IP and Anticompetitive Conduct Intro to IP – Prof. Merges 4.28.09.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Why competition law? Economic performance Social welfare Well being of consumers.
Advertisements

Monopolies and Antitrust Laws
Slide 0 Refusals To License IP Jonathan I. Gleklen Partner Arnold & Porter The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent.
© 2011 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Legal Background.
Chapter 46 Antitrust Law Copyright © 2009 South-Western Legal Studies in Business, a part of South-Western Cengage Learning. Jentz Miller Cross BUSINESS.
Copyright © 2004 by Prentice-Hall. All rights reserved. PowerPoint Slides to Accompany BUSINESS LAW E-Commerce and Digital Law International Law and Ethics.
© 2004 West Legal Studies in Business A Division of Thomson Learning 1 Chapter 46 Antitrust Law Chapter 46 Antitrust Law.
Slides developed by Les Wiletzky Wiletzky and Associates Copyright © 2006 by Pearson Prentice-Hall. All rights reserved. Antitrust Law.
1 COPYRIGHT © 2007 West Legal Studies in Business, a part of The Thomson Corporation. Thomson, the Star logo, and West Legal Studies in Business are trademarks.
US Antitrust Limitations on Patent Licensing Bruce D. Sunstein Bromberg & Sunstein LLP Boston © 2008 Bromberg & Sunstein LLP.
Antitrust Counterclaims: The Basics Daniel M. Wall San Francisco
Antitrust Does Google have monopoly power? Microsoft? On what? Why? Why Not? Is that bad? Why? Can you name monopolies in other industries? Is Monopoly.
1 Abuse of Monopoly Power (or Dominant Position) Moscow, July 9, 2010 Douglas H. Ginsburg.
© 2007 by West Legal Studies in Business / A Division of Thomson Learning CHAPTER 20 Promoting Competition.
Patents Copyright © Jeffrey Pittman. Pittman - Cyberlaw & E- Commerce 2 Legal Framework of Patents The U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8:
Prosecution Delay Laches and Antitrust Prof Merges 4/29/08.
Georgetown University. The Efficiency Properties of Competitive Markets Q $/q S D MC ATC P P=MC Allocative efficiency P=minAC Productive efficiency IndustryFirm.
Monopoly Monopoly and perfect competition. Profit maximization by a monopolist. Inefficiency of a monopoly. Why do monopolies occur? Natural Monopolies.
Miller Cross 4 th Ed. © 2005 by West Legal Studies in Business / A Division of Thomson Learning Chapter 22 Promoting Competition.
Chapter 47 Antitrust Law McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2012 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Antitrust Kim C. Stanger Compliance Bootcamp (5/15)
January 28, AIPLA Conference January 2004 New Defensive Tools For Japanese Patent Litigation Yoshikazu Iwase Anderson.
1 The common law Sherman Act (1890) Clayton Act (1914) § 1 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty Every contract,
Antitrust Policy and Regulation ECO 2023 Chapter 18 Fall 2007.
Types of Cases Government Criminal Case Government Civil Case Private Civil Case W/jury Punishment (jail) Damages (money) Damages (money) W/judge only.
Antitrust Purpose Protect “perfect competition” Sherman Act Historical context (oil, steel, railroads) Section Differences §1 = concerted actions that.
Antitrust. “Is there not a causal connection between the development of these huge, indomitable trusts and the horrible crimes now under investigation?
Misuse and Exhaustion Intro to IP – Prof Merges
© 2008 West Legal Studies in Business A Division of Thomson Learning 1 BUSINESS LAW TODAY Essentials 8 th Ed. Roger LeRoy Miller - Institute for University.
 “Market power” is the power of company to control the market for its product.  The law does allow for market monopolies when a patent is issued. During.
5Jul99 1 of 34 IEEE Patent Policy Presented to IEEE802 Montreal, QC, Canada July 5, 1999 Thomas C. Wettach, Cohen & Grigsby 15th Floor,11 Stanwix Street,
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Antitrust Basics Lesson III: Intellectual Property November 8, 2006 Sean P. Gates Federal Trade Commission.
About the Amendment of the Patent Law of China Yin Xintian WAN HUI DA Law Firm & Intellectual Property Agency 17 April 2013.
United States v. Glaxo Ltd Neil Chang UC Berkeley Bioengineering IEOR 190G Fall 2008.
Judge Sarah S. Vance, Eastern District of Louisiana Establishing Damages Under U.S. Antitrust Law.
Law Antitrust - Instructor: Dwight Drake Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde (Sup. Ct. 1984) Basic Facts: Exclusive contract between hospital.
Chapter 20 Antitrust and Regulation of Competition Copyright © 2015 McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. No reproduction or distribution without.
Constantine & Partners 1 Constantine Cannon 1 C C An Overview of the Antitrust/IP Intersect By Jeffrey I. Shinder Partner, Constantine Cannon New York.
© 2013 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license.
What is a monopoly? What is market power? How do these concepts relate to each other? What is a monopoly? What is market power? How do these concepts.
Law in the Global Marketplace: Intellectual Property and Related Issues Hosted by: Update on U.S. Patent Legislation.
 Federal gov may regulate business for any reason as long as advances gov economic need  States may regulate business as long as the laws do not interfere.
Chapter 46 Antitrust Laws and Unfair Trade Practices
Business Law and the Regulation of Business Chapter 43: Antitrust By Richard A. Mann & Barry S. Roberts.
Chapter 23 Antitrust Law and Unfair Trade Practices.
Warm Up 2/2 Define the following terms: Corporation Board of Directors Dividends Stock.
Defenses & Counterclaims III Class Notes: March 27, 2003 Law 677 | Patent Law | Spring 2003 Professor Wagner.
© 2005 West Legal Studies in Business, a division of Thompson Learning. All Rights Reserved.1 PowerPoint Slides to Accompany The Legal, Ethical, and International.
© 2004 West Legal Studies in Business A Division of Thomson Learning 1 Chapter 26 Antitrust and Monopoly.
Copyright © 2008 by West Legal Studies in Business A Division of Thomson Learning Chapter 5 Government Regulation of Competition and Prices Twomey Jennings.
© 2004 West Legal Studies in Business, a Division of Thomson Learning 20.1 Chapter 20 Antitrust Law.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Chapter 8: Pure Monopoly Copyright © 2010 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
49-1 Copyright © 2013 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
CHAPTER 42: ANTITRUST LAW
Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement: Halo v. Pulse
Chapter 37 Antitrust Law.
Chapter 22 Promoting Competition.
Chapter 27: Antitrust and Monopoly
CHAPTER 38 Antitrust.
PowerPoint Slides to Accompany ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS AND ONLINE COMMERCE LAW 1st Edition by Henry R. Cheeseman Chapter 21 Antitrust Law Slides developed.
What is the Sherman Anti-Trust Act?
Customized by Professor Ludlum December 1, 2016
Monopolies and Antitrust Laws
Dr. Rajesh Kumar Lecture-1
US Antitrust Limitations on Patent Licensing
Essentials of the legal environment today, 5e
Antitrust Law and Unfair Trade Practices
Unilateral Conduct: Section 2 Sherman Act and Beyond
Enforcing Competition: the United States Antitrust Laws
Presentation transcript:

