DARPA Security Mini-task Naveen Sastry. Groups Involved BBN SRI UMass / UMich / U. Arizona UC Berkeley.

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Presentation transcript:

DARPA Security Mini-task Naveen Sastry

Groups Involved BBN SRI UMass / UMich / U. Arizona UC Berkeley

Goals & Organization Looking to define the problem space –Analyze military applications Pursuer / Evader Common Reference Grid Acoustic Counter-Sniper System –Enumerate the threats in the sensor space Applications are being created, deployed and used Security is not often a priority, but it should be Eg: Tampering, Collision, Exhaustion, Flooding Look at what problems are currently being studied –What problems do the groups address –How to apply standard solutions to the current task

Group Proposals UMass –Security Broker: Resource / Security Tradoff Dynamically change ciphers, cipher strength & parameters based on current conditions: load / network / power / … –Intrusion Detection Identify anomalous data SRI –Intrusion Detection Mutual monitoring Feedback into routing to route around problem areas Preserve resources when detecting attack: Sleep, Hibernate BBN –Key management –Efficient PKI for motes –Authenticate external entities: Drone airplanes. Berkeley –Extend TinySec Key management Infrastructure Insider attack protection –Secure routing protocols –Secure aggregation metrics –Spread spectrum techniques

Status Report being assembled for PI Meeting