Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Tort Law Reform.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Business Operations/Construction Office of the Chief Counsel Torts Are Not Just Desserts JulieAnn Rico Allison, Chief Counsel to The School Board.
Advertisements

ECON 1450 – Professor Berkowitz Lectures on Chapter 2 Tort Law Area of Common Law concerned with accidental injuries Potential defendant engages in activity.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Is Tort Law about Money.
What You’ll Learn How to define negligence (p. 88)
Copyright © 2013, 2009, 2003, 1999, 1995, 1990, 1982, 1977, 1973, 1969 by Mosby, an imprint of Elsevier Inc. Chapter 5 Legal Implications of Practice.
Mg.iur. Jānis Kubilis PhD Student (University of Latvia) Attorney at Magnusson Law Firm 19 May 2014.
Law I Chapter 18.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Relying on Contracts.
Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics Ius Commune Conference Leuven Workshop Liability and Insurance November 26, 2010 Louis Visscher Rotterdam Institute.
Economics of Tort Law. CBO Study. The Economics of U.S. Tort Liability: A Primer, October 2003.
Hazards Liability and Tort Lecture 8. Outline Another economic role for the government is regulating hazards and risks Factory producing explosives (location.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Hicks-Kaldor Optimality.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Extensions of the Model.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Other Issues in Tort Law.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Takings. When the government takes property, the Constitution requires that “just compensation”. –The government exercises.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Errors in Application.
Managerial Economics-Charles W. Upton Asymmetric Information.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Negligence. The Problem Neither the rule of strict liability nor the rule of no liability gives both victim and injurer.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton A Model of Joint Action.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Coase on Pigou.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Levels of Activity.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton More on Remedies.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton A Model of Liability.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Private Goods vs. Public Goods.
Strict Liability and Torts and Public Policy Mrs. Weigl.
TORTS. TORT: WHEN ONE PERSON CAUSES HARM TO ANOTHER, THEIR PROPERTY, OR THEIR REPUTATION A CRIME CAN BE A TORT AS WELL BASIC QUESTIONS WHO SHOULD BE LIABLE.
4Chapter SECTION OPENER / CLOSER: INSERT BOOK COVER ART Intentional Torts Section 4.1.
Tech 435 – Legal Aspects of Safety Dr. E. Hansen, CIE Department of Technology NIU-DeKalb, IL.
1 Ins301 Chp12 Tort Law Background on the law Basic tort liability rules Liability from negligence Economic objectives of the tort liability system.
Essentials Of Business Law Chapter 30 Professionals’ Liability McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2007 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Liability Issues involving Domestic Violence in the Workplace Presented by Robin R. Runge, Esq. Director ABA Commission on Domestic Violence.
Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton The Coase Theorem.
LEE BURGUNDER LEGAL ASPECTS of MANAGING TECHNOLOGY Third Ed. LEGAL ASPECTS of MANAGING TECHNOLOGY Third Ed.
The role of international liability in the regulation of SRM field research: An economic analysis Jesse L. Reynolds – Faculty of Law,
Chapter 20 Negligence. The failure to exercise a reasonable amount of care in either doing or not doing something resulting in harm or injury.
Liability Exposure1 Chapter Outline 14.1Some Background on the Law 14.2Overview of Tort Liability Rules and Procedures Basic Tort Liability Rules No Liability.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2009 Lecture 16.
Strict Liability and Tort Reform. Strict liability requires the blame be put on the people conducting the unreasonably hazardous activity Even harm.
 Aim: How do we examine the nature or tort law?  Do Now: Review the Difference between civil and criminal law: 
Joint Liability and Indemnity Several people or companies may contribute to one loss. Each party will pay damages in proportion to the amount of their.
Final Exam Options 1.In class exam Tuesday, May 3, 20051:00-2:20 pm 134 Temple Hoyne Buell Hall 2.Normal final exam time Friday, May 13, :30-3:30.
American Public School Law Torts n Definition of a tort – Intentional interference – Strict Liability – Negligence – Elements of Negligence – Defenses.
Torts A tort is an act or omission which unlawfully violates a person’s right created by the law, and for which the appropriate remedy is a common law.
Chapter 09 Negligence and Strict Liability Copyright © 2012 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
TORTS & PUBLIC POLICY WHAT NEEDS TO BE CHANGED?. DOES THE SYSTEM NEED AN OVERHAUL? NO, IT DOES NOT: Fairly compensates injured victims Allocates benefits.
The Reasonable Person Negligence Standard and Liability Insurance Vickie Bajtelsmit Colorado State University Paul Thistle University of Nevada Las Vegas.
Sources of Law Relevant to Health Service Management  Constitutions little relevant to management  Statutes many statues that affect malpractice  Administrative.
WASHINGTON STATE’S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS What Can Be Done?
4Chapter SECTION OPENER / CLOSER: INSERT BOOK COVER ART Intentional Torts Section 4.1.
Accordion Trends Limiting and Expanding Tort Liability in the US X. AIDA Budapest Insurance Colloquium November 28, 2008 Marianne Oren Director Swiss Re.
International Contracts Slide Set 9 Economic Optimization of Contract Law and Economics Bounded Rationality Matti Rudanko.
LEB Slide Set 7b Economic Optimization of Contract Law and Economics Bounded Rationality Matti Rudanko.
Chapter 18. Understand the primary goals of tort law: (1) fair and efficient settlement of disputes; (2) compensation for those suffering damages; (3)
4Chapter SECTION OPENER / CLOSER: INSERT BOOK COVER ART Negligence and Strict Liability Section 4.2.
Negligence Tort law establishes standards for the care that people must show to one another. Negligence is the conduct that falls below this standard.
Certain professionals, such as doctors, pilots, and plumbers, are held to the standards of reasonably skilled professionals in their field. Even minors.
LAW 421 Week 2 DQ 1 To purchase this material link 421/LAW-421-Week-2-DQ-1 For more courses visit our website
LAW 531 Week 2 DQ 3 How is the issue of intent in strict liability torts different from the intent required in negligence and in intentional torts or for.
LAW 531 Week 2 DQ 4 Discuss one defense to negligence or strict liability and explain how it works. To purchase this material click
Strict Liability and Public Policy
Studies in American Tort Law
Economics of Accidents and Learned Hand Formula of Liability for Negligence Torts are wrongs that subject the wrongdoer to a suit for damages by the victim.
Torts “ Civil Wrongs” Chapter 17
Strict Liability and Torts and Public Policy
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2016 Lecture 17.
Part D-II The Economics of Tort Law
Civil Law 3.1 Intro To Civil Law
Unit 3.
Taking your Case to Court
SUBSTANTIVE LAW “LIVE” CLASS for TORTS
Presentation transcript:

