Sheng-Liang Song ssl@cisco.com IPSec Access control Connectionless integrity Data origin authentication Rejection of replayed packets Confidentiality Sheng-Liang Song ssl@cisco.com
Sheng-Liang Song ssl@cisco.com IPSec Complexity Security worst “enemy” “best practice” Sheng-Liang Song ssl@cisco.com
Agenda IPSec Overview IPSec Discussion Q&A IPSec (Network Layer) Modes (Tunnel/Transport) Protocols (ESP/AH) IKE (Internet Key Exchange) IPSec Cases IPSec Discussion Q&A
Key Words ISAKMP (Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol) SA (Security Associations) SPD (Security Policy Database) IKE (Internet Key Exchange) AH (Authentication Header) ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) HMAC (Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication) H(K XOR opad_5C, H(K XOR ipad_36, text))
IPSec (Network Layer) lives at the network layer transparent to applications application transport network link physical User SSL OS IPSec NIC
IPv4 Header Format Mutable, predictable, Immutable
IPv6 Header Format
IPSec Modes (Tunnel and Transport) Transport Mode Tunnel Mode Transport Mode IP header data IP header ESP/AH data Tunnel Mode IP header data new IP hdr ESP/AH IP header data
IPSec Protocols (ESP and AH) ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) Integrity and confidentiality (HMAC/DES-CBC) Integrity only by using NULL encryption AH (Authentication Header) Integrity only IP HDR Data IPSec Tunnel Original IP Layer encrypted IPSec Encrypted session IPSec Authenticated session AH HDR ESP HDR New IP HDR
AH Format The sender's counter is initialized to 0 when an SA is established.
AH/Transport
AH/Transport
ESP Format The sender's counter is initialized to 0 when an SA is established.
ESP/Transport
ESP/Tunnel
IPSec Tunnels Original IP Packet Classified IP packet IPSec packet IP header TOS IP Payload IP header IP Payload Classified IP packet Set TOS TOS Original IP Packet TOS copy TOS IP new hdr New IP header built by tunnel entry point TOS byte is copied IP new hdr ESP header IPSec packet IP IP Payload TOS
Anti-Replay in IPSec Both ESP and AH have an anti-reply mechanism based on sequence numbers sender increment the sequence number after each transmission receiver optionally checks the sequence number and rejects if it is out of window
How IPSec uses IKE
IPSec and IKE in Practice Sets up a keying channel Sets up data channels Internal Network Certificate Authority Digital Certificate ISAKMP Session Digital Certificate SA Authenticated Encrypted Tunnel ISAKMP (Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol) SA (Security Associations) SPD (Security Policy Database) Discard,bypass IPsec, apply IPSec (Overhead) Clear Text Internal Network Encrypted
IPSec (IKE1 Phase1) Authenticated with Signatures Authenticated with Shared key Authenticated with Public Key Encryption Authenticated with Public Key Encryption (Revised)
IPSec (Cases)
IPSec Case1
IPSec Case2
IPSec Case3
IPSec Case4
Q & A IPSec Discussion IPSec authenticates machines, not users Does not stop denial of service attacks Easier to do DoS Order of operations: Encryption/Authentication Q & A L2,L3,L4 Parsing Header(IP,TCP,UDP) checking Packet action classifying Probabilistic content matching
Reference Information Security: Principles and Practice, Mark Stamp, Jan 29,2005 http://www.ietf.org/ Cisco IOS IPsec www.cisco.com/go/ipsec/ Cisco White Paper, IPsec, http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/so/neso/sqso/eqso/ipsec_wp.htm N. Ferguson and B. Schneier, A Cryptographic Evaluation of IPsec, http://www.schneier.com/paper-ipsec.html IPsec, Security for the Internet Protocol, http://www.freeswan.org/freeswan_trees/freeswan-2.06/doc/intro.html