Defence Research and Development Canada Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada Canada EBO Experimentation and Limits of Knowledge Paul Comeau Dave Allen Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre and DRDC Centre for Operational Research and Analysis Ottawa Canada Complex Adaptive Systems Symposium DSTO, July 2006

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Today’s Military Operations..  Large number of entities interacting  Non-linear behavior, with feedback  Diversity of agents, behaviors, learning  Memory at micro/macro scales (experiences, opinions, culture, values)  Open system in multiple domains (PMESII)

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Why EBAO? Evolving global security environment –Complexity –Uncertain threats, asymmetry –Increasingly interconnected systems –‘Non-linear’ effects of operations –Numerous stakeholders –Need to orchestrate or synchronize application of instruments of national power

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Presentation Outline Objectives and Experiment Hypothesis A knowledge development framework Sample findings Knowledge representations Thoughts on a Way Ahead Questions

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO  Provide actionable recommendations from experimentation results to senior leaders to inform options for future force investments  Pursue rapid, prototyping of capabilities to improve joint warfighting now  SJFHQ  CD/CIE FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 02 Joint Prototype Path Joint Concept Development Path Feb 02 CollaborationPlanningMethodology MN LOE 1 MN LOE 2 MNE 4 MNE 3 Feb 03 KnowledgeInformationSharing Feb 04 EffectsBasedPlanning Feb/Mar 06 EffectsBasedOperations FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 02 Multinational Experimentation led by US JFCOM

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO EBO Capability Hypothesis IF an operational Commander and Staff employ effects-based operations, THEN they will have the ability to: Create a holistic understanding and representation of the operating environment, adversary, friendly, and neutral forces (KBD), Develop an operational plan that establishes clear links between the end-state (EBP) and –effects that must be created to achieve those objectives, –actions and causality intended to create the effects, –the joint, interagency, and multinational resources needed to conduct actions, and –harmonizes the full spectrum of diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) planning Coordinate, direct, and monitor task force operations (EBE), Assess actions and effects to identify deficiencies, recommend methods to improve force effectiveness, and assess progress towards achieving the commander’s end state. (EBA)

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Experiment Scenario Kabul Herat Resurgent Taliban capture an area north of Kandahar (Plan 1A) Farah Insurgents attack a provincial capitol threatening to undermine the Afghan Government ( NRF N) Severe winter weather and increased numbers of refugees create a deepening humanitarian crisis (Plan 2) Kandahar NRF plans for hand-off and redeployment (NRF R)

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Effects-Based Operations – 4 Main Functions Knowledge Dev’t Planning Execution Assessment Observe OrientDecide Act …the OODA Loop? Simplified view on a non-linear process

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Coalition Task Force HQ Organization for MNE4

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO EBO Capability Hypothesis IF an operational Commander and Staff employ effects-based operations, THEN they will have the ability to: Create a holistic understanding and representation of the operating environment, adversary, friendly, and neutral forces (KBD/KM), Develop an operational plan that establishes clear links between the end-state (EBP) and –effects that must be created to achieve those objectives, –actions and causality intended to create the effects, –the joint, interagency, and multinational resources needed to conduct actions, and –harmonizes the full spectrum of diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) planning Coordinate, direct, and monitor task force operations (EBE), Assess actions and effects to identify deficiencies, recommend methods to improve force effectiveness, and assess progress towards achieving the commander’s end state. (EBA)

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Knowledge Management (KM Plan ver 0.9) Govern and Facilitate to achieve organizational objectives Create Organize Formalize Distribute Apply Evolve Knowledge Request Management Collaboration Business Rules and Env’t Maintenance KB Interface (Business Rules for Content and access) Visualization (COP, SoSA products) KM Training Knowledge ProcessesKM Activities

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) Voice/Text Chat Pervasive

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Data Information Knowledge Wisdom? How can we view Knowledge? Data: that upon which pattern generation and recognition occurs Information: Patterns of data that reduce uncertainty*, symbolically H=  p(A i ) log 2 (1/P(A i )) Knowledge†: Interpretation of Information as propositions P in context  on a subject S accepted as true or probable with belief , and encoded for use in reasoning by an individual Based on Shannon, 1948 † Generalized from references Related to “Justified true belief”...

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Sample Knowledge Base

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Sample Findings: Situational Awareness and Understanding over Time Finding – The level of staff SA/SU initially increased after the first week but stabilized quickly to a level that was less than perfect (~60%).

