random functions . ex : the Toeplitz matrix multiplication ( described later ) Still a sufficient condition for many applications; information theoretically-secure authentication, and PA for QKD ( Carter-Wegman 1979 ) Probability Pr : the uniform distribution over index r “1-almost universal 2 ” is often simply called “universal 2 ”

Universal 2 Code Family Linear codes areε-almost universal 2 def A function family isε-almost universal 2 Considerε-almost universal 2 functions which are linear over F 2 A set of linear functions isε-almost universal 2 … , the kernel Ker f r of a linear map f r Since Ker f r vector subspace V r linear code C r , the universality 2 can be defined for linear codes {C r } r . (TT&MH, arXiv: )

Further , given a code family The Dual Code Family C ⊥ of C is the set of their dual codes where The Universality 2 of Dual Codes ― The Main Theorem ― Our Main Theorem A linear code family C = {C r } r is ε-almost universal 2 The dual code family C ⊥ of C is 2(1-2 t-n e )+( e -1)2 t -almost universal 2

Dual Universality 2 of a Code Family A Code family is universal 2 Linear hash functions are universal 2 def Our Main Theorem The dual code family is 2-almost universal 2 Hash functions are 2-almost universal 2 def Not true in general Code family is 2-almost DUAL universal 2 Hash functions f r are 2-almost DUAL universal 2

Examples of (Dual) Universal 2 Hash Functions A concatenation of Toeplitz matrix X r and the identity I n-t gives a code family which is both universal 2 and dual universal 2 Ex. 2 : modified Toeplitz matrices The multiplication of X r and a vector v yields a universal 2 hash family ⇔ The code family {C r } r having parity check matrices X r is universal 2 ⇒ The dual code family {C r ⊥ } r is 2-almost universal 2 Ex.1 : the Toeplitz matrices ( All diagonals are the same ) (Hayashi PRA 2009, Hayashi arXiv: )

Universal 2 Codes Are Good Error Correcting Codes

ε-Almost Universal 2 Code Family is a Good Classical Error Correcting Code Lemma ( Gallager bound ) For an n -tiple use of (i.i.d.) BSC with crossover probability p, if one uses an ε-almost universal 2 code family {C r ⊂ F 2 n } r of nR dimension, the ML decoding fails with error prob. P e (C r ), where Error correction using an ε-almost universal 2 code family achieves the Shannon limit. The syndrome functions are ε-almost universal 2 functions, with a small collision probability. Errors are mapped to syndromes uniquely.

Extension to the Classical CSS Code Lemma ( Gallager bound ) If one uses an ε-almost universal 2 extended code family {C 2,r } r of C 1 in BSC( p ), the decoding error prob. of phase error correction is Projections are ε-almost universal 2 functions {C 2,r } r is an ε-almost universal 2 extended code family of C 1 is an ε’-almost universal 2 subcode family of C 1 ⊥ The same properties hold for a (fixed) m -dimensional code C 1, and the family of its extended codes (subcodes) {C 2,r } r. Main Theorem def. ( C 1 ⊂ C 2,r ⊂ F 2 n, dimC 2,r = t )

Security of QKD and the Quantum Wiretap Channel

Security of QKD 1.PA using anε-almost DUAL univesal 2 function family 2.PA by projection C 1 → C 1 /C 2,r with anε-almost DUAL univesal 2 code family {C 2,r } r 3.Phase error correction using code family with the syndrome functions ε-almost univesal 2 functions The Holevo informationχ of Eve under collective attacks where nR bits are consumed in PA. The security under coherent attacks can be shown similarly. Gallager bound Equiv. by def. PA using ε-almost dual universal 2 functions ⇒ Good CSS codes for phase error correction Equiv. by def. Instead, becomes ε-almost universal 2

Security of QKD 1.PA using anε-almost DUAL univesal 2 function family 2.PA by projection C 1 → C 1 /C 2,r with anε-almost DUAL univesal 2 code family {C 2,r } r 3.Phase error correction using code family with the syndrome functions ε-almost univesal 2 code family The Holevo informationχ of Eve under collective attacks where nR bits are consumed in PA. The security under coherent attacks can be shown similarly. Gallager bound Equiv. by def. PA using ε-almost dual universal 2 functions ⇒ Good CSS codes for phase error correction Equiv. by def.

