THE GENEROSITY OF THE WELFARE STATE AND THE SKILL COMPOSITION OF MIGRANTS: WHICH CAUSES WHICH? IIPF Congress, August 14, 2009 by Alon Cohen and Assaf Razin.

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Presentation transcript:

THE GENEROSITY OF THE WELFARE STATE AND THE SKILL COMPOSITION OF MIGRANTS: WHICH CAUSES WHICH? IIPF Congress, August 14, 2009 by Alon Cohen and Assaf Razin

Fiscal burden of EU accession Migration “Fear mongers, who predicted a drain on the public purse were wrong. In each year since 2004, central European and Baltic immigrants who now make up almost 1 per cent of the population and an even larger share of the labor force, have paid at least 20 per cent more in taxes than they have cost in benefits.” Financial Times editorial, July 24,

. 3 In the last tax year – – immigrants from accession countries to UK paid 37 per cent more in direct and indirect taxes than they received in benefits and from public services such as education, the NHS or social housing, the 2009 study by Christian Dustmann, Ian Preston and Tommaso Frattini, calculates

EU accession migrants into the UK 4

5 Research Issue To analyze what is the effect of welfare state generosity in host countries, over the skill composition of their migrants, we decompose our analysis into two extreme cases of migration regimes: –Free migration –Policy-Restricted Migration

6 Free Migration we argue that the effect of welfare-state policy on immigrants, is different across skill levels; thus the skill composition of immigrants is adversely affected by the welfare generosity of host countries.

7 Policy-Controlled Migration If immigration is controlled and screened by policy of the host country, the opposite may occur, given the considerations of voters in the host country.

8 Related Literature Welfare migration empirical literature is inconclusive. Normally, evidence suggests that welfare serves as a magnet for immigrants: –Southwick (1981); Gramlich and Laren (1984); Blank (1988); Borjas (1999); Gelbach (2000); McKinnish (2005, 2007) On the other hand, some find that welfare benefits has no significant effect over migration: –Walker (1994); Levine and Zimmerman (1999) These studies however, do not address international immigration, only migration within the U.S.

9 Related Literature Peridy (2006) and Warin and Svaton (2008) find that aggregate welfare-state benefits have a positive effect on migration. They do not, however, separate between high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants. De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2006) find that this positive effect is coherent across different levels of education among the immigrants. Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk (2006) find that while all education groups are indeed attracted to welfare- benefits, the unskilled are motivated by social expenditure much more than the skilled. ALL these studies, however, do not differentiate between free and policy-controlled migration!

10 Policy-Controlled Migration Parsimoneous Model: Policy-Controlled Migration Production: Labor: Government Budget: Individuals:

11 Indirect Utility function: Median Voter: Theory: Policy-Controlled Migration Stylized Model

12 The share of skilled immigrants, σ, has two effects on the indirect utility. First, an increase in σ increases labor productivity and thereby the level of benefits, b. Second, an increase in σ depresses skilled labor wages and raises unskilled labor wages. If the median voter is unskilled, both effects are positive. Thus, the unskilled median voter is unambiguously for skilled immigration. If the domestic median voter is skilled, however, the two effects are conflicting. Therefore: σ s <σ u =1. Theory: Policy-Controlled Migration Stylized Model

13 : Policy-Controlled Migration Comparative statics: Policy-Controlled Migration

14 Individuals in the source country are heterogeneous: in each skill level, there is a continuum (with respect to any other quality other than labor skills, for instance, migration costs) of reservation utilities. Free Migration Stylized Model

15 : Free Migration Stylized Model Parsimoneous Model: Free Migration Stylized Model Define skilled and unskilled migration: The cut-off reservation utility is: Implying:

16 Testable Implications The main results of the theory: Namely, if migration is free, the generosity of the welfare state has an adverse effect on the skill composition of immigrants. If, however, the skill mixture of migration is controlled by policy, then the generosity of the welfare state has a positive effect on it.

17 Decomposition of Data Data is decomposed into two groups: (1) Group A contains only source-host pairs of countries within the EU-- free migration; (2) Group B includes only source – host pairs for which the source country is non- EU country and the host is an EU country.