IP and Anticompetitive Conduct Intro to IP – Prof. Merges

Agenda Brief overview of antitrust principles Relationship to IP Law Walker Process; Brunswick Corp.; Data General

Defenses: Antitrust/Misuse Patents confer market power Market power can be abused When it has been, this may provide a defense for an infringer

Antitrust/Misuse Centers on how the patentee deploys the technology Numerous potential ways to abuse the market power conferred by a patent

Examples Use of patents to mask or hide a cartel – “Horizontal” abuse Use of patents to exert control over dealers or customers – “Vertical” abuse

Sherman Act: Section One 15 U.S.C. § 1 Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

Sherman Act: Section Two 15 U.S.C. § 2 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.

The Clayton Act (1914) extended the right to sue under the antitrust laws to "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." Under the Clayton Act, private parties may sue in U.S. district court and should they prevail, they may be awarded treble damages and the cost of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees. Clayton Act: 15 USC sec. 15

IP and Antritrust IP Rights give the power to exclude from a market – Colloquially: a “monopoly” Antitrust law polices monopolies

Strategic use of antitrust in IP litigation The power of a counterclaim Drive settlement, create a counter-risk for the plaintiff

Misuse/Antitrust Counterclaim Plaintiff/Patentee Defendant

Misuse/Antitrust Counterclaim Plaintiff/Patentee Defendant Counterclaim

Misuse/Antitrust Counterclaim Plaintiff/Patentee Defendant Licensing Agreement

Misuse/Antitrust Counterclaim Plaintiff/Patentee Defendant Licensing Agreement Defendant asserts patent is unenforceable due to anticompetitive licensing agreement

Typical Counterclaims Anticompetitive acquisition of patent – Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery Chemical Corp., 382 U. S. 172 (1965); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc. 743 F. 2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984) Illegal tie-in – Morton Salt

Illinois Tool, 547 U.S. 28 (2006) Trident, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Illinois Tool Works, is a manufacturer of printheads and owns U.S. Patent No. 5,343,226 covering the technology. The ‘226 patent discloses an ink jet device and a supply system with a hand actuated peristaltic pump. Trident also manufactures ink for use with the patented printheads. Although the ink is not protected by any of Trident’s patents, their standard license agreements grant the right to “manufacture, use and sell… ink jet printing devices…” to other printer manufacturers ONLY “when used in combination with ink and ink supply systems supplied by Trident.”

Illinois Tool The Supreme Court eliminated the presumption that a patent provides market power in a licensing agreement involving a tie-in The Court has signaled a willingness to revisit old precedent originating in the anti-patent era of the 1930s and 1940s when Congress and scholarly opinion had turned decisively against it

Walker Process Food Machinery Corp. sued Walker Process for patent infringement Patent invalidated: prior public use (more than 1 year prior to filing by FM) Defendant asserts WP knew patent was invalid and obtained and asserted it anyway

“It must be remembered that we deal only with a special class of patents, i.e., those procured by intentional fraud.” -- p If fraud is found, must still evaluate antitrust claim on the merits: relevant market, monopolistic effect of patent – p. 1129

Facts: Grew out of patent interference (not long gestation) Brunswick accused Riegel of fraudulently acquiring the patent Brunswick v. Riegel

Posner’s 3 conditions 1.Patent must dominate actual mkt 2.Invention must not be patentable NB: Posner’s comments here: A/T law only! 1.“Colorable validity” – e.g., enforcement actions

Condition 2 Theft of a valid patent creates no antitrust liability Maybe not here, but... See Note 3

Data General Computer system service industry Claim: refusal by DG to license ADEX, diagnostic s/w package

Unilateral refusal to deal Refusal to license, maintains market power position Aspen Skiing: essential facilities doctrine “Presumptively valid” to enforce copyright When can you overcome presumption?