Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk Simulated killing Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Simulated killing The dramatization, i.e. enactment, of killing within a fictional context, e.g. in video games, films and plays Playing the killer Witnessing a killing Why worry? If simulated killing is wrong, obviously it is not for the same reasons that killing is wrong Is any representation morally ok, e.g. rape? What are the real effects of simulated killing?

Playing the killer

Utilitarianism Could simulated killing lead to real harm, e.g. an increased risk of killing, aggressive behaviour, becoming less responsive to distress, approval of violence? This is an empirical claim Evidence: yes, in the short term, though perhaps only in boys or people with violent personalities (Young, Ethics in the Virtual World) No, in the long term (perhaps, for some people)

Utilitarianism Any real harm must be weighed against real pleasure of playing the game Common morality: simulated killing is widely considered normal development But is it ‘childish’? So what? Lower pleasure?

Kantian deontology Playing the killer is no violation of one’s duty, but damaging one’s rational will is Could cruel fictional actions encourage real cruelty? The evidence doesn’t support this Could we fail to develop our moral identity?

Virtue ethics We become just by doing just acts But why think that simulating unjust acts will develop an unjust character Would a virtuous person engage in simulated killing? What is the right way, the right motive, the right times? Should we take pleasure from simulated killing? Can we enjoy such pleasures virtuously, e.g. is it within a narrative structure or the point of the game?

Game and reality The ‘mean’ is relative to the individual Someone who cannot keep the game and reality separate should not play Evidence again: perhaps someone who can draw both a conceptual and emotional distinction is not at risk of real psychological effects

Acting the killer Actors don’t imitate real-life killings, but pretend to kill according to agreed conventions Actors don’t feel genuine rage (etc.), but at most, fictional counterparts To feel such emotions would blur the boundary between the character’s psychology and the actor’s

An audience’s perspective

Make-belief With fiction, we ‘make-believe’ that what we see is real Is it wrong to make-believe a killing? Killing is sometimes right What can be wrong with engaging fictionally with a morally right killing? But what about morally wrong killings? Utilitarianism: depends on consequences

Morality in fiction A simulated immoral killing can be presented as immoral, the killer as wretched Or it can be presented as moral – the morality of the work of fiction disagrees with our own Is it wrong to imagine that what is immoral is moral? What does the author intend? We need to be able to keep our ‘moral distance’