Hydrogen R&D system HAZOP and failure analysis Yury Ivanyushenkov, Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw, Mike Courthold, Matthew Hills and Tony Jones.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Carbon Dioxide Systems 1.Carbon dioxide properties 2.Storage 3.Uses 4.Limitations 5.Types of systems 6.Local Application 7.Total Flood.
Advertisements

1 AFSWG Mtg 15 Aug 2003 Elwyn Baynham RAL Safety Overview Work done by RAL Group Contributors Elwyn Baynham Tom Bradshaw Iouri Ivaniouchenkov.
GRPE ISO GROUP MEETING, MUNICH, JANUARY 22th, 2003 GAS CYLINDERS USE OF PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES Hervé BARTHELEMY AIR LIQUIDE PARIS.
Cooling System Get the engine up to optimum operating Temperature as quickly as possible and maintains it at that temperature. Controls the heat produced.
Hydrogen R&D system HAZOP
Thermal Power Station Plant. Introduction 150 MW Thermal power station plant, produce 450t/hr steam at full load The max steam pressure is 150 bar with.
31/03/11FV 1 CEDAR from flammable gas safety point of view.
MICE OsC – 22 nd June 2010 Liquid-hydrogen system and absorber M Hills T Bradshaw M Courthold S Ishimoto W Lau I Mullacrane P Warburton.
1 MICE Hydrogen System Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw, Iouri Ivaniouchenkov RAL MICE / RAL Safety RAL, 30 October 2003.
Safe Handling of Flammable and Combustible Liquids
Hydrogen Hazard Summary and Preliminary FMECA and HAZOP Yury Ivanyushenkov Elwyn Baynham Tom Bradshaw.
1 Status of Hydrogen System Development MICE Collaboration Meeting, Frascati, June 26-29, 2005 Yury Ivanyushenkov, Tom Bradshaw, Elwyn Baynham, Mike Courthold,
MICE Hazard Overview and Analysis Elwyn Baynham Tom Bradshaw Yury Ivanyushenkov.
CM26 – 26 th March 2010 Step IV: Liquid Hydrogen Infrastructure M Hills M Courthold T Bradshaw I Mullacrane P Warburton.
1 MICE Absorber working group Columbia, 13 June 2003 MICE Hydrogen System. Preliminary HAZOP. Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw and Iouri Ivaniouchenkov,
MICE Safety System DE Baynham TW Bradshaw MJD Courthold Y Ivanyushenkov.
1 Hydrogen Safety System Summary MICE Collaboration Meeting, Osaka, August 1-3, 2004 Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw, Yury Ivanyushenkov Applied Science Division,
MICE AFCSWG Safety Review Summary Mary Anne Cummings Dec. 17, 2003 MICE Video Conference.
MICE Hydrogen System Implementation Tom Bradshaw Elwyn Baynham Iouri Ivaniouchenkov Jim Rochford.
A presentation at the MICE Video Conference on Wednesday the 5 th of May 2004 Response to the Safety review comments by Wing Lau -- Oxford.
March 14, 2003 MICE Absorber/Coil Integration MICE LH2 Absorber 1.Assembly 2.Safety 3.Staging 4.Instrumentation.
H2 Safety Review - response paul drumm MICE VC, March 29 th,2006.
Matthew Hills Hydrogen System – Piping and Instrumentation Diagram.
Hydrogen system status Yury Ivanyushenkov for Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw, Mike Courthold, Matthew Hills and Tony Jones.
MICE Hydrogen System Design Tom Bradshaw Iouri Ivaniouchenkov Elwyn Baynham Columbia Meeting June 2003.
MICE Hydrogen System MICE Collaboration Meeting, CERN, 29 March-2 April 2004 Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw, Yury Ivanyushenkov Applied Science Division,
MICE hydrogen review Summary of system hardware. System function To provide 22 litres of liquid hydrogen for use as a muon absorber within a superconducting.
LNG Hazards.
CNG STATION & GARAGE MODIFICATION CODES & STANDARDS Graham Barker Business Development Manager.
Mechanical Safety Systems and DSEAR Compliance
MICE hydrogen review System modifications. Relief circuit repair During leak testing of R&D tests, the insulating vacuum would not go lower than
MICE Hydrogen System Tom Bradshaw Yury Ivanyushenkov Elwyn Baynham Meeting October 2004 – Coseners House.
Patrick Thornton, SNS/FPE June 9, 2008
