MILITARY AND POLICE IN COLOMBIA 3/31/2010

Military Spending in Colombia 2010 National Budget  27.3% Debt Service  19.9% Social Protection  14.2% Defense and Security  13.9% Education  7.0% Housing  3.9% Interior and Justice  2.8% Transportation  2.3%Action and Social Aid  1.7% Environment and Development  1.6% Mines and Energy

The Colombian Military: Function Threats to State Sovereignty and Security  The government lacks a monopoly on power and violence within its territory, esp. in the interior  Insurgency  Narco-State Crime  Homicides (2008): 16,140 (33/100,000 inhabitants)  Kidnapping (2008): 437 (total +/-1,500 held in 2009) Threats to Human Security:  Between 3 and 5 million Internally Displaced Persons (6% to 10% of the total population)  Poverty 46%  Unemployment 12%

National Police  Armed force under the Ministry of Defense  Personnel: 143,557 (2008) Armed Forces  Army: 230,373  Navy: 28,796  Airforce: 8,227

The Colombian Military: Corruption  Inflating Military Success  29 Oct 2008: 3 Generals and 24 other officers were fired and face criminal murder charges for their involvement in a scheme to murder poor, unemployed young men and pass them off as guerrillas killed in combat with the army  Complicity with Right-Wing Paramilitaries  Organizational support  Deliberately fail to take action to prevent abuses or massacres  Participation in abuses or massacres  Complicity with Left-Wing Guerrillas and Drug Cartels  Deliberately fail to take action to prevent abuses  Information sharing  Human Rights Abuses  The military is responsible for over 300 "extrajudicial executions” each year.  Oct 2008: Police opened fire on thousands of Indian marchers demanding land, killing two protesters.

Paramilitary Actors in Colombia  Other Military-Like Organizations  Paramilitary Police: Colombian National Police; Personnel: 143,557  Paramilitary Groups; Personnel: 129,000 Groups: Leftist Guerrillas: FARC-EP, ELN Right-Wing Paramilitary: AUC Drug Cartels: Medellin, Cali  Private Security Companies CONVIVIR: a self-defense and intelligence gathering group; when Congress restricted their operations in 1997 they reorganized as the illegal AUC US companies are contracted to carry out counternarcotics activities and support activities in Colombia. DynCopr Petroleum companies hire private security to protect pipelines and other infrastructure (the military and paramilitaries also play a role here)

Timeline: Colombia  2002: Uribe elected President  2004: Ammendment to the Constitution allows Uribe to run for a second consecutive term  2005: Justice and Peace Law  2006: Uribe reelected

Timeline: Colombia  2008:  Extradition of 14 right-wing paramilitary leaders to the US on drug charges  Three of FARC's seven-man secretariat are killed Raul Reyes is killed by a Colombian bombing raid on his camp in Ecuador Ivan Rios is killed by his bodyguard leader Mr Marulanda dies of a heart attack  Betancourt and 14 other hostages are rescued  2009:  Illegal phone and eavesdropping by the Administrative Security Department (DAS)  Signes bases agreement with U.S.  2010 Constitutional Court rejects a re-election law that would have allowed Uribe to run for a 3 rd term

Demilitarization v. Armed Confrontation Demilitarization  Weakens the military’s ability to intervene in politics  History of failure  Risks legitimizing paramilitary activity  Progress:  The AUC reached agreement with the government in 2003 (implementation in 2005) to demobilize. By ,000 paramilitaries had demobilized and the AUC as a formal organization ceased 92% are covered by an amnesty declared by presidential decree The remaining 8% come under the Justice and Peace Act and are eligible for reduced penalties and sentences  There have been four major peace processes involving the guerrilla groups, all of which have failed.

Demilitarization v. Armed Confrontation Armed Confrontation:  Augments military power in all arenas  Risks intensifying conflict and triggering side-conflicts  Risks increasing military corruption  Achieving total victory is unlikely and impractical