“Political Liberalization, Energy Production, and Labor Flows in the Global South” David H. Bearce University of Pittsburgh University of Colorado, Boulder and Jennifer Laks University of Pittsburgh

Research Questions Do international labor flows influence domestic political regime type, both in the countries that import labor and in the countries that export it? Why does labor move across the Global South, where there remains interesting variation in terms of domestic political regime type?

Why does labor move across the Global South? Start with stylized fact from Rogowski 1989: All Global South economies scarce in terms of capital. But they may be abundant either labor or land. Land includes all natural resources, especially those related to energy. There are thus two primary types of Global South national economies 1. Low land/labor ratio (e.g. Philippines and Pakistan) 2. High land/labor ratio (e.g. Saudi Arabia and UAE) Hypothesis: labor will move from the low land/labor ratio countries into the countries with a high land/labor ratio.

Testing the Immigration Hypothesis Sample is Global South country/year (i.e. no advanced industrial democracies). Dependent Variable is Net Immigration per capita (measured every 5 years). Independent Variables are Energy Production per capita and Land Area per capita. Immigration hypothesis expects both to take on positive coefficients. Controls include National Income (GDP), Economic Development (GDPpc), Trade Openness, Political Liberties, and Fixed Effects.

Dependent VariableNet Immigration per capita Net Immigration per capita Net Immigration per capita Net Immigration per capita Energy Production per capita 2.22** (0.92) 1.93*** (0.72) 2.00*** (0.76) 1.31** (0.54) Land Area per capita 0.04* (0.02) 0.04* (0.02) 0.11* (0.06) 0.11** (0.05) Year Fixed EffectsYes Country Fixed EffectsNo Yes N R NoteIncludes interpolated values Models of Net Immigration

Do international labor flows influence political regime type? Start with stylized factoral model of an autocratic political system Small Winning coalition (W) includes capital and land owners Large Losing (L) coalition includes labor Argument assumes that there is some external pressure on Global South autocracies to liberalize politically. They can thus either resist (i.e. no or negative political liberalization) or acquiesce (i.e. positive political liberalization). WL WL

WL WL emigration WLWL WLWL immigration International Labor Flows and the Size of the Losing Coalition. How will this affect political liberalization in terms of voting rights and civil liberties?

Voting Rights With smaller losing coalition, it becomes less risky to extend voting rights. Thus, emigration may facilitate political liberalization. With a larger losing coalition, it becomes more risky to extend voting rights. Thus, immigration may hinder political liberalization.

Civil Liberties Freedom of movement, association, and speech all make it easier for the losing coalition to organize a revolution. Thus, a larger losing coalition may make it more risky for the government to extend civil liberties. Conversely, a smaller losing coalition may make it easier for the government to extend civil liberties.

Hypothesis and Model of Political Liberalization Hypothesis: greater net immigration per capita should be associated with less political liberalization Dependent Variable – Change in Freedom House (or Polity) over the last 5 years Independent Variable – Net Immigration per capita lagged 5 years Political liberalization hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient. Controls include prior level of Democracy, GDP, GDPpc, Trade Openness, IGOs, Islam, Year Fixed Effects.

1234 Dependent Variable Measured using: Freedom House Polity Prior level of Democracy0.79*** (0.03) 0.76*** (0.02) 0.76*** (0.03) 0.75*** (0.03) Net Immigration per capita -2.50* (1.48) -3.46** (1.52) -6.19** (2.85) -8.55*** (2.72) N R NoteIncludes interpolated values OLS Models of Political Liberalization

123 Lagged Dependent Variable 0.77*** (0.03) 0.77*** (0.03) 0.77*** (0.03) Net Immigration per capita -5.71** (2.86) -5.76** (2.96) Industrial Value Added per capita *** ( ) Economic Growth (0.017) 1 st stage F10.6 N R20.69 Note Industrial Value Added per capita used as an instrument for Net Immigration per capita. Reduced Form Model. Testing Possible Exclusion Restriction Violation. Models of Political Liberalization using an Instrumental Variable

Implications 1.If energy resources/production attract internationally mobile labor and immigration hinders political liberalization, then we have an alternative explanation for the resource curse. 2. We may also have an alternative explanation for what appears to be a regional diffusion of democracy. National economies in a given region tend to be similar in terms of land and labor endowments. Thus, they should also be similar in terms of immigration and emigration patterns, which would produce a regional clustering in terms of political regime type.