MICE Hydrogen Control System MICE H2 Review Meeting RAL 15 th Jan 2015 PJ Warburton – STFC Daresbury Lab.
The MICE Hydrogen System Summary Tom Bradshaw, Yury Ivanyushenkov, Elwyn Baynham, Tony Jones, Mike Courthold and Matthew Hills Rutherford Appleton Laboratory.
HVAC523 Basic Subsystems.
ERT 312 SAFETY & LOSS PREVENTION IN BIOPROCESS INTRODUCTION TO RELIEF
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGY Rosa Mª Rengel Gálvez Marina B. Gutiérrez García-Arias 11/09/2007 Rosa Mª Rengel Gálvez Marina B. Gutiérrez.
CXS490 Carbon Dioxide Systems
MICE Hydrogen Safety Functions IEC61508 Compliance & Emergency Procedures MICE Safety Review Meeting 4 th Oct 2011 PJ Warburton - Daresbury Lab.
Anhydrous Ammonia Emergency Preparedness v Information from the 2012 Emergency Response Guidebook v ID # 1005 v Guide # 125 v Name of Material Anhydrous.
© 2012 Delmar, Cengage Learning Chapter 5 Hazards of Liquids.
MICE Hydrogen Control System MICE Collaboration Meeting CM33 27 th July 2012 PJ Warburton – STFC Daresbury Lab.
Hydrogen system R&D. R&D programme – general points Hydrogen absorber system incorporates 2 novel aspects Hydrogen storage using a hydride bed Hydrogen.
Explosion An explosion is a rapid expansion of gases resulting in a rapid moving pressure or shock wave. The expansion can be mechanical or it can be.
Conceptual Design Review of the NPDGamma Experiment in Beam Line 13 Seppo Penttila NPDGamma project manager September 25, 2007 at SNS.
Hazard Identification
Hydrogen Pre-Operation Safety Review 4 th October 2011 Results from Helium Commissioning M Hills.
Safety Requirements and Regulations 10/3/20121Safety Requirements & Regulations James Sears.
The MICE Hydrogen System Safety Review Introduction Tom Bradshaw, Yury Ivanyushenkov, Elwyn Baynham, Tony Jones, Mike Courthold and Matthew Hills Rutherford.
MICE Hydrogen System Tom Bradshaw Yury Ivanyushenkov Elwyn Baynham Collaboration Meeting RAL October 2004.
MICE Hydrogen Control System MICE Safety Review Meeting 4 th Oct 2011 PJ Warburton - Daresbury Lab.
2 IMPACT - THE FIRE PERMIT = Hot Work Permit 3 Welcome ! This course is linked to the use of IMPACT, so it is assumed that: You know how to use IMPACT.
CM 28 – 6 th October 2010 LH2 Infrastructure M Hills M Courthold T Bradshaw I Mullacrane P Warburton.
LH2 Safety Issues for MICE 1.O2/LH2 separation 2.No Ignition sources near LH2 3.Adequate ventilation 4.Affects: Windows: absorbers and vacuum Primary and.
CM27 – 8 th July 2010 LH2 System Progress and Future Plans M Hills T Bradshaw M Courthold I Mullacrane P Warburton.
Progress on Hydrogen R&D System
Johan Bremer, 22th-26th September 2008 Cryogenics Operations 2008, CERN, Geneva, Switzerland 1 CRYOGENICS OPERATIONS 2008 Organized by CERN Safety aspects.
SAFETY WITH CRYOGENIC SYSTEMS. Safety aspects 1. Physiological 2. Suitability of materials and construction 3. Explosions and flammability 4. Excessive.
Hydrogen Control System MJD Courthold TW Bradshaw Y Ivanyushenkov D Baynham.
Progress on Hydrogen R&D System Yury Ivanyushenkov on behalf of Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw, Mike Courthold Matthew Hills, Tony Jones MICE Collaboration.
1 Liquid Hydrogen R&D test report CM34 – 17/10/12 S Watson P Warburton M Courthold.
Duy Phan, EN-STI-RBS. Description of the hazards  An Oxygen Deficiency Hazard (ODH) exists when the concentration of O2 ≤ 19.5 % (by volume)  Cold burns.
BY FRANS WILBRINK WILBRINK & ASSOCIATES. OUTLINE Classify the different types of hazardous areas Identify the risks associated with each of these areas.
Working group meeting 07/05/15. Agenda Overview of review and current action list Relief system – Summary of problem – Details of analysis, testing and.
MICE Safety Review Meeting 4th Oct 2011 PJ Warburton - Daresbury Lab
Status of Hydrogen System Development
PCV and EVAP Emission Control Systems
Risk Management Student Powerpoint
Presentation transcript:

