CS 345 Data Mining Online algorithms Search advertising.

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Presentation transcript:

CS 345 Data Mining Online algorithms Search advertising

Online algorithms  Classic model of algorithms You get to see the entire input, then compute some function of it In this context, “offline algorithm”  Online algorithm You get to see the input one piece at a time, and need to make irrevocable decisions along the way  How is this different from the data stream model?

Example: Bipartite matching a b c d GirlsBoys

Example: Bipartite matching a b c d M = {(1,a),(2,b),(3,d)} is a matching Cardinality of matching = |M| = 3 GirlsBoys

Example: Bipartite matching a b c d GirlsBoys M = {(1,c),(2,b),(3,d),(4,a)} is a perfect matching

Matching Algorithm  Problem: Find a maximum-cardinality matching A perfect one if it exists  There is a polynomial-time offline algorithm (Hopcroft and Karp 1973)  But what if we don’t have the entire graph upfront?

Online problem  Initially, we are given the set Boys  In each round, one girl’s choices are revealed  At that time, we have to decide to either: Pair the girl with a boy Don’t pair the girl with any boy  Example of application: assigning tasks to servers

Online problem a b c d (1,a) (2,b) (3,d)

Greedy algorithm  Pair the new girl with any eligible boy If there is none, don’t pair girl  How good is the algorithm?

Competitive Ratio  For input I, suppose greedy produces matching M greedy while an optimal matching is M opt Competitive ratio = min all possible inputs I (|M greedy |/|M opt |)

Analyzing the greedy algorithm  Consider the set G of girls matched in M opt but not in M greedy  Then it must be the case that every boy adjacent to girls in G is already matched in M greedy  There must be at least |G| such boys Otherwise the optimal algorithm could not have matched all the G girls  Therefore |M greedy | ¸ |G| = |M opt - M greedy | |M greedy |/|M opt | ¸ 1/2

Worst-case scenario a b c (1,a) (2,b) d

History of web advertising  Banner ads ( ) Initial form of web advertising Popular websites charged X$ for every 1000 “impressions” of ad  Called “CPM” rate  Modeled similar to TV, magazine ads Untargeted to demographically tageted Low clickthrough rates  low ROI for advertisers

Performance-based advertising  Introduced by Overture around 2000 Advertisers “bid” on search keywords When someone searches for that keyword, the highest bidder’s ad is shown Advertiser is charged only if the ad is clicked on  Similar model adopted by Google with some changes around 2002 Called “Adwords”

Ads vs. search results

Web 2.0  Search advertising is the revenue model Multi-billion-dollar industry Advertisers pay for clicks on their ads  Interesting problems What ads to show for a search? If I’m an advertiser, which search terms should I bid on and how much to bid?

Adwords problem  A stream of queries arrives at the search engine q1, q2,…  Several advertisers bid on each query  When query q i arrives, search engine must pick a subset of advertisers whose ads are shown  Goal: maximize search engine’s revenues  Clearly we need an online algorithm!

Greedy algorithm  Simplest algorithm is greedy  It’s easy to see that the greedy algorithm is actually optimal!

Complications (1)  Each ad has a different likelihood of being clicked Advertiser 1 bids $2, click probability = 0.1 Advertiser 2 bids $1, click probability = 0.5 Clickthrough rate measured historically  Simple solution Instead of raw bids, use the “expected revenue per click”

Complications (2)  Each advertiser has a limited budget Search engine guarantees that the advertiser will not be charged more than their daily budget

Simplified model  Assume all bids are 0 or 1  Each advertiser has the same budget B  Let’s try the greedy algorithm Arbitrarily pick an eligible advertiser for each keyword

Bad scenario for greedy  Two advertisers A and B  A bids on query x, B bids on x and y  Both have budgets of $4  Query stream: xxxxyyyy Worst case greedy choice: BBBB____ Optimal: AAAABBBB Competitive ratio = ½  Simple analysis shows this is the worst case

BALANCE algorithm [MSVV]  [Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani, and Vazirani]  For each query, pick the advertiser with the largest unspent budget Break ties arbitrarily

Example: BALANCE  Two advertisers A and B  A bids on query x, B bids on x and y  Both have budgets of $4  Query stream: xxxxyyyy  BALANCE choice: ABABBB__ Optimal: AAAABBBB  Competitive ratio = ¾

Analyzing BALANCE  Consider simple case: two advertisers, A 1 and A 2, each with budget B (assume B À 1)  Assume optimal solution exhausts both advertisers’ budgets

Analyzing Balance A1A1 A2A2 B A1A1 A2A2 Unallocated x y B A1A1 A2A2 x Opt revenue = 2B Balance revenue = 2B-x = B+y We have y ¸ x Balance revenue is minimum for x=y=B/2 Minimum Balance revenue = 3B/2 Competitive Ratio = 3/4

General Result  In the general case, worst competitive ratio of BALANCE is 1–1/e = approx  Interestingly, no online algorithm has a better competitive ratio  Won’t go through the details here, but let’s see the worst case that gives this ratio

Worst case for BALANCE  N advertisers, each with budget B À N À 1  NB queries appear in N rounds of B queries each  Round 1 queries: bidders A 1, A 2, …, A N  Round 2 queries: bidders A 2, A 3, …, A N  Round i queries: bidders A i, …, A N  Optimum allocation: allocate round i queries to A i Optimum revenue NB

BALANCE allocation … A1A1 A2A2 A3A3 A N-1 ANAN B/N B/(N-1) B/(N-2) The sum of the allocations to a bin k is given by: S k = min(B,  1 · 1 · k B/(N-i+1))

BALANCE analysis B/1 B/2 B/3 B/4 … B/k … B/(N-1) B/N A1A1 A2A2 A n-k+1

BALANCE analysis  Fact: H n =  1 · i · n 1/i = approx. log(n) for large n Result due to Euler  So if H k = log(N)-1, k=N/e 1/1 1/2 1/3 1/4 … 1/k … 1/(N-1) 1/N log(N) 1 log(N)-1

BALANCE analysis  So after the first N(1-1/e) rounds, we cannot allocate a query to any advertiser  Revenue = BN(1-1/e)  Competitive ratio = 1-1/e

General version of problem  MSVV also provides an algorithm for the general case with arbitrary bids Same competitive ratio

Sidebar: What’s in a name?  Geico sued Google, contending that it owned the trademark “Geico” Thus, ads for the keyword geico couldn’t be sold to others  Court Ruling: search engines can sell keywords including trademarks  No court ruling yet: whether the ad itself can use the trademarked word(s)