COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE ENERGY FROM THE BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Sergio G. Mathias LAS/ANS Symposium Rio de Janeiro, Brazil June 13-16, 2005

Angra 3 Angra 2 Angra 1

Typical share of Angra 1 and Angra 2 in previous years : 4% Production was lower in 2004 mainly because of two forced outages of Angra 2: failure of a Containment Isolation Valve (26 days) and malfunction of Electric Generator (32 days)

Typical share of Angra 1 and Angra 2 in previous years : 4% Production was lower in 2004 mainly because of two forced outages of Angra 2: failure of a Containment Isolation Valve (26 days) and malfunction of Electric Generator (32 days)

SHAKESPEAREAN DILEMMA IN THE OPERATION OF THE BRAZILIAN ELECTRIC SYSTEM To dispatch or not to dispatch the thermal plants, that is the question! Decision Future water inflows Operational consequences Wet OK Right decision ! Using the reservoirs Not using the reservoirs (Thermal plants can supply only 20% of load demand) Dry Risk of deficit OK Right decision ! Dry (Waste of fossil fuel) Wet Water spilling

E N E R G Y BRAZILIAN ELECTRIC SYSTEM GENERATORS CONSUMERS G2G2 G1G1 Spot Market Dn D2D2 D1D1 $ Financial contracts DISTRIBUTORS E N E R G Y Accounting of contracted/supplied differences GnGn Load Dispatcher

COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE ENERGY OF ANGRA 1 AND ANGRA 2 Estimated values for 2005:  = MWavg Spot price = 8 US$/MWh Composed average tariff = 45 US$/MWh ELETRONUCLEARELETRONUCLEAR FURNASFURNAS +  x spot price (limited to +  x tariff) -  x spot price (limited to -  x tariff) Contracted energy: 1,475 MWavg Tariff: 37 US$/MWh (Charged regardless of actual supply)

CONTRACTING OF ELECTRIC ENERGY Freely negotiated contracts Generators Freely negotiated prices “Free” consumers (consumption > 3 MW) Regulated contracts Generators Prices resulting from auctions Distributors Regulated tariffs “Captive” consumers ELETRONUCLEAR Regulated tariff FURNAS Angra 1Angra 2

“Reference” Offer Total Demand from the Distributors 2 nd round 3 rd round 4 th round 1 st round Prices Amounts of energy offered by the Generators AUCTIONS - FIRST PHASE -System specifies prices -Generators specify amounts of energy they want to sell

CBA A PA=PA= Amounts of energy offered by the Generators Contracted amounts B PBPB C PCPC P1P1 P 1 = Final price from the first phase AUCTIONS - SECOND PHASE Prices Total demand from the Distributors Generators specify amounts of energy they want to sell and prices (limited to prices resulting from the first phase)

THANK YOU !!! Sergio Mathias ELETRONUCLEAR Rio de Janeiro - Brazil