Coalition Governance The Beginning

Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988 M: “Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of voters’ beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be of function of electoral promises and rewards.” M: “Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of voters’ beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be of function of electoral promises and rewards.” NH: Voters in multiparty PR do not condition their voting choices on party performance after the election. NH: Voters in multiparty PR do not condition their voting choices on party performance after the election. P: P: Multistage game Multistage game Terminal node reached by party bargaining Terminal node reached by party bargaining Party influence proportional to legislative seats won in election Party influence proportional to legislative seats won in election Three parties with no entry Three parties with no entry Voters backwards induct and vote on preferences induced by bargaining game solution Voters backwards induct and vote on preferences induced by bargaining game solution Policy outcome is weighted average of party positions in resulting coalition Policy outcome is weighted average of party positions in resulting coalition The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium Voters may cast strategic votes Voters may cast strategic votes

Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988 C: C: If no party wins a majority of seats in the election, the equilibrium outcome will consist of a coalition between the largest and smallest party If no party wins a majority of seats in the election, the equilibrium outcome will consist of a coalition between the largest and smallest party Party positions in the election are two parties symmetrically about the median with third party at the median Party positions in the election are two parties symmetrically about the median with third party at the median Median party gets fewest votes (but is always in the winning coalition) Median party gets fewest votes (but is always in the winning coalition) Pre-voting expectation is the median, but the outcome is a coalition between one off median and one median party, hence with a policy outcome off median Pre-voting expectation is the median, but the outcome is a coalition between one off median and one median party, hence with a policy outcome off median

Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988

Grofman, 1985 M: Downs has been misinterpreted as having a model per chapter rather than a unified theory M: Downs has been misinterpreted as having a model per chapter rather than a unified theory NH: Voters accept policy promises, in spatial models, rather than calculate what parties might actually accomplish in office. NH: Voters accept policy promises, in spatial models, rather than calculate what parties might actually accomplish in office. P: P: Unidimensional spatial model in all respects save one Unidimensional spatial model in all respects save one Parties can only change the status quo part way toward what they (say they) would like to achieve Parties can only change the status quo part way toward what they (say they) would like to achieve

Grofman, 1985 C: Voters may support the farther removed party, for that reason. C: Voters may support the farther removed party, for that reason.

Grofman, 1985