SNS Integrated Control System SNS Machine Protection System EPICS Workshop April 27, 2005 Coles Sibley.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Jan Uythoven, AB/BTLHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page GeV Commissioning Machine Protection Needs to be commissioned to: Prevent damage with the used, higher.
Advertisements

SNS Integrated Control System SNS RDB Requirements, wish list, status A little history l Oracle RDB used exclusively by accelerator physics group l JERI.
“LHC Controls for Sector Test” Planning SPS Extraction Kicker and Septa LHC Injection Kicker and other equipment (beam stoppers, dumps,...) Etienne CARLIER.
01/11/2002SNS Software Final Design Review1 V123S Event Link Encoder, Transmission System and PLL Receiver Thomas M. Kerner (BNL) SNS Global Controls.
CLS Machine Status Displays System Analyst - Controls Canadian Light Source Inc. web: Perimeter.
Current Status of Virtual Accelerator at J-PARC 3 GeV Rapid Cycling Synchrotron H. Harada*, K. Shigaki (Hiroshima University in Japan), H. Hotchi, F. Noda,
HPS MPS OVERVIEW Dan Sexton & the Safety Systems Group JLAB 1.
Oak Ridge SNS Experimental Facilities X /arb 1 SNS MPS Review Target-MPS Review WBS Ron Battle Target Controls, Target Systems Experimental.
SNS Machine Protection System Final Design Review Introduction
Stephen Norum LCLS FAC April 16, LCLS Machine Protection System Overview Interim MPS Full LCLS MPS Design Schedule.
Patrick Krejcik LCLS April 16-17, 2007 Breakout Session: Controls Controls Commissioning Experience.
Paul Chu FRIB Controls Group Leader (Acting)
Linear Collider Machine Protection Issues M. Palmer Injection System Injector Damping Rings Bunch Compressor and Transfer Sections Main LINAC Beam Delivery.
Dayle Kotturi SLC April 29, 2004 Outline Motivation Key Components Status Update SLC / EPICS Timing Software Tasks Hardware.
Agenda Adaptation of existing open-source control systems from compact accelerators to large scale facilities.
The Architecture, Design and Realisation of the LHC Beam Interlock System Machine Protection Review – 12 th April 2005.
SNS Integrated Control System MPS - Commissioning Plans 1. Quick MPS System Overview 2. Run Permit System 3. Fast Protect Auto Reset 4. Fast Protect Latched.
ORNL-SNS Diagnostic Group SNS Beam Loss Monitors and HARPs Machine Protection System FDR September 11,2001 Presented by Saeed Assadi.
SNS Integrated Control System EPICS Collaboration Meeting SNS Machine Protection System SNS Timing System Coles Sibley xxxx/vlb.
IMMW14, Ferney Voltaire, September 2005 (slide 1/35) Experience with configurable acquisition software for magnetic measurement.
Tuning an Accelerator for 1 MW C. Peters WAO 12 August 8 th, 2012.
CRIO as a hardware platform for Machine Protection. W. Blokland S. Zhukov.
SNS Integrated Control System SNS Timing Master LA-UR Eric Bjorklund.
Beam diagnostics control for J-PARC LINAC Guobao SHEN J-PARC Center Japan Atomic Energy Agency Mar
Stephen Schuh Vacuum Controls SCR and 16 November 2005 Vacuum Controls System Concept Review and Preliminary Design Review.
Controls-related R&D options Etienne CARLIER 18 th ABTEF meeting
G2p/GEp Beamline Tim Michalski Project Lead. Beamline Overview Slow Raster Tungsten Calorimeter Upside Down Girder (correctors, BCM, superharp) FZ1 Magnet.
Operational SNS Karen S. White Controls Group Leader 10/11/10.
SNS Integrated Control System Timing Clients at SNS DH Thompson Epics Spring 2003.
Managed by UT-Battelle for the Department of Energy SNS BLM System Overview Detectors, Measurements, Simulations Alexander Zhukov Saeed Assadi SNS/ORNL.
Issues in Accelerator Control Bob Dalesio, December 23, 2002.
Timing Requirements for Spallation Neutron Sources Timing system clock synchronized to the storage ring’s revolution frequency. –LANSCE: MHz.
BP & RS: BIS & SLP for AB/CO Review, 23 h Sept Realisation of the interlocking between SPS, LHC and CNGS and open issues Beam Interlock Systems.
NCSX CD-4/MIE block diagrams April 18, 2007 P. Sichta rev 0.
Managed by UT-Battelle for the Department of Energy SCL Vacuum Control System Upgrade Derrick Williams
NML Machine Protection System (MPS) Arden Warner Fermilab August 2 nd, 2007.
EtherCAT based RF Interlock System for SwissFEL LLRF 2015 Abstract As part of the overall development effort for SwissFEL's RF and LLRF systems, the RF.
Machine Protection Systems (MPS) Arden Warner, and Jim Steimel Project X Machine Advisory Committee March 18-19, 2013.
BIS main electronic modules - Oriented Linac4 - Stéphane Gabourin TE/MPE-EP Workshop on Beam Interlock Systems Jan 2015.
HB2008 – WG F: 27 Aug. S. Childress – Diagnostics_2MW 1 NuMI Beam Diagnostics and Control Steps to 2 MW S. Childress Fermilab.
MI Shielding Machine Protection Credit D. Capista March 7,2010.
Maximum Credible Beam Loss in the Main Injector D. Capista January 26, 2012.
NMLTA Protection System Update -Loss Monitors- Arden Warner September 2 nd, 2009.
M. Munoz April 2, 2014 Beam Commissioning at ESS.
Failure Analysis Tools at DESY. M. Bieler, T. Lensch, M. Werner, DESY ARW 2013, Melbourne,
Design process of the Interlock Systems Patrice Nouvel - CERN / Institut National Polytechnique de Toulouse CLIC Workshop Accelerator / Parameters.
SNS Integrated Control System ORACLE –JERI DB Generation April 27, 2004 Coles Sibley Jeff Patton.
Reliability and Performance of the SNS Machine Protection System Doug Curry 2013.
Operations Machine Simulator.
SESAME Control System Status
Data providers Volume & Type of Analysis Kickers
2007 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium (NSS)
Dependability Requirements of the LBDS and their Design Implications
SNS Status Report Karen S. White 10/15/08.
Injectors BLM system: PS Ring installation at EYETS
CSNS Accelerator Control and Beam Instrumentation JIN Dapeng, XU Taoguang … June 9, 2015
SNS Timing System EPICS Workshop April 28, 2005 Coles Sibley
A Portion of the SCP RF Control System LCLS Related
Machine Protection Xu Hongliang.
LCLS Event System - Software
Interlocking of CNGS (and other high intensity beams) at the SPS
UITF MPS system requirements
BCM-BIS Interface Szandra Kövecses
System Architecture of MPSVac and MPSID
MPS commissioning at ESS
The LHC Beam Interlock System
(Beam) Commissioning Plan
UITF Conduct of Operations Review
Operation of Target Safety System (TSS)
Rack installation and local tests for the MEBT Chopper Rack
Presentation transcript:

