Modelling and Analysing of Security Protocol: Lecture 5 BAN logic Tom Chothia CWI.

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Presentation transcript:

Modelling and Analysing of Security Protocol: Lecture 5 BAN logic Tom Chothia CWI

Introduction So far you have learn: – the “vocabulary” of protocols and – to “look hard at it to see if its right”. This is a lot more than most people know! But how can we be sure that a protocol is correct? This lecture: BAN logic - A formal logic of security protocols.

SecureComm Lots of state-of-the-art protocol research including: –“VANET”: Vehicular Ah-hoc NETworks –“Rural area networks”: Put the routers on bus - hours of delays between messages. –Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS): Updating priority telephone systems for VoIP protocols.

A BitTorrent DoS attack Target

A BitTorrent DoS attack Tracker

A BitTorrent DoS attack Tracker Target

OpenFire Open up the network: –so that people attack decoy machines, –not the real machines.

Kerberos A protocol for key establishment and authentication used in Windows, MacOS, Apache, OpenSSH,... 1.A  S : A,B,N A 2.S  A : {K AB,B,L,N A,..} K AS,{K AB,A,L,..} K BS 3.A  B : {A,T A } K AB,{K AB,A,L,..} K BS 4.B  A : {T A +1} K AB

Kerberos Assumption A and S share the key K AS B and S share the key K AS A trusts S to generate a new key B trusts S to generate a new key N is a nonce, T is a timestamp and L is an expiration time.

What Do We Mean By Correct? “Good Key” and “Key Confirmation”: –A believes that K AB is a good key to communicate with B –B believes that K AB is a good key to communicate with A –A believes that B believes that K AB is a good key to communicate with A

Why “A” Believes in the Key? A’s belief in the key comes from the message: 2. {K AB,B,L,N A,..} K AS,{K AB,A,L,..} K BS This line and the assumptions are all “A” needs.

Why “A” Believes in the Key? Step 1: A sees the message part {K AB,B,L,N A,..} K AS As the key K AS is only shared with A and S the part of the message (K AB,B,L,N A ) must have come from S. Rule: If A and S share a key K and A sees a message { M } K (not from A) then A can conclude that S said “M” at some point.

Why “A” Believes in the Key? Step 1: A believes that S said (K AB,B,L,N A ) at some point N A is A’s nonce therefore this cannot be an old message therefore A can conclude that S said (K AB,B,L,N A ) as part of the current run of the protocol. Rule: If A believe that S once said M and M includes a nonce then A can conclude that S currently believes M

Why “A” Believes in the Key? Step 1: A believes that S currently believes (K AB,B,L,N A ) and in particular K AB as a key for A and B. A trusts S to makes keys for A and B, therefore A can accept K AB as a key with B. Rule: If A trusts S to produce keys and A believes that S believes in a key then A believe in the key.

Verify this Argument There are 4 parts to this argument: –The assumptions. –The protocol messages. –The rules. –The application of the rules. If the check each of these parts you can be sure the whole proof is correct.

Logic A “logic” is a formal system of reasoning. They specify rules for knowledge, e.g. Rule: If you know that “A implies B” and you know “A” then you may conclude “B” General Idea: the logic fixes the rules and you or a computer applies them. If the rules lead your goal then you know it’s true.

and rules like: A /\ B A A => B A B   x. A(x) A(y) Logic Classic Logic uses: A /\ B and A \/ B or ~ A not A => B implies  x.A(x) For all  x.A(x) Exist

Proof Trees All men are mortal, Plato is a man, therefore Plato is mortal.  x. Man(x)  Mortal(x) Man(Plato)  Mortal(Plato) Man(Plato) Mortal(Plato)

Logics A logic is “sound” if everything you can deduce from the rules is true. And “complete” if everything that is true can be deduced. There is no sound and complete logic for mathematics... if there was all mathematicians would be out of a job!

BAN logic See paper and JAPE demo

Wide Mouth Frog Protocol A light weight key establishment protocol: 1. A  S : A, {Ta, B, K ab } Kas 2. S  B : {Ts, A, K ab } Kbs What are the assumption?

Conclusion BAN logic give us a formal way to reason about protocols. It’s not “sound” or “complete” but it is very effective. If you have time to a BAN proof of your protocol. If you don’t think about the rules.