U.S. Government Nuclear Forensics Operations September 16, 2014 Jeffrey Morrison Program Manager National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center

The Challenge: Nuclear Terrorism is a Persistent Threat “I continue to believe that nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security. That’s why working to prevent nuclear terrorism is going to remain one of my top national security priorities as long as I have the privilege of being President of the United States.” President Obama (NDU, 3 Dec 2012) A nuclear attack would change our way of life. Terrorists have called for a nuclear attack on the US. The availability of nuclear and radiological material continues to increase as nations develop the capability to produce nuclear power. Nuclear terrorism remains an enduring risk because of its potential consequences.

IAEA Illicit Trafficking Data The IAEA reports over 2160 incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear material between 1993 & 2011 Source: IAEA Incident &Trafficking Database

DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office DNDO was established in DHS as an interagency office in 2005 (NSPD 43/HSPD 14) and authorized by the 2006 SAFE Port Act. “To improve the Nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time.” DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center was established in 2006 (NSPD 17/HSPD 4) and authorized by the 2010 Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act (P.L. 111-140). “To ensure an enduring national technical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen the collective response of the United States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear attacks.”

Nuclear Forensics: from Deterrence to Attribution Trace origin of materials to help identify and close smuggling networks. Inform national response decisions. Disrupt follow-on event. Support prosecution. Enhance deterrence. Intelligence Community } Technical Nuclear Forensics All-source info fused Law Enforcement Through its support to attribution, nuclear forensics plays a role across the entire nuclear defense spectrum from deterrence to attribution – both pre-event and post event. These are priorities for nuclear forensics – to support deterrence; counter nuclear smuggling; in the event of an attack or interdiction -- assist the investigation and disrupt follow on attacks; inform national response options; and support prosecution efforts. Technical nuclear forensics conclusions, information from IC and LE fused to develop attribution assessment. Materials Device Debris Deter- Dissuade Detect Interdict Render Safe Post-Det Cons. Mgmt. Secure Attribution Recovery Nuclear Defense Spectrum

U.S. Policy “Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use WMD, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.” Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010 How do we discover those accountable?

LEAD AGENCY INVESTIGATION Interagency Mission DoD FBI DOE DOS DHS ODNI POST-DET LEAD AGENCY INVESTIGATION PRE- TO POST- DET INTERNATIONAL PRE-DET MATERIALS INTELLIGENCE ANL INL LANL LLNL NBL NIST ORNL PNNL Y-12 DoD Labs SRNL SNL A multi-agency mission built on the technical foundation of the national laboratories and US Air Force. This graphic illustrates the inherently interagency nature of the USG TNF capability – 6 Federal D/As, each with specific roles and responsibilities, supported by a foundation of technical expertise at the DOE National Laboratories. DHS, through DNDO, serves as the USG integrator/steward of the NTNF program and also as pre-det materials capability provider. The Defense Department leads in the post-det nuclear debris capability. Department of Energy has the pre-det device capability, as well as responsibility for/oversight of the national laboratories where most of the TNF work is done. Within the United States, and in other specific cases, FBI leads the investigative aspect of any terrorism incident, and the State department takes the lead in most international cases. Of course, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence corrals the intelligence community under its purview. The foundation of our national technical nuclear forensics capability is the strong scientific expertise and operational resources within the national laboratory system. New Brunswick Lab and the resources of NIST are relied on for help in the development of standardized and validated methodologies and standard reference materials.

DNDO’s Primary Interlocking Nuclear Forensics Missions

USG Integration and Readiness Joint planning National Strategic Plan, Implementation Plan, Annual Review to Congress Executive Council, Steering Committee, Working Groups Nuclear Forensics Requirements Center Joint exercising “Snowmaggedon” in New York “Prominent Hunt” in Indiana International (“Iron Koala” & “Galaxy Serpent”) Attribution TTX Joint assessments National Academy of Sciences: “Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk” OSTP “Nuclear Defense R&D Roadmap” Pipeline and Workforce studies DNDO’s NTNFC leads the integration of the USG interagency through joint planning, exercising and assessments.

