A Deeper Look at the Proportionality – Turnout Nexus by Peter Selb

Turnout: problem (1) Does the electoral system influence turnouts?  Evidence for higher turnout in proportional representation  Consensus in political science

Turnout: problem (2) Why does proportional representation foster turnout?  1. hypothesis: proportional representation means more parties 3→ increased choice for voters → higher incentive to vote  2. hypothesis: majoritarian systems have districts with high expected margins → outcome in the district seems to be clear → less incentive to vote and less incentive for parties to mobilize voters

Turnout: problem (3) First hypothesis has been falsified  empirical evidence for the contrary: more parties decrease turnout Second hypothesis not sufficiently empirical tested yet

Research design (1) Aim of research: empirical testing of 2° hypothesis  Basic considerations: a deeper look into districts Comparison of district turnouts dependent on competition

Research design (2) Main theory:  Pivotal Voter Model Voting causes costs and benefits. Benefits for the voter are higher if his vote makes a bigger difference to the result Empirical difficult to confirm  Pivotal Elites Model Parties have higher incentive to use their limited resources to mobilize voters in district with narrow margins

Research design (3) Operationalization (1):  Competition on average lower in Single Member Districts because it is unpromising to catch up to a clear leading candidate  Competition on average higher in Multi Member Districts because the decisive margin for the marginal seat is lower therefore easier to catch up

Research design (4) Operationalization (2)  Putting together the theory of Pivotal Elites model and the assumption of the last slide: As bigger the margin in a district in majoritarian voting system as lower turnout in this district.

Research design (5) Operationalization (3)  Counterfactual hypothesis: The impact of the margin in a Multi Member District (proportional representation) is significantly lower

Research design (6) Operationalization (4)  Threshold of exclusion boundaries competition in a system:  SMD: maximum possible vote share without winning a seat is 50%  Other districts: less, formula 1/(Seats+1)

Research design (7) Operationalization (5)  Hypothesis: As higher the threshold of exclusion as lower the average turnout and as higher the variation of turnouts over the district

Data (1) CSES Dataset  Provides data also for districts  Available: 3194 electoral districts observed in 31 national elections in 20 countries

Data (2) Available district variables B4001 >>> NUMBER OF SEATS IN DISTRICT B4002 >>> NUMBER OF CANDIDATES IN DISTRICT B4003 >>> NUMBER OF PARTY LISTS IN DISTRICT B4004_A >>> PERCENT VOTE IN DISTRICT - PARTY A B4004_B >>> PERCENT VOTE IN DISTRICT - PARTY B B4004_C >>> PERCENT VOTE IN DISTRICT - PARTY C B4004_D >>> PERCENT VOTE IN DISTRICT - PARTY D B4004_E >>> PERCENT VOTE IN DISTRICT - PARTY E B4004_F >>> PERCENT VOTE IN DISTRICT - PARTY F B4005 >>> TURNOUT IN DISTRICT

Data (3) Data problems (1)  Data only include final results in the districts, the model refers to the expected results in districts.  But: Assuming expected results are on average as final results of the election

Data (4) Data problems (2)  Intervening Variables Compulsory voting seems to balance the effect of the voting system Exclusion from this analysis

Data (5) Empirical model of district turnout  Feeding formulas with empirical dataset data and assumptions.

Findings 1. Threshold of exclusion decreases average turnout in districts and increases the turnout variance in the districts 2. Low district margins lead significantly to higher turnouts in the districts

Paper criticism Clear research paper: clear research question, clear hypothesis, why operationalization with two measurements? Big effort for a comparable banal result?