SNS Integrated Control System SNS Machine Protection System EPICS Workshop April 27, 2005 Coles Sibley

SNS Integrated Control System Intro 1. System overview 2. Hardware summary 3. Input Summary 4. Software tools 5. Configuration Control 6. Tools needed for MPS What to avoid.

SNS Integrated Control System MPS Design Assumptions l Four layers of protection! »HardwarePLC »Hardware / Software(Fast Protect Latched) »Hardware / Software(Fast Protect Auto Reset) »Software (Run Permit System) l Machine Protection System is not a “Safety Class” or “Safety Significant” System. l SNS will be built and commissioned in Phases, MPS must accommodate this schedule, (Flexible and Reliable). l Reliability – The Machine Protection System must inhibit the beam when required. It must fail in a SAFE state. l Availability – The machine availability should be as high as possible. The MPS must be easy to configure and have a “friendly” operator interface. False trips must be minimized.

SNS Integrated Control System Layers of Protection l Run Permit System (1 second) »Verifies IOC configuration and beam line equipment status. »MPS masking, Beam Power limit verification l Fast Protect Auto Reset (20 microseconds) »Beam Loss Monitors »Beam Current Monitors l Fast Protect Latched System (20 microseconds) »Power Supply status, RF, Kicker status »System cooling status (Collimators, dumps, etc) »etc. l MPS PLC (~ 33 msec) »Magnetic Field limit(s) verification »Beam Dump monitoring

SNS Integrated Control System Machine Availability l MODE masks are defined by MPS and Operations, not easily changed. l Allows beam when invasive diagnostics are used only for SAFE beams. l Easy OPI for verifying Mode Masks. l Mode masks are applied pulse to pulse from timing system l Allow easy bypass (Software Masking) for selected inputs »Different rules for commissioning and operations »Commissioning, FPAR devices can be masked »Commissioning, FPL – subset of Quads can be masked, all dipoles and rest of quads need ASD Operations approval.

SNS Integrated Control System Machine / Beam Mode Definitions l Machine Modes »MEBT Beam Stop »CCL Beam Stop »Linac Dump »Injection Dump »Ring »Extraction Dump »Target l Beam Modes »Diagnostics (10 usec) »Diagnostics (50 usec) »Diagnostics (100 usec) »Full Pulse Width (1 msec) »Full Power (Depends on Dump) l Machine mode selected by Key switch in control room, Beam Mode selected by Key or software. Switches read by MPS PLC system.

SNS Integrated Control System MPS Timing System checks l RTDL Heartbeat (PCI Clock) l Event link heartbeat l Driver – IOC heartbeat l Hardware Configuration file checks against actual HW settings l Machine / beam mode (< 3.3e-10 probability of undetected fault) »8 bit CRC (1/256) »8b bits encoded in 24 bit frame for single bit errors »24 bit CRC on all frames (1/ ) l Mode Masks »mask + /mask>>8 (single bit upset errors) »Software verification of masks (Configuration control) »Checksum of masks (File integrity) l Cable Status monitored

SNS Integrated Control System MPS Hardware l Technobox PMC reconfigurable IO card l 10K70 Altera l (20k200 newer) l Up to 5 per IOC with PMC_Span, 16 inputs each

SNS Integrated Control System MPS PMC Module (Also nice generic digital IO module)

SNS Integrated Control System MPS Fast Protect System Layout

SNS Integrated Control System MPS Input Summary (August 5005) l 27 new chassis installed l Copper phased out, using fiber l Post CD4, corrector PS status will be used l Inputs will quadruple for CD4

SNS Integrated Control System MPS – PLC Control Net Layout

SNS Integrated Control System PLC Remote Inputs l Machine made, Beam Mode selection l Emergency Crash l Trigger Control sanity checks l Timing System handshakes l Target (or Dump) Status »Pressure, Temperature »Flow, Vacuum status l Power supply current monitor’s »Quads – Hi window, Dipoles, Hi and Off windows. »Steering corrector’s – Window (RTBT only)

SNS Integrated Control System Injection Dump inputs l Beam Current Monitor (Not in baseline, Hardware chosen) »P-P Pulse Width verification »Beam Power, Integrated Beam Current l No direct current density or beam position monitors on dump windows or target

SNS Integrated Control System Run Permit (Software) Layers l Configuration Control »Mode masks »SW masks »EPICS db’s »Archiver files »Alarm Handler (?) »Timing System db’s l Post Mortem »First fault »Waveform viewer l Software monitoring »PS’s Field »RF, Phase and amplitude »BLM HV l Selected set point limits l Timing System pattern generator l Integrated Beam Loss (software MPS trip)

SNS Integrated Control System MPS Applications l First hit and total trips entered every day at midnight l MPS First Hit stats since Sep 19, :00:00 RFQ_LLRF:HPM1:FPAR_Src_chan_status, counts = 2806 DTL_LLRF:HPM5:FPAR_CCL_BS_chan_status, counts = 2176 DTL_LLRF:HPM6:FPAR_CCL_BS_chan_status, counts = 755 CCL_MPS:FPAR_Sublink04D:FPAR_CCL_BS_chan_status, counts = 624 l Noise was initially a big problem. Noise reduction, filters, fiber installations have mostly eliminated the problem. l MPS First fault – Now runs as server – client application l Detects first fault, tracks total # faults

SNS Integrated Control System MPS Applications l Input Status Summary »Shows input status and consequences of changing beam modes or machine modes. l Mode Mask Verification »Replaces spreadsheet, paper and pencil »Replaces tedious task of verifying 35 modes per input * 350 inputs = individual checks l Automated Verification (in progress) »Check inputs »Trip and verify MPS »Reset, turn back on »Generate report to e-log

SNS Integrated Control System MPS Bypass Request Enter new bypass request Edit request Approve request Install request Remove request View existing Open request’s View history

SNS Integrated Control System Software tools needed l 3D Waveform viewers »BLM waveform vs. time or accelerator location l Scope Application (Correlated waveforms) »RF vs BLM waveforms »Injection / Extraction kickers vs BLM »BCM vs. BLM l Post Mortem Tools »First fault »BLM loss model vs component »BLM waveform signatures (Archive waveform viewer) –Fast vs Off Energy vs Halo l MAID (Maximum allowable intra pulse difference) – Full Power operation »Verifies beam to target parameters acceptable before allowing next pulse (or as fast as possible) l Beam Scheduler / pattern generator