Communication Networks A Second Course Jean Walrand Department of EECS University of California at Berkeley

Strategic Transport Users Motivation Social Strategic Nash Equilibrium Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Price of Anarchy Network Case R. Johari and J. Tsitsiklis, “Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game.”

Motivation The transport protocol regulates the sharing of links If users cheat, they can get more bandwidth If all users cheat, the social welfare goes down The question is whether the effect is important or negligible The answer is that, although the effect is bounded, it may still be significant The type of question and technique is more generally applicable

dRdR C = 1 d1d1 didi Social

Strategic dRdR C = 1 d1d1 didi

Nash Equilibrium

Example 1

½  U = ½ ½  U = ¼ Example 2

Example 3

Price of Anarchy

Price of Anarchy (continued)

Network Case

Network Case (continued)