Technology Advancement for Materials Signature Discovery Improving Analysis Methods Certified Reference Materials and Performance Testing Pattern Recognition and Other Evaluation Tools Material Production Timelines

Academic Pathway to a Nuclear Forensics Career National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program DNDO leading effort to restore the expertise pipeline – back from the brink Provided support to over 300 students and faculty and 23 universities since 2008, in close partnership with 11 national labs 19 new PhD nuclear forensic scientists in the workforce; on track to meet near-term milestone of 35 new PhDs by 2018 Program now viewed as model – Nuclear Security Summit 2014; future IAEA collaboration Relies on Multi-Disciplinary Expertise: Radiochemists Geochemists Analytical Chemists Nuclear Engineers Reactor Engineers Process Engineers Physicists Nuclear Physicists Statisticians Metallurgists Undergraduate Scholarships, Summer School Post-doctoral Fellowships Junior Faculty Awards National Lab Mentoring Graduate Fellowships, Internships University Education Awards Multi-Year R&D Funding

Nuclear Forensics International Cooperation Strengthening international collaboration is essential: Develops nuclear forensics core capabilities, shares best practices and lessons learned, and builds NF community Forum Members Focus Key Products 54 Heads-of-State (Invited) Effective momentum to existing NF efforts Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan, Communique 85 Partner Nations (Volunteer) Policy: NF capabilities awareness, best practices, TTXs NF Fundamentals Document, Iron Koala, NF Information Sharing 162 Member States NF guidance and training for member states Nuclear Security Series Documents, IAEA NF Training International scientists and law enforcement (volunteer) Technical forum and information exchange, analytical exercises Comparative Lab Analysis Exercises; National NF Libraries TOR

Quality Assurance “You have to be right – and you have to be able to prove that you’re right” Michael Chertoff Former Secretary of Homeland Security NTNFC Program Review – 29 July 2013

QA Systems in Nuclear Forensics Measurements must be scientifically and legally defensible ‘Daubert’ Standard Empirical testing: whether the theory or technique is falsifiable, refutable, and/or testable. Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication. The known or potential error rate. The existence and maintenance of standards and controls concerning its operation. The degree to which the theory and technique is generally accepted by a relevant scientific community. QA systems are used to provide a high level of confidence and reliability in nuclear forensics measurements ISO 17025 Accreditation Annual Proficiency Testing Annual Audits Certified Reference Materials Methodology Benchmarking Studies Exercises

Certified Reference Material Traceability Chain Nuclear Forensics Certified Reference Material Traceability Chain ANSI N42.23 BIPM CCQM/CCRI (Core Competencies) InterLab Comparisons Bq, g National Metrology Institutes: (NIST, IRMM, LNHB, NRC, NPL, PTB, etc.) SRMs/CRMs Isotopics/Assay Measurement Traceability & Evaluations (IRMM NUSIMEP/REIMEP Mass) Nuclear Forensics MQO/QC Requirements FBI, NMIP, DOE/NNSA, DoD, DHS Reference Laboratory: DOE/NBL InterLaboratory Comparisons LANL Pu Exchange AWE U Exchange IRMM NUSIMEP/REIMEP CRMs Meas Eval Prog (Mass, Isotopics) CRM Measurements Other Nat’l/Int’l Measurement Laboratories: (AWE, IAEA, CEA, ITU etc.) Measurement Laboratories: National Labs (INL, LLNL, LANL, PNL, SRNL, ORNL, etc.)

Methodology Benchmarking Studies Methodology Benchmarking Studies Designed to Establish: Data on the accuracy and precision of analytical methods used by different laboratories, including variation within and between laboratories. The most appropriate analytical methods for determining required TNF conclusions. A set of modern baselines and expectations for nuclear measurement performance. A compendium of “best practices” and “best standard operating procedures” for TNF. Strengths and weaknesses in measurement capability. Data for method validation and laboratory quality assurance. Uranium Methodology Benchmarking Completed in FY11 Plutonium Methodology Benchmarking Completed in FY12 Trace Actinides in Uranium Benchmarking Completed in FY14 Trace Actinides in Plutonium Benchmarking Underway

Key Points Nuclear forensics supports (does not equal) attribution Technical conclusions may be crucial to USG’s case May help to deter the facilitators (not the terrorists themselves) NTNF is a tightly coordinated multi-agency, cross-disciplinary mission The expertise pipeline is rebounding – promising career path QA is critical to ensuring defensible results “You have to be right – and you have to be able to prove that you’re right” Expectation management is crucial: “Substantial capabilities exist today, but much work remains to be done in order for capabilities to match expectations.”