Summer Institute of the Chinese Cognitive Linguistics Association and the Mouton journal Intercultural Pragmatics ‘Culture, Communication, Cognition’ Shanghai, June 2008 Pragmatic Inference and Default Interpretations in Current Theories of Discourse Meaning Kasia Jaszczolt University of Cambridge, U.K.

2 Lecture 3 Salient Meanings and Default Interpretations

3 Defaults in Semantics and Pragmatics Default interpretation is the salient meaning intended by the speaker, or presumed by the addressee to have been intended, and recovered: Default interpretation is the salient meaning intended by the speaker, or presumed by the addressee to have been intended, and recovered: (a) without the help of inference from speaker’s intentions, or (b) without a conscious inferential process altogether.

4 Communicators convey more information than is contained in the expressions they utter. (1) Tom finished writing a paper and went skating. (2) +> Tom finished writing a paper and then went skating. (3) Picasso’s painting is of a crying woman. (4) +> The painting executed by Picasso is of a crying woman.

5 Grice (1975) generalized conversational implicature (GCI); Grice (1975) generalized conversational implicature (GCI); post-Griceans: salient, context-independent, default meanings (Horn, e.g. 2004; Levinson 1995, 2000; Recanati 2003, 2004; Jaszczolt, e.g. 1999, 2005); post-Griceans: salient, context-independent, default meanings (Horn, e.g. 2004; Levinson 1995, 2000; Recanati 2003, 2004; Jaszczolt, e.g. 1999, 2005); context-dependent pragmatic inference, no defaults (Sperber and Wilson 1986; Carston, e.g. 1988, 2002). context-dependent pragmatic inference, no defaults (Sperber and Wilson 1986; Carston, e.g. 1988, 2002).

6 Said or implicated? Said or implicated? (i) implicatures (Levinson); (ii) pragmatic input to what is said (Recanati); explicature (Sperber, Wilson, Carston); primary meaning (Jaszczolt); (iii) separate level of what is implicit in what is said (Bach 1994, 2004, 2006; Horn 2006).

7 ‘Whatever the theoretical status of the distinction, it is apparent that some implicatures are induced only in a special context (…), while others go through unless a special context is present (…)’. Horn (2004: 4-5)

8 The differences in using the term ‘default’ consist of the acceptance or rejection of at least the following properties: (i) cancellability (defeasibility) of preferred interpretations;

9 The differences in using the term ‘default’ consist of the acceptance or rejection of at least the following properties: (i) cancellability (defeasibility) of preferred interpretations; (ii) availability of preferred interpretations without making use of conscious inference;

10 The differences in using the term ‘default’ consist of the acceptance or rejection of at least the following properties: (i) cancellability (defeasibility) of preferred interpretations; (ii) availability of preferred interpretations without making use of conscious inference; (iii) shorter time required for their formation by the speaker and recognition by the addressee as compared with that required for the meanings induced through inference;

11 The differences in using the term ‘default’ consist of the acceptance or rejection of at least the following properties: (i) cancellability (defeasibility) of preferred interpretations; (ii) availability of preferred interpretations without making use of conscious inference; (iii) shorter time required for their formation by the speaker and recognition by the addressee as compared with that required for the meanings induced through inference; (iv) the availability of preferred interpretations prior to the completion of the processing of the entire proposition (local, pre-propositional defaults).

12 1. Bach’s Default Reasoning Kent Bach (1984): ‘jumping to conclusions’, ‘default reasoning’. Cancellable. Speakers know when context-dependent, conscious inference from the content of the sentence is required and when it is not. Speakers know when context-dependent, conscious inference from the content of the sentence is required and when it is not. When it is not required, they progress, unconsciously, to the first available and unchallenged alternative. When it is not required, they progress, unconsciously, to the first available and unchallenged alternative.