Extension of Secure Hash Functions for QKD (and the Quantum Wiretap Channel) Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification using universal 2 hash functions {f r } r Previous Work ( e.g., Renner-König 2004; Hayashi 2009 ) Present Work Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification using an ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions {f r } r. Universal 2 Hash Functions ⊂ ε-Almost Dual Universal 2 Hash Functions A much larger class According to our main theorem,

An ε-almost universal 2 code family that is NOT ε-almost dual universal 2 Given a t -dimensional universal 2 code family C = {C r } r over, one can construct another code family that is a 2-almost universal 2 code family over One cannot attain strong security by performing privacy amplification using is NOT ε-almost dual universal 2. Counterexample of a Secure ε-Almost (Non-Dual) Universal 2 Hash Function Family with ε ≧ 2

Strongly Secure Hash Functions ε-Almost Universal 2 Dual Universal 2 ε-Almost Dual Universal 2 Permutation Code Family Our Counterexample (Codes with the MSB=0) Modified Toeplitz Classes of (Dual) Universal 2 Code Families and the Security of QKD Renner and König 2005 Hayashi 2009 Present Work ?

Applications to Classical Cryptography

Permutation Code Family ∃ C : t dimensional code over F 2 n s.t. the codes obtained by bit-permuting C is an (n+1) -almost universal 2 code family . Lemma Proof : Apply Markov inequality to Another example of ε-almost universal2 codes There exists a fixed (deterministic) code C, such that its bit- permutations generate anε-almost universal 2 code family. Since i.i.d. channels are invariant under bit perm. The fixed code C works asε-almost universal 2 codes.

Classical Wiretap Channel (1/2) Alice, Bob, and Eve are connected by i.i.d. channels. On Alice’s input i , Eve obtains data obeying prob. dist. W i E We simulate this system with a quantum wiretap channel. The mutual information I of Alice and Eve can be bounded: AliceBob Eve i WiEWiE How many secret bits can Alice and Bob extract?

If Eve’s channel is a BSC with crossover probability p, the amount of leaked Information can be measured by fidelity Our Result (deterministic) Previous Results (random) For S : = The sacrifice bit rate of privacy amplification, Classical Wiretap Channel (2/2) S

From an n -bit string obeying a binomial dist. with parameter p. We extract random number A r n by a projection C r : chosen randomly from a t- dimensional ε-almost dual universal code family {C r } r Using the argument of permutation code, we can show the existence of a deterministic and universal protocol Goal: Extracting a uniformly distributed random bits from a partially random bits. ( Classical ) Randomness Extraction (1/2)

( Classical ) Randomness Extraction (2/2) We generate a uniformly distributed random bits from an n -bit string obeying binomial distribution with parameter p Our Result ( deterministic protocol ) Previous work (deterministic protocol) Previous work (probabilistic protocol) Generation Rate R p

Summary We introduce the concept of (dual) universal 2 hash function family , and (dual) universal 2 code family –By analogy and as an extension of universal 2 hash functions. (Dual) universal 2 code is a good classical error correction code –As good as truly random codes (Gallager bound) Extension of hash functions used for QKD –QKD systems using universal hash functions can be shown secure even in Shor-Prekill argument, or in Koashi’s argument. –More generally, ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions can be used. Applications to the classical wiretap channel and the classical randomness extraction –We simulate a classical system by using a quantum system, and analyze it as a quantum wiretap channel. –We show the existence of a deterministic hash function that works universally under variable information leakage.

References 1. R. Renner, “Security of Quantum Key Distribution,” PhD thesis, Dipl. Phys. ETH, Switzerland, 2005; arXiv:quantph/ M. Hayashi, “Upper bounds of eavesdropper’s performances in finite-length code with the decoy method,” Phys. Rev. A 76, (2007); Phys. Rev. A 79, (E) (2009). 3. M. Hayashi, “Exponential decreasing rate of leaked information in universal random privacy amplification,” arXiv: , to be published in IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory. 4.D. R. Stinson, “Universal hashing and authentication codes,” in J. Feigenbaum (Ed.): Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’91, LNCS 576, pp (1992). 5.M. N. Wegman and J. L. Carter, “New Hash Functions and Their Use in Authentication and Set Inequality,” J. Comput. System Sci. 22, pp (1981).