Hydrogen R&D system HAZOP and failure analysis Yury Ivanyushenkov, Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw, Mike Courthold, Matthew Hills and Tony Jones

2 Hydrogen Properties The potential hazards of liquid hydrogen stem mainly from three important properties: 1.Its extremely low temperature 2.Its very large liquid to gas expansion ratio 3.Its wide range of flammable limits after vapourising to gas

3 Hydrogen Hazards Consequences (hazards) of these properties: 1. => - severe burns can be produced upon contact with the skin; - some materials can become brittle and easily broken 2.=> overpressure => - excessive deformation of a vessel; - rupture of the pressure vessel 3.=> fire => - injury of personnel - damage to equipment / property Fire is a primary hydrogen hazard !

4 Hydrogen Hazards (2) Fire is a primary hydrogen hazard ! A fire can result from two scenarios [1]: (1)- Hydrogen is released, - mixes with an oxidizer, - forms a combustible mixture, - the mixture contacts an ignition source, - and ignition occurs. (2)- The hydrogen system is contaminated with an oxidizer (as a result of improper purging and/or in leakage of an oxidizer, such as air), - the hydrogen and the oxidizer form a combustible mixture; - the combustible mixture contacts an ignition source; - and ignition occurs. [1] Guide for Hydrogen Hazards Analysis on Components and Systems, NASA TP-WSTF-937

5 MICE Hydrogen R&D System Node 1 Node 4 Node 3 Node 2 Node 5

6 HAZOP: Nodes Node 1: Metal hydride storage unit Node 2: Hydrogen absorber vessel Node 3: Hydrogen absorber vacuum jacket Node 4: Buffer tank Node 5: Hydrogen enclosure

7 HAZOP: Node 1 Node 1: Metal hydride storage unit NoParameterGuide word CauseConsequenceSafeguardsRecommendations 1PressureHigherHydride bed is overheated. Hydrogen goes back into the absorber rather then to be stored in the hydride bed. Pressure in the absorber can exceed the max working pressure. Pressure regulator to reduce the pressure on the line to the absorber. Pressure relief valve to vent outside. Active pressure gauge to trigger an alarm. Consider implementation of an active pressure gauge. Intent: To keep hydrogen gas in the storage unit - absorber vessel closed system.

8 HAZOP: Node 2 Node 2: Hydrogen absorber vessel NoParameterGuide word CauseConsequenceSafeguardsRecommendations 1TemperatureLowerToo much cooling power. Pressure in the hydrogen system drops below atmospheric, the system is vulnerable for the ingress of air. Active pressure gauge to trigger an alarm. Temperature sensor to trigger an alarm. Additional: Liquid hydrogen level meter to trigger an alarm. The temperature and pressure to be continuously monitored. Additional: Implement an active liquid level meter. 2TemperatureHigherNot enough cooling power. Power cut. Liquid hydrogen evaporates and LH2 level eventually goes down. Hydrogen pressure rises. Temperature sensor to trigger an alarm Additional: Liquid hydrogen level meter to trigger an alarm. Pressure gauge to trigger an alarm. As above. 3PressureLowerAbsorber hydrogen vessel is leaking. Absorber hydrogen vessel is over cooled. Hydrogen leaks into vacuum vessel. Pressure in the system drops and air might leak into the system if seals are faulty. Active pressure gauge to trigger an alarm. Temperature sensor to trigger an alarm. As above. Intent: To keep hydrogen liquid inside hydrogen absorber module.

