Online Matching for Internet Auctions DIMACS REU Presentation 20 June 2006 Slide 1 Online Matching for Internet Auctions Ben Sowell Advisor: S. Muthukrishnan.

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Presentation transcript:

Online Matching for Internet Auctions DIMACS REU Presentation 20 June 2006 Slide 1 Online Matching for Internet Auctions Ben Sowell Advisor: S. Muthukrishnan Co-Advisor: Graham Cormode 20 June 2006

Online Matching for Internet Auctions DIMACS REU Presentation 20 June 2006 Slide 2 Internet Auctions Every time a search query is entered, an automated auction is run to determine which ads are displayed. Each advertiser specifies a daily budget and some number of bids. The goal is to maximize revenue without exceeding any advertiser’s budget. Ads from

Online Matching for Internet Auctions DIMACS REU Presentation 20 June 2006 Slide 3 Online Bipartite Graph Matching Given one query at a time, can we decide which advertiser to match it to? Evaluated using the competitive ratio, which is the worst case ratio between the online algorithm and the optimal solution. Given all of the queries, can we find a matching that optimizes revenue? This problem NP-hard. The best we can do in general is where n is the number of bidders and k is the number of queries Online ProblemOffline Problem (Andelman and Mansour, 2004)

Online Matching for Internet Auctions DIMACS REU Presentation 20 June 2006 Slide 4 The Algorithm Mehta et. al. describe an online algorithm that gives a competitive ratio of Define the tradeoff function Assign each query to the bidder that maximizes where is ’s bid, and is the fraction of ’s budget spent so far. Easily modifiable to incorporate a variety of auction techniques.

Online Matching for Internet Auctions DIMACS REU Presentation 20 June 2006 Slide 5 What’s Next Use LP rounding to approximate the solution to the offline problem and estimate the competitive ratio. Consider special cases (e.g when each advertiser bids on many queries) and see if we can do better than Develop effective heuristics, even if we can’t prove the results.

Online Matching for Internet Auctions DIMACS REU Presentation 20 June 2006 Slide 6 References N. Andelman and Y. Mansour. Auctions with budget constraints. In 9th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory (SWAT), pages , Bala Kalyansundaram and Kirk R. Pruhs. An optimal deterministic algorithm for online b-matching. Theoretical Computer Science, 233(1-2): , R.M. Karp, U.V. Vazirani, and V.V. Vazirani. An optimal algorithm for online bipartite matching. In Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, A. Mehta, A. Saberi, U. Vazirani, and V. Vazirani. Adwords and generalized online matching. In Proceedings of the 46th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2005.