13 2. Levinson’s Presumptive Meanings Stephen Levinson (1995, 2000): presumptive meanings, generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs) GCIs are neither properly semantic nor properly pragmatic. Instead, ‘they sit midway, systematically influencing grammar and semantics on the one hand and speaker-meaning on the other.’ (Levinson 2000: 25). Presumed meanings are the result of rational, communicative behaviour. They arise through three assumed heuristics:

14 (1) (1) ‘What isn’t said, isn’t’; (Q-heuristic) (2) (2) ‘What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified’; (I-heuristic) (3) (3) ‘What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal’; (M-heuristic) Presumptive meanings can arise at various stages in utterance processing (local). They are cancellable without contradiction.

15 ? Is cancellability psychologically real? Two options: (i) a particular GCI arose and was subsequently cancelled; or (ii) a GCI did not arise at all due to being blocked by the context. Experimental evidence, e.g. Noveck & Sperber (2004).

16 I-heuristic: ‘What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified’ (5)bread knife+>knife used for cutting bread kitchen knife +>knife used for preparing food, e.g. chopping steel knife+> knife made of steel

17 (6) a secretary+> a female one a road +> hard-surfaced one I don’t like garlic. +> I dislike garlic. Cancellation problem: ? Cancellation problem: (7) Some (+> ‘not all’), in fact all, of the boys came.

18 (8)‘John’s book is good.’ ?+> the one he read, wrote, borrowed… vs. (9)‘Chomsky’s book is about grammar.’

19 (8)‘John’s book is good.’ ?+> the one he read, wrote, borrowed… vs. (9)‘Chomsky’s book is about grammar.’ We need a theory that construes pragmatic inference and defaults as operating on a unit that is adequate for the case at hand, ranging from a morpheme to the entire discourse.

20 3. Asher and Lascarides’ Rhetorical Structure Rules Defaults and nonmonotonic reasoning in computational linguistics. Origins: Humboldt, Jespersen and Cassirer; more recently Reiter’s (1980) default logic A:B C C can be concluded if A has been concluded and B can be assumed (and not B cannot be proven).

21   nonmonotonic logic: there are default rules and default operators in the language see e.g. Thomason (1997)  Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT, e. g. Asher and Lascarides 2003)

22 Defaults are highly probable routes that an interpretation of a sentence may take in a particular situation of discourse. rhetorical structure rules: Narration, Background, Explanation, Elaboration. The relations between states and events are computed as strong probabilities, in the process called defeasible reasoning.

23 SDRT includes the following components: SDRT includes the following components: (i) the semantics of sentences alone, that is the underspecified output of the syntactic processing of the sentences;

24 SDRT includes the following components: SDRT includes the following components: (i) the semantics of sentences alone, that is the underspecified output of the syntactic processing of the sentences; (ii) the semantics of information content (further addition to underdetermined meaning, including default additions);

25 SDRT includes the following components: SDRT includes the following components: (i) the semantics of sentences alone, that is the underspecified output of the syntactic processing of the sentences; (ii) the semantics of information content (further addition to underdetermined meaning, including default additions); and (iii) (iii) the semantics of information packaging that ‘glues’ such enriched representations by means of the rules of the rhetorical structure of discourse.

26 4. Defaults in Optimality-Theory Pragmatics OT pragmatics, Blutner 2000; Blutner and Zeevat 2004 The process of interpretation is captured in a set of pragmatic constraints (= optimization procedure); The process of interpretation is captured in a set of pragmatic constraints (= optimization procedure); These constraints are ranked as to their strength and they are defeasible; These constraints are ranked as to their strength and they are defeasible; OT pragmatics formalizes and extends the Gricean principles; OT pragmatics formalizes and extends the Gricean principles;

27 STRENGTH means preference for readings that are informationally stronger, CONSISTENCY means preference for interpretations that do not conflict with the extant context, FAITH-INT stands for ‘faithful interpretation’, interpreting the utterance without leaving out any aspect of what the speaker says. The ordering of these constraints is The ordering of these constraints is FAITH-INT > CONSISTENCY > STRENGTH.

