The Affects on Expected Market Outcomes when People Look for Information Where There is None Drew Marticorena Ashleigh Edwards.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Chapter 7 Learning Objectives
Advertisements

Some Problems from Chapt 13
Arbitration. Introduction In this section we will consider the impact of outside arbitration on coordination games Specifically, we will consider two.
1 COMM 301: Empirical Research in Communication Lecture 15 – Hypothesis Testing Kwan M Lee.
Budget Today or Tomorrow
Module C1 Decision Models Uncertainty. What is a Decision Analysis Model? Decision Analysis Models is about making optimal decisions when the future is.
Chapter 11 Optimal Portfolio Choice
Earnings Management What is earnings management? Why do managers do it? How do they do it? How can we detect it?
3. Basic Topics in Game Theory. Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ Outline 3.1 What is a Game ? The elements of a Game The Rules of the.
Other Issues in Game Theory BusinessNegotiationsContracts.
Contrarian investing and why it works. Definition What is a contrarian? A Contrarian makes decisions for different reasons than most traders. The majority.
Randomized Strategies and Temporal Difference Learning in Poker Michael Oder April 4, 2002 Advisor: Dr. David Mutchler.
Chapter 15: Decisions Under Risk and Uncertainty McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2011 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Judgment in Managerial Decision Making 8e Chapter 4 Bounded Awareness
McGraw-Hill/Irwin © 2004 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. Efficient Market Hypothesis 1.
1 Teck H. Ho April 8, 2004 Outline  In-Class Experiment and Motivation  Adaptive Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) Learning in Games: Camerer and.
A Game Of Strategy … Or Luck? Serene Li Hui Heng Xiaojun Jiang Cheewei Ng Li Xue Alison Then Team 5, MS&E220 Autumn 2008.
Yale 9&10 Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis. Overview As I randomize the strategies, the expected payoff is a weighted average of the pure strategies.
Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior
Making Decisions Under Uncertainty
Evolutionary Games The solution concepts that we have discussed in some detail include strategically dominant solutions equilibrium solutions Pareto optimal.
Outline  In-Class Experiment on Centipede Game  Test of Iterative Dominance Principle I: McKelvey and Palfrey (1992)  Test of Iterative Dominance Principle.
BCOR 1020 Business Statistics Lecture 21 – April 8, 2008.
Economics 101 – Section 5 Lecture #15 – March 4, 2004 Chapter 7 How firms make decisions - profit maximization.
Copyright © 2005 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Managerial Economics Thomas Maurice eighth edition Chapter 15.
Estimation and Hypothesis Testing. The Investment Decision What would you like to know? What will be the return on my investment? Not possible PDF for.
1 GE5 Lecture 6 rules of engagement no computer or no power → no lesson no SPSS → no lesson no homework done → no lesson.
Business Strategy, Luck, and Poor Judgment Jerker Denrell, Stanford Christina Fang, NYU.
Brian Duddy.  Two players, X and Y, are playing a card game- goal is to find optimal strategy for X  X has red ace (A), black ace (A), and red two (2)
Chapter 12 & Module E Decision Theory & Game Theory.
Experiments & Statistics. Experiment Design Playtesting Experiments don’t have to be “big”--many game design experiments take only 30 minutes to design.
Games of Strategy (Game Theory) Topic 1 – Part IV.
Presented by Qian Zou.  The purpose of conducting the experiments.  The methodology for the experiments.  The Experimental Design : Cohesion Experiments.
Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium is defined in terms of strategies, not payoffs Every player is best responding simultaneously (everyone optimizes) This.