Law and Economics-Charles W. Upton Tort Law Reform

Does the tort system work well?

Tort Law Reform Does the tort system work well? Let’s see how it can break down.

Tort Law Reform A Model of Torts There is a probability p that a surgeon will have an accident during an operation, and impose damages D.

Tort Law Reform A Model of Torts If the surgeon is not liable, damages are borne by the patient, either directly or via an insurance policy.

Tort Law Reform A Model of Torts If the surgeon is not liable, damages are borne by the patient, either directly or via an insurance policy. If the surgeon is liable, he purchases an insurance policy and passes the cost to the patient.

Tort Law Reform A Model of Torts Suppose that p is a function p(x), the surgeon’s investment in safety. We want the surgeon to bear the risk himself. But the costs of transferring the risk to the surgeon may exceed the efficiency gains.

Tort Law Reform Efficient Risk Bearing

Tort Law Reform Efficient Risk Bearing

Tort Law Reform Efficient Risk Bearing

Tort Law Reform Efficient Risk Bearing

Tort Law Reform General Product Liability In the case of product liability, we have a strict damage rule. Is this efficient?

Tort Law Reform General Product Liability Perhaps it is, as long as we have a defense of failure to use the product properly. But the potential for abuse is there.

Tort Law Reform A General Conclusion Let Z =-  PD -  X be the gains from efficient risk bearing. T = Transactions cost of suits (  ⅔D ?) If Z>T tort law makes sense If Z <T tort law does not

Tort Law Reform Three Topics Workman’s Compensation Product Liability Malpractice

Tort Law Reform Three Topics Workman’s Compensation Product Liability Malpractice

Tort Law Reform Three Topics Workman’s Compensation Product Liability Malpractice

Tort Law Reform End ©2004 Charles W. Upton