28 5. Defaults in Truth-Conditional Pragmatics Recanati (2002, 2003, 2004) Pragmatic processing is not necessarily fulfilled by conscious inference: processes that enrich the output of syntax are sub-doxastic, direct, unreflective, automatic, associative. The content of an utterance is arrived at directly, similar to the act of perception of an object. Anti-inferentialist view: “communication is as direct as perception” (Recanati 2002: 109). = primary pragmatic processes. Some of them make use of contextual information, others are context-independent.

29 Two kinds of modulation (cf. Lecture 1) of the content obtained through the syntactic processing: (i) (i)completing of a semantically incomplete proposition saturation (10) The fence isn’t strong enough. (11) The fence isn’t strong enough to withstand the gales. (ii) (ii) further elaboration of the meaning of the sentence free enrichment. (12) John hasn’t eaten. (13) John hasn’t eaten dinner yet.

30 Defaults don’t involve conscious inference, albeit, in Recanati’s terminology, they involve inference in the broad sense: the agent is not aware of performing an inference but is aware of the consequences of this pragmatic enrichment of the interpreted sentence. Defaults don’t involve conscious inference, albeit, in Recanati’s terminology, they involve inference in the broad sense: the agent is not aware of performing an inference but is aware of the consequences of this pragmatic enrichment of the interpreted sentence. Primary pragmatic processes are not ‘processes’ in the psychological sense. Primary pragmatic processes are not ‘processes’ in the psychological sense.

31 6. Types of defaults in Default Semantics One of the main questions to ask about any theory of utterance interpretation is: One of the main questions to ask about any theory of utterance interpretation is:

32 What sources does information about meaning come from?

33 In Default Semantics (Jaszczolt, e.g. 2005, forthcoming a, b), utterance meaning is the outcome of merging of information that comes from: (i) world knowledge (WK); (ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS); (iii) situation of discourse (SD); (iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS); (v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC).

35 CDs and SCWDs cut across Grice’s GCI/PCI divide: some of them arise due to the properties of words or constructions used and are present by default independently of the context of the utterance, while others are default meanings for the particular situation of discourse. (Lecture 4)

36 CDs are default interpretations that are triggered by the properties of mental states. CDs are default interpretations that are triggered by the properties of mental states. (14) The architect who designed St Paul’s cathedral was a genius. (15) Sir Christopher Wren was a genius.

37 SCWDs are default interpretations that arise due to the shared cultural and social background of the interlocutors. SCWDs are default interpretations that arise due to the shared cultural and social background of the interlocutors. (16) The baby cried and the mother picked it up. (17) The baby cried and the baby’s mother picked it up. In CDs and SCWDs there is no conscious inference. In CDs and SCWDs there is no conscious inference.

38 Definitional Characteristics of Default Interpretations [1a] Defaults belong to competence. OR [1a] Defaults belong to competence. OR [1b] Defaults belong to performance. [1b] Defaults belong to performance. [2a] Defaults are context-independent. OR [2a] Defaults are context-independent. OR [2b] Defaults can make use of contextual information. [2b] Defaults can make use of contextual information. [3a] Defaults are easily defeasible. OR [3a] Defaults are easily defeasible. OR [3b] Defaults are not normally defeasible. [3b] Defaults are not normally defeasible.

39 [4a] Defaults are a result of subdoxastic, automatic process. OR [4a] Defaults are a result of subdoxastic, automatic process. OR [4b] Defaults can sometimes involve conscious pragmatic inference. [4b] Defaults can sometimes involve conscious pragmatic inference. [5a] Defaults are developments of the logical form of the uttered sentence. OR [5a] Defaults are developments of the logical form of the uttered sentence. OR [5b] Defaults need not enrich the logical form of the sentence but may override it. [5b] Defaults need not enrich the logical form of the sentence but may override it.

40 [6a] Defaults can all be classified as one type of pragmatic process. OR [6a] Defaults can all be classified as one type of pragmatic process. OR [6b] Defaults come from qualitatively different sources in utterance processing. [6b] Defaults come from qualitatively different sources in utterance processing.

