Newall: Philosophy of Mind I.Mind and body are the same (monism) a)Physicalism: physical objects or processes (e.g., neural firings) are “tokens” (examples) of “types” of things (minds or mental events) i.Reductive physicalism: minds/mental events are reducible to physical objects/events ii.Non-reductive physicalism: minds/mental events “supervene on” physical objects and events: that is, they depend on, but are not reducible to, physical objects and processes

More Monistic Theories of Mind b)Mind-Brain (Identity) Theory: mental states are simply brain states Objection: brain states and introspective qualia (experiences) have different characteristics c)Functionalism: mental states are associations or linkages of sensory stimuli and behaviors d)Eliminative Materialism: we should replace terms like “thought” with materialist expressions e)Idealism: physical objects/processes are really only mental events or objects of mind

Dualistic Theories of Mind a)Predicate Dualism: the mental and physical are said to be different kinds of things b)Property Dualism: the mental and physical are different characteristics of things c)Substance Dualism: the mental and physical are simply different kinds of real things The major problem with dualism (viz., interaction) concerns how the physical and mental can affect or relate to one another

Attempted Solutions to the Challenge of Dualistic Interactionism Epiphenomenalism: bodies can influence minds, but minds cannot influence bodies Objections: why can’t minds influence bodies? Why have the mental at all? Occasionalism: God’s intervention accounts for the interaction Parallelism: apparent interaction is due to a pre-established harmony between the physical and mental N. Malebranche G. W. Leibniz