Explaining the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement

EC/EU Objectives Promote domestic economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe Promote international stability and peaceful resolution of conflicts Goals remained constant, but means have varied

Widening vs. Deepening France: deepening favored over widening Great Britain: deepening favored over widening Germany: deepening and widening

France Why deepening? – Contain Germany within a political union Why not widening? – Enlargement would shift balance of power in favor of Germany – Reduce France’s benefits from the CAP – Not as vulnerable to consequences of instability Policies – Monetary union (and political union?) – Slow down enlargement

Great Britain Why widening? – Widening would make deepening more difficult Why not deepening? – Reluctance to give up sovereignty Policies – Stay out of EMU – Support enlargement to the East

Germany Why deepening? – Bind present and future governments to (Western) Europe – Win French support for German unification Why widening? – Promote stability in Eastern Europe Policies – EMU and enlargement

What’s Being Explained Decision to enlarge to the East – 1993 Copenhagen European Council accepts enlargement contingent on political and economic reforms Timing of the decision to enlarge Reconsideration of the enlargement strategy at December 1999 Helsinki European Council

Enlargement Strategy July 1997: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia judged to have met political and economic conditions Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria did not meet the economic conditions. Slovakia did not meet political conditions Membership negotiations open with the five front-runners in March 1998

Three Explanations Liberalism (liberal intergovernmentalism) – Economic interests Sociological institutionalism – Identity and norms Geopolitics – Promoting stability in Eastern Europe – Maintaining relative influence within the EU

Liberalism Policymaking dominated by sectoral interests Logic – Those who would benefit most from increased economic interdependence should favor it

Liberalism’s Predictions Limited concessions Those bordering Eastern Europe should favor enlargement

Empirical Support for Liberalism Explains – opposition to enlargement – trade and cooperation agreements and Europe Agreements Does not explain – Shift in favor of membership in 1993 – 1999 decision to open up negotiations with those excluded in 1997

Sociological Institutionalism (SI) Identity and norms explain – Enlargement – Conditionality Logic – Becoming a member of an organization means adopting the collective identity of the organization EU: adopt liberal values and norms

Predictions of SI Accession conditions reflect the EU’s liberal values and norms Countries selected for accession talks should – Match EU members – Be different from those not invited to talks

Empirical Support for SI, I Explains – Accession conditions does reflect the EU’s liberal values and norms The new members do share the EU’s collective identity – 1997 decision to open accession talks with the five frontrunners Different from those not invited

Empirical Support for SI, II Does not explain – Shift in policy in 1993 – 1999 decision to open talks with the other five associates

Geopolitics Geopolitical considerations – Need to promote stability in Eastern Europe – Maintain influence and power in the EU These considerations explain – Decision to enlarge as well as its timing – Conditions attached to membership – Reconsideration of enlargement strategy in 1999

Hypotheses Hypothesis 1: High threat  Favor deeper/costlier engagements with Eastern Europe Hypothesis 2: States whose influence will increase will favor enlargement, those whose influence will decrease will oppose it Hypothesis 3: Major geopolitical events that reveal new information  shifts in preferences and policies

Before 1993 Threat low enough that concerns about influence within EC predominated – France: favors deepening over widening (bind Germany) – Great Britain: favors widening over deepening (weaken supranational aspects) – Germany: favors both (stability and self-binding) Difference between France and Germany is consistent with hypothesis 1: threat higher for Germany All three positions consistent with hypothesis 2

The Decision to Enlarge New information – Rise of protectionist pressures in Eastern Europe – Conflicts on the Balkans, particularly Bosnia- Herzegovina Increases threat of instability, which changes the calculus, particularly France’s – Membership offered to promote and lock in reforms and provide stability (hypotheses 1 & 3)

Kosovo and the Shift in Enlargement Strategy Italy, Sweden, and Denmark argued in 1997 that strategy would create dangerous political divisions Argument rejected: limited intake would reduce costs (EU reforms) Kosovo crisis: threat reassessed Countries kept out would become disillusioned, reforms might be reversed 1999 Helsinki European Council: accession negotiations would begin with Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania (and Malta) Evidence consistent with hypotheses 1 & 3

Summary of Findings Support for hypotheses 1 and 3: – France supports enlargement as result of increased threat to stability after break-up of Yugoslavia (also Eastern European protectionism) – Shift in enlargement strategy after Kosovo: increased threat Support for hypothesis 2: – French position on enlargement driven in large part by desire to maintain influence in EU, constrain Germany – British position: enlargement will weaken supranational aspects – German position: consistent with hypotheses 1 & 2