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Situational Awareness/Understanding by Functional Group

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO SA/SU for 3 rd Survey Week 3 … Zoom box Correct answers

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO SA/SU for 3 rd Survey … Correct answers Finding: Knowledge well developed for individuals within most functional groups, both for military and civilian affiliation

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Knowledge Development High scores (> 90% correct responses): „The longer the CTF’s presence in Afghanistan, the more it will be viewed as an occupational force by the Afghan population.“ (T) “In 2006, opium trade will be a minor source for funding Taliban.” (F) “CTF assumes that Adversary Forces will very likely exploit international boundaries.” (T) Low scores (< 30% correct responses) “If international reconstruction aid continues in line with that up to 2001, then Afg reconstruction needs will be sufficiently supported.” (T) “In 2005, most Afghan provinces had no Prov Dept to assist returnees.” (F) “Introducing standardized documentation into Afghanistan’s main value transfer system will increase its viability.” (F) “Extensive experience with teacher-training programs is UNDP’s key strength.” (F) “Assistance from the Pakistan Government combined with appropriate boarder agreements will reduce the number of illegal ACM border crossings.” (F) “According to EB Plan 1, increasing the number of escorted Convoys will affect the MOE for Effect 006 (ACM Ineffective) positively.” (F)

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Information Interpretation Finding: Assigning correct degree of belief improved with time but staff overestimated their knowledge overall Guess Correct Low Certain Approximate Expected Calibration Source: KBD analysis

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Knowledge Requests over Time EBO is knowledge intensive; KR demand close to linear over time (rate = 8 new KRs per day) Most KRs acknowledged quickly but slow to respond, 50% adequately responded, many dropped Cumulative Elapsed Still open at ENDEX

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Knowledge Request Timeliness Response times varied by assigned group MNIG could not access req’d info sources (open sources) Intel forwarded most KRs, vice providing answers

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Quality of Knowledge Support Finding: Majority of role players dissatisfied with both quality and timeliness of responses LOW HIGH

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Defining the Operational End-State (Example) A secure environment in the AFG SW administrative zone free of major internal and external threats within 18 months, in order to enable and support enduring goals of: –Establishing a regional representative Gov’t –Establishing the rule of law based on human rights and public confidence –Pursuing humanitarian national development efforts –Building capacity of AFG security forces so they can maintain security in the SW area –Setting the conditions for improved opportunities for legal economic and social development

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Objectives to Effects Links (Example) Legitimate & Stable Afg Gov’t Rule of Law based on Hum.Rights & Justice System Self-Sustaining Legal Economy ASF maintaining Law and Order / Territorial integrity Neutralize terrorists/insurgents E002 Security for Hum Assistance Ops E004 ASF capable of maintaining security E003 Basic Health Services for Population E004 Citizens know legal system GoA authority established E005 Schools Operating E001a Critical Infrastructure Re-established Coalition Strategic Objectives Effects (in CJOA-SA) Op Level Military End State Atributes: Enduring Security to enable GoA, HR, HA, Conditions for Legal, Social, Economic Development E006 Anti-Gov’t Forces Rendered Innefective Commander’s Approved Effects List E004b GoA policies Implemented by Region/local auth. E001 Security for Reconstruction Efforts (defeat now, deter future) Contributes to E007 Gov’t Forces Maintain Lawful Env’t

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO CTF Approved Effects List and Assumed Dynamics

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Knowledge Representation: Insurgency Dynamics

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Systemic Analysis Example - Influence Diagram Insurgency Pattern - Mechanisms of Taliban Victory Anti Subversion Efforts Taliban Social and Political Efforts Transfer Rate Population Supporting Taliban Strength Supplies and Recruits Supply Control Efforts Military Response Persuasion Loop + +/- Compulsion Loop +/- Logistic Loop +/- Paul Müller, Analyst adapted from R. G. Coyle

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Knowledge Formalization 11 variants of “Humanitarian Influences” diagram by 3 authors in KB Weak evidence of collaboration, ‘validation’, or alternate perspectives

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Overall Assessment Results Player audience did not gain a holistic understanding of the system Wide variation in knowledge within groups EBO is knowledge intensive Limited deep thought about effects, what would prevent achievement, and anticipation of undesired effects, possible emergence; could not infer causality or influence Adaptation not considered explicitly Belief revision was ad hoc and individual; lack of knowledge formalization, and recognition of uncertainty Coalition perspective dominates knowledge creation

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Thoughts on a Way Forward Understand CAS concepts in relation to EBO; recognize limits of knowledge, importance of sense making and own perspective Use a discovery approach; Update and revise Beliefs based on new evidence Systems not necessarily controllable, nor observable; develop policies to influence evolution toward end-state goals Examine inference networks (Bayesian Nets) and linked systems analysis for application to EBO (e.g. RiskOutlook) Both theory and field experimentation required to operationalize EBO concept

Defence R&D Canada – CORA R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO Questions? I shall proceed from the simple to the complex. But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together. Carl von Clausewitz On War, 1831 in the long run the only sustainable competitive advantage is your organization’s ability to learn faster than the competition. Peter Senge – The Fifth Discipline