9 HAZOP: Node 3 Node 3: Hydrogen absorber vacuum jacket NoParameterGuide wordCauseConsequenceSafeguardsRecommendations 1PressureHigherHydrogen internal vessel leaks. Vacuum jacket or seals are leaking Hydrogen leaks into vacuum jacket Air leaks into vacuum jacket. Pressure in the vacuum jacket goes up and heat load onto hydrogen vessel increases. Pressure relief valve to vent hydrogen outside in case of rapid pressure rise. Pressure gauge to trigger an alarm. Pressure to be continuously monitored. Intent: - To insulate thermally the internal hydrogen vessel. - To provide additional barrier for air.

10 HAZOP: Node 4 Node 4: Buffer tank NoParameterGuide wordCauseConsequenceSafeguardsRecommendations 1PressureLowerHydrogen internal vessel is over- cooled. Potential ingress of air into the buffer tank if it leaks. Temperature control loop in the hydrogen vessel cooling system.. Active pressure gauge triggers an alarm. Pressure to be continuously monitored. Intent: To quickly relief pressure in the test absorber module in case of accidental rapid pressure rise.

11 HAZOP: Node 5 Node 5: Hydrogen enclosure NoParameterGuide wordCauseConsequenceSafeguardsRecommendations 1Hydrogen concentr ation HigherHydrogen leaks out hydrogen pipes. Hydrogen leaks out hydride bed. Venting system stopped working due to power cut. Explosive oxygen- hydrogen mixture can be formed Ventilation system to quickly vent hydrogen out. Hydrogen detector to trigger an alarm and to start a high rate mode for the ventilation system. Fans in the venting system are powered by UPS. Consider installation of additional active hydrogen detector. Intent: To localize and vent hydrogen off in case of hydrogen leakage.

12 HAZOP: Recommendations Hydrogen storage unit: C onsider implementation of active pressure gauge Hydrogen absorber internal vessel: Implement monitoring of pressure temperature and liquid hydrogen level Hydrogen absorber vacuum jacket: Implement monitoring of pressure Buffer tank Implement monitoring of pressure Hydrogen module enclosure Consider implementation of more than one active hydrogen detectors.

13 No.Failure ModeEffectCriticalityComments 1Failure of electricity supply The temperature control of the hydride bed will be lost and the hydride will absorb hydrogen up to its equilibrium point. If there is liquid hydrogen in the system it will be evolved and absorbed by the hydride. The loss of vacuum will accelerate this process. Need to ensure that the hydride bed can accommodate the evolution rate else hydrogen will be lost through the vent line. Normally loss of vacuum is gradual. 2Failure of chiller/heater unit to hydride Temperature control of the hydride will be lost and it will absorb up to its equilibrium pressure. When the pressure in the vessel riches the relief valve setting point, hydrogen venting starts. Hydride bed vessel design pressure is about 30 bar. Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Preliminary FMECA

14 Preliminary FMECA (2) No.Failure ModeEffectCriticalityComments 3Rupture of line between hydride and absorber Hydrogen will be lost and detected by hydrogen detectors in the vent line. The hydrogen detectors are the only indication of system gas loss. 4Fire in vicinity of hydride This will cause a rise in temperature of the hydride bed leading to evolution of the hydrogen. The pressure will rise leading to venting as soon as the relief valve operates. The hydrogen will be vented at roof level away from the scene of the fire. Is the hydride flammable ?