41 Other differences to be discussed: [7a] Defaults are always based on a complete proposition. OR [7a] Defaults are always based on a complete proposition. OR [7b] Defaults can be ‘local’, ‘sub-propositional’, based on a word or a phrase. [7b] Defaults can be ‘local’, ‘sub-propositional’, based on a word or a phrase. [8a] Defaults necessarily arise quicker than non- default meanings. Hence they can be tested for experimentally by measuring the time of processing of the utterance. OR [8a] Defaults necessarily arise quicker than non- default meanings. Hence they can be tested for experimentally by measuring the time of processing of the utterance. OR [8b] Defaults do not necessarily arise quicker than non-default meanings because both types of meaning can be based on conscious, effortful inference. Hence, the existence of defaults cannot be tested experimentally by measuring the time of processing of the utterance. [8b] Defaults do not necessarily arise quicker than non-default meanings because both types of meaning can be based on conscious, effortful inference. Hence, the existence of defaults cannot be tested experimentally by measuring the time of processing of the utterance.

42 For example: Levinson’s presumptive meanings are defeasible, i.e. fulfil [3a]; local [7b]; pertain to competence [1a]; and are faster to process than inferential meanings [8a]. For example: Levinson’s presumptive meanings are defeasible, i.e. fulfil [3a]; local [7b]; pertain to competence [1a]; and are faster to process than inferential meanings [8a].

43 Local vs. global defaults (18) Many people liked Peter Carey’s new novel. (19) Many ( many but not all) people liked Peter Carey’s new novel. (19) Many (  d many but not all) people liked Peter Carey’s new novel. (20) Those paper cups are not suitable for hot drinks. (21) Those paper cups ( cups made of paper) are not suitable for hot drinks. (21) Those paper cups (  d cups made of paper) are not suitable for hot drinks. (22) I want three tea cups, three saucers and three spoons please. (23) I want three tea cups ( cups used for drinking tea), three saucers and three spoons please. (23) I want three tea cups (  d cups used for drinking tea), three saucers and three spoons please.

44 Problems with local defaults Costly cancellation: Costly cancellation: (24) Many, and possibly all, people liked Peter Carey’s new novel. Difficult cancellation: Difficult cancellation: (25) Those paper cups, I mean cups used for storing paper, are full.

45 Advantage of local defaults Local defaults allow us to dispose of the level of an underspecified propositional representation in semantic theory for which there is no evidence from processing. Since the inferences proceed incrementally, then as soon as the triggering expression is encountered, there is no level of a minimal proposition that would constitute a foundation for further inferences.

46 Conclusions Preferred, default readings should not be thrown into one basket. Some are context-free, some are not. Some are automatic, some appear to use some minimal inference. Some are local, some are global. Some come from the lexicon or grammar, others come from the way humans think or the way they construct their social and cultural reality. Preferred, default readings should not be thrown into one basket. Some are context-free, some are not. Some are automatic, some appear to use some minimal inference. Some are local, some are global. Some come from the lexicon or grammar, others come from the way humans think or the way they construct their social and cultural reality.

47 There seems to be no compelling argument for their unitary analysis. The diversity of default interpretations pertains not only to their features listed in [1]-[8] but also to their provenance. There seems to be no compelling argument for their unitary analysis. The diversity of default interpretations pertains not only to their features listed in [1]-[8] but also to their provenance.

48 There seems to be no compelling argument for their unitary analysis. The diversity of default interpretations pertains not only to their features listed in [1]-[8] but also to their provenance. There seems to be no compelling argument for their unitary analysis. The diversity of default interpretations pertains not only to their features listed in [1]-[8] but also to their provenance. We are still far from having a reliable typology of default meanings but the categories [1]-[8] are likely to be crucial. We are still far from having a reliable typology of default meanings but the categories [1]-[8] are likely to be crucial.

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