COGNITIVE SCIENCE Dr. Tom Froese

Asimo breaks down (again)

Problems with classic AI Robustness (noise and fault-tolerance) Adaptability (generalizability) Integrated learning Real-time performance Sequential processing The Symbol Grounding Problem The Frame Problem The ‘Chinese Room’ Argument

Cognitive science map (Varela et al. 1991)

New cognitive science (4E)

New cognitive science: “4E” Cognition Cognition is Embodied, Embedded, Extended and Enactive … And Ecological! And Emotional! “Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many?” (Kiverstein and Clark 2009) "Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition” (Menary 2010) "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended” (Ward and Stapleton 2012)

The Embodied Mind Cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) Cognitive robotics (Pfeifer and Bongard 2007) Cognitive science (Varela et al. 1991; Gallagher 2005) Emotion science (Colombetti 2014) Bio-phenomenology (Thompson 2007)

The Embedded Mind Situated cognition is a theory that posits that knowing is inseparable from doing. All knowledge is situated in activity that is bound to social, cultural and physical contexts. It suggests a model of knowledge and learning that requires thinking on the fly rather than the storage and retrieval of conceptual knowledge. Mind is analyzed as a form of material practice. (Hutchins 1995; Malafouris 2013)

The Extended Mind Clark and Chalmers (1998) – one of the most cited papers in philosophy of mind in recent history! This approach retains much of the computationalist theory of mind (e.g., computation, representation, internalism) But it allows the mind to extend beyond the brain if some of its functions are realized externally. Extended functionalism! (Clark 2008)

The Ecological Mind The world appears in terms of its affordances for potential actions (Gibson). Affordances are relations between organisms and environments that can be shaped by physiological, cognitive and cultural factors. The environment is perceived directly (Gibson). Optic flow Chemero (2009)

The Enactive Mind Organisms actively bring forth their own worlds of significance via agent-environment interaction. Life-mind continuity thesis (Thompson 2007) Enactive perception (Varela et al. 1991; Noë 2004) To perceive is to act. Sensorimotor approach (O’Regan & Noë 2001) Radical enactivism (Hutto & Myin 2013) “Exploring the Diversity within Enactivism and Neurophenomenology” Constructivist Foundations

Oustanding issues Many advances, but core questions of cognitive are still left unanswered. How to define a body? How to define agency? How to define an action? How to define cognition? Etc… Enactivism tries to provide the answers.

References Chemero, A. (2009). Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. New York, NY: Oxford University Press Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. J. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7-19 Colombetti, G. (2014). The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press Di Paolo, E. A. (2015). El enactivismo y la naturalización de la mente. In D. Pérez Chico & M. G. Bedia (Eds.), Nueva Ciencia Cognitiva: Hacia una Teoría Integral de la Mente (in press). Zaragoza: PUZ

References Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press Gibson, J. J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press Kiverstein, J., & Clark, A. (2009). Introduction: Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many? Topoi, 28, 1-7 Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. New York, NY: Basic Books Malafouris, L. (2013). How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Menary, R. (2010). Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press

References O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5), Pfeifer, R., & Bongard, J. C. (2007). How the Body Shapes the Way We Think: A New View of Intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Ward, D., & Stapleton, M. (2012). Es are good: Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended. In F. Paglieri (Ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The Role of the Natural and Social Context in Shaping Consciousness (pp ). Amsterdam: John Benjamins

Homework Please read the whole article if possible: Di Paolo, E. A. (2015). El enactivismo y la naturalización de la mente. In D. Pérez Chico & M. G. Bedia (Eds.), Nueva Ciencia Cognitiva: Hacia una Teoría Integral de la Mente (in press). Zaragoza: PUZ Optional: van Gelder, T. & Port, R. F. (1995). It’s about time: An overview of the dynamical approach to cognition. In: R. F. Port & T. van Gelder (eds.), Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition (pp. 1-43). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press