J. K. Dietrich - GSBA 548 – MBA.PM Spring 2007 Investment Strategy April 11, 2007 (LA) or April 5, 2007 (OCC)
Chapter 3 Arbitrage and Financial Decision Making
Decision Making Under Uncertainty and Risk 1 By Isuru Manawadu B.Sc in Accounting Sp. (USJP), ACA, AFM
Chapter 5 Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior. ©2005 Pearson Education, Inc.Chapter 52 Q: Value of Stock Investment in offshore drilling exploration: Two.
Binomial Distributions
Chapter 5 Choice Under Uncertainty. Chapter 5Slide 2 Topics to be Discussed Describing Risk Preferences Toward Risk Reducing Risk The Demand for Risky.
Data Analysis Econ 176, Fall Populations When we run an experiment, we are always measuring an outcome, x. We say that an outcome belongs to some.
Issues concerning the interpretation of statistical significance tests.
Sample: Probability “Fair Game” Project (borrowed from Intel®, then adjusted)
Agresti/Franklin Statistics, 1 of 88 Chapter 11 Analyzing Association Between Quantitative Variables: Regression Analysis Learn…. To use regression analysis.
Part 3 Linear Programming
Final Lecture. Problem 2, Chapter 13 Exploring the problem Note that c, x yields the highest total payoff of 7 for each player. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
Models for Strategic Marketing Decision Making. Market Entry Decisions To enter first or to wait Sources of First-Mover Advantages –Technological leadership.
KEYS Scott Gajewski ART 389A Spring Contents Premise Getting Started -Players -Set-up -Materials Rules -Basics -Points System -Multiple Players.
Testing theories of fairness— Intentions matter Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher February 26, 2015.
The Nonrational Escalation of Commitment The Nonrational Escalation of Commitment Presented by: Hamid Shekari Omid Keivanloo.
Lesson Use and Abuse of Tests. Knowledge Objectives Distinguish between statistical significance and practical importance Identify the advantages.
The Evolution of “An Experiment on Exit in Duopoly”
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2006 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 5 Understanding Risk.
1 1 Chapter 6 Forecasting n Quantitative Approaches to Forecasting n The Components of a Time Series n Measures of Forecast Accuracy n Using Smoothing.
Econ 545, Spring 2016 Industrial Organization Dynamic Games.
The Practice of Statistics Third Edition Chapter 11: Testing a Claim Copyright © 2008 by W. H. Freeman & Company Daniel S. Yates.
Chapter 12 Decision Analysis. Components of Decision Making (D.M.) F Decision alternatives - for managers to choose from. F States of nature - that may.
Oligopoly and Game Theory Topic Students should be able to: Use simple game theory to illustrate the interdependence that exists in oligopolistic.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 11 Understanding Randomness.
DECISION MODELS. Decision models The types of decision models: – Decision making under certainty The future state of nature is assumed known. – Decision.
+ Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory By Katie & Matt.
Indirect Reciprocity in the Selective Play Environment Nobuyuki Takahashi and Rie Mashima Department of Behavioral Science Hokkaido University 08/07/2003.
Probability in gambling Lucie Tejessyová. Gambling Games of chances or skills when betting ratios are to bettors disadvantage The best bets – bring the.
OVERCOMING COORDINATION FAILURE THROUGH NEIGHBORHOOD CHOICE ~AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY~ Maastricht University Arno Riedl Ingrid M.T. Rohde Martin Strobel.
Chapter 15: Decisions Under Risk and Uncertainty
Decisions Under Risk and Uncertainty
Making Decisions Under Uncertainty
Chapter 15 Decisions under Risk and Uncertainty
Behavioral Finance Economics 437.
Chapter 15: Decisions Under Risk and Uncertainty
Presentation transcript:

The Affects on Expected Market Outcomes when People Look for Information Where There is None Drew Marticorena Ashleigh Edwards

Round Position Round 1 round 2 round %$23$22 2 None48%40% 3 48%44%46% 4 $2434%42% 5 46%$2036% 6 $23none$18 7 $22$2444% 8 36%46%$ %$1948% 10 None42%$21 11 $20$1838% 12 30%$22$ %40%$20 14 Nonenone32% 15 $21$1630% 16 None30%$ %36%34% 18 $19$15none 19 38%$21$23 20 $16none$ %38%$16 22 $1832% 23 $15$17 24 $17

Things to Notice People clearly not playing the strongly dominating strategy People clearly not playing the strongly dominating strategy Always choose the good with the highest expected value and if indifferent, choose randomly Always choose the good with the highest expected value and if indifferent, choose randomly People are looking to play to a pattern that does not actually exist People are looking to play to a pattern that does not actually exist Causes later systematic deviations in the data from expected values Causes later systematic deviations in the data from expected values

Expectations of Experiment People should always purchase a good People should always purchase a good Expected Value of any given good is a net value of 27.5 to 36.5 Expected Value of any given good is a net value of 27.5 to 36.5 People will systematically purchase a certain type of discount after previous person passes on purchasing second good People will systematically purchase a certain type of discount after previous person passes on purchasing second good If the previous person fails to purchase a second good the next person will, above chance, select the opposite type of discount If the previous person fails to purchase a second good the next person will, above chance, select the opposite type of discount

Data: The Beginning # of No Purchases Difference in Goods Around None # of Rebates Chosen # of Sales Chosen Good Purchased After Round 1 43 First 01Sale Second 35Rebate Third 47Rebate Fourth 57Sale Round 2 32 First 23Rebate Second 66Rebate Third 98Sale Round 3 11 First 710Rebate

What the previous table tells us: When people choose the less advantageous good – a Poor Good (defined by the expected value for each set of goods) they will more often choose the sale discount When people choose the less advantageous good – a Poor Good (defined by the expected value for each set of goods) they will more often choose the sale discount They possibly give it additional weight because of how it is framed They possibly give it additional weight because of how it is framed People do seem to interpret another player choosing not to purchase a good as a signal, more often switching away from the discount that the previous person chose on the first part of their turn People do seem to interpret another player choosing not to purchase a good as a signal, more often switching away from the discount that the previous person chose on the first part of their turn 6/8 times vs. expected 4/8 times 6/8 times vs. expected 4/8 times

Type of good selected before No Good is purchased PoorGood Excellent Good # of No Purchases in Round Round Round Round 3 011

Breakdown of Consistent Turns Each Round # of Turns in Round # of Turns Consistent # of No Purchases Round Round Round A consistent turn is one in which two of the same type of discount is purchased

Data: The End # of Consistent Turns starting with Excellent Good # of Turns Starting With Excellent Good # of Turns Starting With Poor Good # of Consistent Turns Starting with Poor Good Round Round Round

How did our hypothesis hold up? People purchase goods more often as the game progresses People purchase goods more often as the game progresses This is consistent with our expectations This is consistent with our expectations People are just as likely to purchase No Good after purchasing an Excellent Good as they are after purchasing a Poor Good People are just as likely to purchase No Good after purchasing an Excellent Good as they are after purchasing a Poor Good This is not consistent with our hypothesis This is not consistent with our hypothesis

Results from Experiment People are likely to choose a different type of discount (sale versus rebate) after purchasing an Excellent Good than vice versa (switching on 14/15 opportunities) People are likely to choose a different type of discount (sale versus rebate) after purchasing an Excellent Good than vice versa (switching on 14/15 opportunities) If people weren’t deriving information from one of the types of goods, we would expect them to choose each type of good 50% of the time If people weren’t deriving information from one of the types of goods, we would expect them to choose each type of good 50% of the time

People seem to believe that if their first good is a Poor Good they should stick with the same type of discount because an Excellent one is “due to come up” People seem to believe that if their first good is a Poor Good they should stick with the same type of discount because an Excellent one is “due to come up” Occurred in 4/20 opportunities Occurred in 4/20 opportunities This is compared to when an Excellent Good comes up first, in which case people expect it to switch to a Poor Good next This is compared to when an Excellent Good comes up first, in which case people expect it to switch to a Poor Good next Occurred in 1/15 opportunities Occurred in 1/15 opportunities Not significant but trending towards expectations Not significant but trending towards expectations

Conclusion There was an Average Loss made per round due to failure to purchase goods There was an Average Loss made per round due to failure to purchase goods People overcame this non-profit maximizing behavior with practice People overcame this non-profit maximizing behavior with practice Very small effect in this experiment, but we would expect other influential factors in real-world settings Very small effect in this experiment, but we would expect other influential factors in real-world settings Loss in Earnings per Round: Loss in Earnings per Round: Round 17.5 Round Round