18 Identification strategy (1) Decomposition into group A and group B is exogenous to the dependent variable (2) The generosity of the welfare state, is averaged, lagged and instrumented

19 Two altrnative instruments (The measure of social benefits for each host country instrumented by legal origin; (2) We cluster the sample of host countries by linguistic similarity, legal origin and geographical proximity into several groups. In each group for either host country we construct an IV measure: the average predetermined value of welfare state benefits of the OTHER countries in the group.

20 Tax rates and welfare benefits are correlated by competition within each group—leading to exogeneity The groups: (England and Ireland); (Austria, Germany, Switzerland); (Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece); (Denmark, Sweden; Norway, Finland); (Portugal, Spain). Plausibly, countries within each group have strong economic relations and similar social systems. Thus tax rates and welfare benefits are correlated by competition. IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THE MIGRATION DECISION TO MOVE TO A COUNTRY WITHIN A GROUP DEPENDS ON THE LAGGED VALUE OF THE BENEFITS OF OTHER COUNTRY IN THE GROUP!

21 Empirical Evidence: Assumptions These are 16 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K., Norway and Switzerland. The second group (group B) includes only source- host pairs of countries, within which the source country residents cannot freely move, work and get benefits in either of the host country. The host countries are the same 16 countries. The source countries are 10 developed countries: U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore.

22 Identification Assumptions It embodies our threefold identification assumptions: –Immigration within group A is free –Immigration within group B is controlled and screened by policies of the host countries –The decomposition into groups A and B is exogenous to the skill composition of immigrants

23 If immigration is indeed free within Group A, then a competitive equilibrium is achieved. In which case, a change in welfare-state benefits within the host countries, other things being equal, generate a change in the supply side of immigrants. Plausibly, the demand for labor immigrants is independent of the welfare-state benefits. Hence, within group A, welfare-policy changes identifies the considerations of the potential immigrants. These consideration implicates that: Empirical Evidence: Assumptions

24 w/p S low S high S high/low (normalized) Empirical Evidence: Assumptions m high, m low

25 If immigration is indeed restricted within group B, then the “demand” for immigrants is perfectly inelastic. (It is not demand per se, but regulated quota) Therefore, only shifts of the “demand” side, that is, the migration policy, can change the equilibrium rates of immigration. Hence, within group B, welfare-policy changes identifies the considerations of the policy-makers within the host countries. These consideration implicates that: Empirical Evidence: Assumptions

26 m high, m low w/p D high D low D high/low (normalized) Empirical Evidence: Assumptions

27 Empirical Evidence: Data Immigration Data (Docquier and Marfouk (2006)): The data contains bilateral stock of immigrants, based on census and register data, for the years 1990 and Immigrants are at working age (25+), defined as foreign born, subdivided into three classes of education level: low-skilled (0-8 schooling years), medium-skilled (9-12 schooling years) and high- skilled (13+ schooling years). Stock variables are more reliable than flow data, as flow data disregards return migration movements, which may distort the estimated effects. Moreover, endogenous dynamic of equilibrium rates, are better captured by stocks than flows.

28 Empirical Evidence: Data Data for welfare-state benefits per capita is based on OECD's Analytical Database. We use lagged average rates between Social benefits encompass all kinds of social public expenditures, in cash or in kind, including, for instance, old age transfers, incapacity related benefits, health care, unemployment compensations and so on. The data is PPP-converted to 1990 U.S. dollars.

29 The Econometric Approach

30 Explanatory Variables

31 Differencing

32 Observables and non observables

33 Group A and Group B

34 The Estimated Equation

35

36 Robustness Tests

37 Empirical Evidence: Robustness

38

39 Replacing the period for the benefits

40 Pension payments as the benefits

41 Index of non-defense- spending measure for the benefits

42 Adding the Gini Coefficient

43 Adding Gravity variables

44 Reversing the Direction: migration effect on benefits

Skill Composition and the Generosity of the Welfare state: Free vs. Controlled + LDCs + Quality of education 45

Groups A, B and C Group A: 16 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, Norway, & Switzerland. Group B: 10 DCs: US, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore.

Developing countries Group C: 19 LDCs: Argentina, Brazil, Chile China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela. (For Quality of education Ecuador and Venezuela are dropped because of lack of data- hence analysis is done on 17 LDCs). 47

Adjusting to Education Quality Using Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann