On the Implausibility of Differing-Inputs Obfuscation (and Extractable Witness Encryption) with Auxiliary Input Daniel Wichs (Northeastern U) with: Sanjam.

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Presentation transcript:

On the Implausibility of Differing-Inputs Obfuscation (and Extractable Witness Encryption) with Auxiliary Input Daniel Wichs (Northeastern U) with: Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi

Overview of Result Differing-inputs obfuscation cannot exist assuming another form of obfuscation does exist. + science Theorems, Proofs philosophy / hand-waving What does it all mean?

Ancient History of Obfuscation ‘00-’13 First formally studied by [Hada 00] and [Barak et al. 01]. Defined strong notion of “virtual black-box obfuscation” (VBB). – Obfuscated code only as good as black-box access to program. Negative Result: VBB obfuscation is impossible for many “pathological functions” (contrived). – Cannot have general VBB obfuscation. – Don’t have a general class that excludes all “pathological functions”. Positive Results: Can obfuscate some very simple functions like “point functions” [Canetti ‘97, Wee ‘05,…].

Our Knowledge of VBB Obfuscation unobfusctable obfusctable unknown

Interpretation of VBB before ‘13 unobfusctable obfusctable

Candidate Obfuscator The first general candidate obfuscator [Garg-Gentry-Halevi-Raykova-Sahai-Waters 13] – Can be applied to any poly-time program. – Fails to be VBB for some “pathological functions”, but does not seem to have any other weakness.

Interpretation of VBB after ‘13 unobfusctable obfusctable Green or red?

General Obfuscation Assumption Can we have a general, simple-to-state, useful assumption about an obfuscator? Two such candidates proposed by [Barak et al. 01]: – Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO) – Differing-Inputs Obfuscation (diO)

Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Differing-Inputs Obfuscation

Recently explored by Ananth et al. [ABG+13] and Boyle et al. [BCP14] who showed many applications: – obfuscation for TMs – adaptively secure functional encryption for TMs. – extractable witness encryption Many results using iO can be simplified if we use diO.

Our Results General differing-inputs obfuscation cannot exist assuming that a “special-purpose obfuscation assumption” holds (a specific function can be obfuscated to hide specific info) (extractable witness encryption)

Counter-Example

At most one can survive! General differing-inputs obfuscation for all “differing-inputs distributions” [indistinguishability property] holds vs. Special-purpose obfuscation assumption given obfuscation of specific C* hard to recover a valid signature Not “falsifiable” [Naor 03 ] falsifiable implies existence of efficient algorithm without having a candidate

What to think of diO? General diO for all “differing-inputs families” is implausible. But diO and even VBB obfuscation can plausibly hold for most natural candidates that we’d like to obfuscate. – Better to rely on diO vs. VBB. Clarifies which property you really need. The search continues for a useful, plausible, general obfuscation assumption. Obfuscation is the new random oracle model ?

Thank you!