© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info SM Challenges of Deploying DNSSEC: Prepare your ccTLD with Secondary DNS services LACNIC Meeting May 2010 Presented by:

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Presentation transcript:

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info SM Challenges of Deploying DNSSEC: Prepare your ccTLD with Secondary DNS services LACNIC Meeting May 2010 Presented by: Roland LaPlante SVP, Chief Marketing Officer Afilias

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info 2 Agenda DNSSEC is coming ! DNSSEC is BIG ! How to protect your TLD Speaker: Roland LaPlante

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info DNSSEC is at the tipping point BarriersIncentives New hw & sw solutions Testbed deployments Signed TLDs:.org,.gov,.se Signed Root CostsComplexity NO YES Speaker: Roland LaPlante

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info DNSSEC is coming Several TLDs have signed their zones already –.ORG,.GOV,.SE,.PM, BR, BG, CZ, PR (.com plans early 2011) Plans in place for domains to be signed as well The root to be signed in July, 2010 – May 5: DURZ deployed to all 13 root servers (deliberately unvalidatable root zone) for observation – July: Distribution of validatable, production, signed root zone; publication of root zone trust anchor.ORG deploying DNSSEC for second level domains in June, 2010 All ICANN new TLDs will be required to have DNSSEC at launch Afilias: supports.ORG’s deployment; provides secondary DNSSEC ready DNS service for.SE Speaker: Roland LaPlante

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info 1.DNS loads WILL increase for 3 reasons: Larger Zone File Size Greater Bandwidth Requirements More Traffic DNSSEC is BIG—really! Speaker: Roland LaPlante

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info 1.For EVERY signed domain, your zone file will now have to store and provide: Digital signer record to point to the Public Key Signature records 2.On average, you should expect your zone file to increase 4-6 times its current size. More data = more space Zone File increases Speaker: Roland LaPlante

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info 1.DNSSEC responses contain more information Initial DNS response (e.g.: for SOA record), PLUS RRSig DNSKey 2.A DNSSEC response is about 4k vs. 512b for a regular DNS query 3.Factor in more bandwidth and processing power to handle larger responses for EACH DNSSEC QUERY 4.Extra Bandwidth requirement: 2-4x (estimated) Bandwidth increases Speaker: Roland LaPlante

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info More TCP queries: DNS uses UDP, a lightweight protocol, to return responses for DNS queries. BIND 9.4.x (and earlier versions) limit UDP responses to 512 bytes Since DNSSEC information is larger (~4k), responses can be truncated Those who use UDP may resend a TCP query to get DNSSEC info **Most signed TLDs report 1-2% TCP traffic increase. Key Rollover: No industry standards for key storage down the “chain of trust” (until root validates) If a validating resolver caches an out of date key, you could see query traffic increase for those that need to renew the key Traffic impact: +1% in TCP traffic? Hard to estimate until the root is signed Traffic Increases Speaker: Roland LaPlante

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info The most ubiquitous DNS software – BIND – already asks for DNSSEC information built in This means you will be serving signature information as soon as you sign 50% of the traffic Afilias sees TODAY asks for DNSSEC information How will you be ready for the increases in load? Speaker: Roland LaPlante

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info 1.Reduces the risk of load increases from DNSSEC deployment – Effortlessly handle significant increases in DNS load once you sign your TLD with DNSSEC. – Economical and risk-free way of ensuring 100% DNS up-time when deploying DNSSEC. 2.Guarantees 100% uptime of your DNS (regardless of DNSSEC) – Insurance against unexpected traffic spikes. – Protection in case of a full network outage by DDoS. – Protection from zero day vulnerabilities. 3.Augment your existing DNS network – Minimizes the expenses and capital requirements to expand your existing DNS network. Why consider secondary DNS? Speaker: Roland LaPlante

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info Afilias offers secondary DNS Secondary DNS services Primary DNS services Complete Registry + DNS services Special Offer: FREE 45 days of Secondary DNS Support for ccTLDs that sign their zone with DNSSEC Special Offer: FREE 45 days of Secondary DNS Support for ccTLDs that sign their zone with DNSSEC Speaker: Roland LaPlante

© Afilias Limitedwww.afilias.info SM Thank you! Roland LaPlante