Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Extending the Cournot Model.

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Presentation transcript:

Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Extending the Cournot Model

Our Example Q = 100 – 2p MC=5

Extending the Cournot Model The Reaction Function q A = 45 – (1/2)q B q B = 45 – (1/2)q A

Extending the Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output A’s Reaction Function B’s Reaction Function 45 90

Extending the Cournot Model New Assumptions Three firms, A, B, C Q = 100 – 2p MC=5

Extending the Cournot Model The Reaction Function q A = 45 – (1/2)(q B + q C ) q B = 45 – (1/2)(q A + q C )

Extending the Cournot Model The Reaction Function q A = 45 – (1/2)(q B + q C )

Extending the Cournot Model The Reaction Function q A = 45 – (1/2)(q B + q C ) q A = 45 – (1/2)(q A + q A )

Extending the Cournot Model The Reaction Function q A = 45 – (1/2)(q B + q C ) q A = 45 – (1/2)(q A + q A ) q A = 22.5

Extending the Cournot Model The Reaction Function q A = 45 – (1/2)(q B + q C ) q A = 45 – (1/2)(q A + q A ) q A = 22.5 q A + q B + q C = 67.5

Extending the Cournot Model The Reaction Function q A = 45 – (1/2)(q B + q C ) q A = 45 – (1/2)(q A + q A ) q A = 22.5 q A + q B + q C = 67.5

Extending the Cournot Model Graphing the Reaction Function A’s Output B’s Output A’s Reaction Function B’s Reaction Function 45 90

Extending the Cournot Model With Three Firms A’s Output B’s Output A’s Reaction Function B+C Reaction Function B+C Output

Extending the Cournot Model The Pattern With n firms, output is a fraction of the amount demanded in perfect competition

Extending the Cournot Model The Wudget Problem To Review Q = 630,000 – 300 p

Extending the Cournot Model The Wudget Problem To Review Q = 630,000 – 300 p MC = $500 A monopoly maximizes profits by selling 240,000 units at a price of $1300. Let’s call this year zero.

Extending the Cournot Model The Wudget Problem To Review Q = 630,000 – 300 p MC = $500 A monopoly maximizes profits by selling 240,000 units at a price of $1300 If MC = $400 in year one, the monopoly maximizes profits with P= $1250 and Q= 255,000

Extending the Cournot Model The Wudget Problem Now suppose that in year two a second firm starts making the wudget. MC = $400.

Extending the Cournot Model The Wudget Problem Now suppose that in the second year a second firm starts making the wudget. MC = $400. Q C = 640,000 – 300 (400) = 630, ,000 = 510,000

Extending the Cournot Model The Wudget Problem Now suppose that in the second year a second firm starts making the wudget. MC = $400. Q C = 630,000 – 300 (400) = 630, ,000 = 510,000 Q = (2/3)510,000 = 340,000 P = $967

Extending the Cournot Model Year Three Sales A third firm starts making the Wudget. MC =$400.

Extending the Cournot Model Year Three Sales and Price Q C = 510,000

Extending the Cournot Model Year Three Sales and Price Q C = 510,000 Q=(3/4)510,000=382,500 q = 127,500

Extending the Cournot Model Year Three Sales and Price Q C = 510,000 Q=(3/4)510,000=382,500 q = 127,500 P = (630, ,500)/300 = $825

Extending the Cournot Model Years Four and Five A new firm enters each year

Extending the Cournot Model Years Four and Five A new firm enters each year. Without going through the algebra…

Extending the Cournot Model Years Four and Five A new firm enters each year. Without going through the algebra… Year Four: Q = 408,000, q = 102,000, P = $740

Extending the Cournot Model Years Four and Five A new firm enters each year. Without going through the algebra… Year Four: Q = 408,000, q = 102,000, P = $740 Year Five: Q = 425,000, q = 85,000, P = $683

Extending the Cournot Model Year by Year Summary YearPriceQuantity 0$ ,000 1$ ,000 2$967340,000 3$825382,500 4$740408,000 5$683425,000

Extending the Cournot Model Year by Year Summary YearPriceQuantity 0 $ ,000 1 $ ,000 2 $ ,000 3 $ ,500 4 $ ,000 5 $ ,000

Extending the Cournot Model Conclusion As the number of firms grows, P  MC The Cournot model gives us a series of predictions about how that will occur.

Extending the Cournot Model The Appeal of the Cournot Model With two firms, why not simply try the cooperative solution. With five firms…

Extending the Cournot Model How Many Economists does it take…? In fact we know the world is not as simple as the Cournot model So, how many firms does it take to get to the competitive price?

Extending the Cournot Model How Many Economists does it take…? Leonard Wiess Studied the process

Extending the Cournot Model How Many Economists does it take…? PmPm Number of Bidders

Extending the Cournot Model How Many Economists does it take…? PmPm Number of Bidders

Extending the Cournot Model How Many Economists does it take…? PmPm Number of Bidders PcPc

Extending the Cournot Model How Many Economists does it take…? PmPm Number of Bidders PcPc 4-8

Extending the Cournot Model How Many Economists does it take…? PmPm Number of Bidders PcPc 4-8 With that many firms, you essentially have perfect competition

Extending the Cournot Model End ©2003 Charles W. Upton