Enhanced Secure Dynamic DNS Update with Indirect Route David Wilkinson, C. Edward Chow, Yu Cai 06/11/2004 University of Colorado at Colorado Springs IEEE.

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Presentation transcript:

Enhanced Secure Dynamic DNS Update with Indirect Route David Wilkinson, C. Edward Chow, Yu Cai 06/11/2004 University of Colorado at Colorado Springs IEEE Information Assurance Workshop 2004

Introduction to DNS DNS: Domain Name System DNS translates between domain names and IP addresses. Berkeley Internet Name Domain package (BIND). DNS was designed two decades ago. DNS is undergoing changes with various enhancements.  DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions)  Dynamic DNS update and secure DNS update RFC  DNS for loading balancing and traffic distribution  Storing IPSec keying material in DNS  And many more

Introduction to SCOLD SCOLD: Secure COLlective Defense system, designed to defend against DDoS attack. The key idea of SCOLD: follow intrusion tolerance and network reconfiguration paradigm by providing alternate routes via a set of proxy servers and alternate gateways when the normal route is unavailable or unstable due to network failure, congestion, or DDoS attack. In SCOLD, the DNS is utilized to store the indirect routing information, like the proxy server IP addresses

Introduction to SCOLD Motivation of SCOLD:  Multiple gateways or multi-homing scheme are popular.  When the main gateway is under attack, the traffic should be redirected through the alternate gateways.  We may not want to reveal the alternate gateway IP addresses to public domain, because otherwise they may become new targets of attacks.  We design to use proxy servers to protect the alternate gateways and reroute the traffic. A key technique in SCOLD is the enhanced secure dynamic DNS update with indirect route. We refer to it as the IR DNS update.

SCOLD Overview: Target site under DDoS attack

SCOLD Overview: The control flow

SCOLD Overview: Indirect Route

The enhanced DNS update with indirect route: IR DNS Redefine the DNS record format for storing the additional information. A sample of the new DNS record in the DNS zone file: The first line is a normal DNS entry, containing host name and its IP address. The next 3 lines contain the IP addresses of proxy servers, as the newly defined “ALT” type (type 99). target.targetnet.com. 10 IN A target.targetnet.com. 10 IN ALT IN ALT IN ALT

Why DNS update with Indirect Route? In the scenario of DDoS attack, the main gateway of the target server domain may become unavailable or unstable. Therefore, the normal DNS update might experience significant delay or even completely fail. By setting up indirect route and perform the DNS update via the indirect route, we can overcome the problem. IR DNS can also be used to protect the Root DNS servers.

IR DNS update

Protect the root DNS server

Implementation We implement the IR DNS update on BIND v and Redhat Linux v. 8 / 9. The indirect route is implemented by using IP tunnel protocol The BIND 9 DNS server was enhanced. The DNS dynamic update utility (nsupdate) was enhanced as a new program named “nsreroute” The domain name resolve library (v.2.3.2) was enhanced An agent program runs on each participating node (DNS servers, proxy servers, gateways) listening for the control message.

Implementation All the control messages are encrypted using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and all participating nodes must be mutually authenticated. Nsreroute and input_file format: nsreroute input_file reroute client.clientnet1.com. victimDNSserver1.victimnet.com. victimDNSserver2.victimnet.com.... reroute client.clientnet2.com. victimDNSserver1.victimnet.com. victimDNSserver2.victimnet.com....

Experimental Results

1.Overhead of resolve library and DNS server is limited 2.Overhead of IP tunnel is acceptable 3.There is a limit on how many client DNS servers one IR DNS update can handle concurrently. 4.Overhead of Indirect Route is acceptable compared with the impact of DDoS attacks % overhead vs. possibly infinity

Conclusion We present the design and implementation of the IR DNS update. It is an essential part of the SCOLD system, but can also serve as a useful extension to the existing DNS update utility. BIND 9 DNS package is modified to support IR DNS update. IP tunnel was utilized to implement indirect routing. New ALT 99 type data is defined and a new DNS update utility named nsreroute is developed. The preliminary results show that SCOLD can improve the network security, availability and performance.

References [1] P. Mockapetris, “Domain Names--Implementation and Specification”, RFC 3658, Nov. 1987RFC 3658 [2] P. Mockapetris, “Domain Names--Concepts and Facilities”, RFC 1034, Nov. 1987RFC [3] Internet Systems Consortium, “ISC BIND”, [4] The SANS Institute, “How To Eliminate The Ten Most Critical Internet Security Threats” [5] Internetnews.com, “Massive DDoS Attack Hit DNS Root Servers”, [6] Edward Chow, Yu Cai, “Secure Collective Defense system (SCOLD)”, SCOLD_globecom2004.doc, submitted to Globecom 2004 [7] DNSSEC, [8] Dynamic DNS update, RFC 2136, [9] Secure DNS update, RFC 3007, [10] Y. Shim, et al., “Extension and Design of Secure Dynamic Updates in Domain Name Systems”, 5th Asia-Pacific Conference on Communications, 1998