Interlocks for Magnet Protection System1 Beam dumps 4 th 11h33 and 5 th 03.01 Both beam dumps caused by a stop of a Powering Interlock PLC,

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Presentation transcript:

Interlocks for Magnet Protection System1 Beam dumps 4 th 11h33 and 5 th Both beam dumps caused by a stop of a Powering Interlock PLC, located (together with 2 others) in UJ56 / UJ14 PLCs in question are interlocking circuits in matching section LR5 and XL1 PLC stoppage lead to loss of communication with remote I/O units in RR57/UJ14 and consequently initiated Fast Aborts in all protected circuits and the beam dump Identical failure signature observed previously, pointing to an internal memory corruption (but core dump was empty for 1 st event, 2 nd event to be analysed) Dump was correctly executed and clean

Interlocks for Magnet Protection System2 Architecture and Location of Interlock Components Profibus 36 PLCs in ‘non-radiation’ area Remote I/O close to clients 120 x ANYBUS + 36 x XC95144 Ethernet Technical Network PVSS server in CCR IR1IR2IR3IR4IR5IR6IR7IR8 UJ14UA43UJ56UA63UA23UJ33 UA47USC55UA67 TZ76UA83 UA27 UA87UJ16 IR1IR2IR3IR4IR5IR6IR7IR8 RR13UA43 UJ56 UA63UA23UJ33 UA47 USC55 UA67 RR73UA83 UA27 UA87 UJ14 RR53 RR57 RR77 UJ16 RR17

Interlocks for Magnet Protection System3 Are these Radiation Induced Failures (SEUs)? 4 identical events on 4 different PLCs observed in areas of higher radiation Memory corruption is a typical radiation effect, but no hard proof (from core dumps) Failure recoverable through (remote) power cycle, but… Similar failures have been observed in the lab (EN/ICE) + first two events with NO or very little beam Conclusions: Today's events could be radiation induced, but (would) need more statistics For all 9 PLCs in UJ14/UJ16/UJ56 relocation to US152 and USC55 is already prepared (i.e. extension cables pulled), start relocation already during next TS Event TimestampModeFill #Energy Int B1/B2 [1e10] Operator Comment 11-AUG ADJUST /5 Asynchronous dump test at 3.5 TeV 03-MAR ACCESS152900/0 Lost PLC 1 hour after beam dump! 04-AUG SB /16382 Lost comm with PIC PLC in UJ56 05-AUG SB /16582 Lost comm with PIC PLC in UJ14