Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms Abraham Flaxman and Vahab Mirrokni, Microsoft Research.

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Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms Abraham Flaxman and Vahab Mirrokni, Microsoft Research

Price on Anarchy [KP, RT] Selfish users User goal: minimize its cost Nash Equilibrium (NE) System goal (e.g. Social welfare) The worst ratio of NE cost to OPT cost

Price of Anarchy Concept Not algorithmic Only analysis What to do if PoA is large How to influence the system

Possible Solutions Change the system (add tolls, payments) Stackelberg strategy = control some users Disadvantages: changing the settings, global knowledge Challenge: influence within the same setting and locally (distributed)

Coordination Mechanism [CKN] Mechanism: local policy (algorithm) that assigns a cost for each strategy of the user Advantages: local, same type of cost Goal: achieving good NE Example: scheduling jobs on machines

Unrelated Machine Scheduling m unrelated machines n jobs – each owned by different user p(i,j) - processing time of job i on machine j Social Objective: minimize completion time User goal: minimize its own completion time (Makespan: Cmax)

Unrelated Machines Scheduling

Coordination Mechanism for Scheduling Policy for each machine (algorithm) which decides how to schedule jobs assigned to it Each Policy induces NE on jobs

Local Scheduling Policies

Shortest-first Policy Longest-first Policy Random Order Policy MakeSpan Policy

Challenge Design policies that results in good NE (i.e. low PoA)

Unrelated Machines Scheduling

Equilibrium for Longest First

PoA of Longest First Results in poor NE The PoA is unbounded even for 2 machines The optimum completion time is low The completion time of NE is large

Machine Scheduling Models Identical Machines: P||Cmax Related Machines: Q||Cmax (Different Speeds) Restricted Assignment: B||Cmax Unrelated Machines: R||Cmax

PoA Results MakeSpan Policy Shortest- first Policy Longest- first Policy Randomized Policy P||Cmax2-1/m 4/3-1/3m2-2/m+1 Q||CmaxO(log m) 2-1/mO(log m) B||CmaxO(log m) R||CmaxUnbound ed O(m)UnboundedO(m)

Pure NE Results MakeSpan Policy Shortest- first Policy Longest- first Policy Randomized Policy P||CmaxExists Q||CmaxExists B||CmaxExists R||CmaxExists ???OPEN

Type of Policies Local policy – depends on jobs assigned to machine Strongly local policy - depends only on processing time of jobs on that machine Ordering Policy = IIA (independence of irrelevant alternative)

Lower Bound for Strongly Local Policy We start with Shortest-First Extend it to arbitrary strongly local IIA policy Shortest-First is interesting by its own

Shortest-First Approx factor known to be at most m NE can be computed by shortest- first greedy algorithm (Alg D by Ibarra and Kim) An open question from 1977 We show it is at least m/2

Idea of the Proof m types of jobs Type j can be scheduled on machines j & j+1 Processing time of type j on machine j is low and on machine j+1 is high (ratio is j) All jobs on machine j have almost the same processing time

Example for Shortest-First

Idea of the Proof OPT assign all jobs of type j to machine j Number of jobs is chosen such that OPT has the same completion time for all machines

Optimal Assignment

Idea of the Proof In NE about half jobs of type j are on machine j and half on machine j+1 Completion time of NE grows linearly in m

Equilibrium for Shortest-First

Extend to Arbitrary Strongly Local Structure is similar to lower bound for Shortest-First Arbitrary ordering function is given for each machine Indices of jobs are chosen to behave similar to the above example

Efficiency Based Algorithm Order jobs on each machine by their efficiency Efficiency of job on machine is: The ratio between job’s best processing time to its processing time on this machine PoA of algorithm is O(log m)

Equilibrium Improves

Efficiency Based Algorithm Unfortunately – pure NE may not exist Iterative improvement may cycle Modified algorithm guarantees convergence and pure NE with PoA of O(log^2 m)

Modified Algorithm Each machine simulate log m submachines (by round robin) Submachine k of machine j handles jobs on efficiency between 2^{-k} and 2^{- k+1} Jobs are ordered on submachine by Shortest-First PoA of algorithm is O(log^2 m)

Summary Coordination Mechanism: Influence on the quality of the equilibrium Unrelated Machines: m – lower bound Shortest-First is at least m Local order by efficiency O(log m) – optimal Pure + Convergence O(log^2 m)

Discussion and Open Problems Non ordering strategies – get below log m Extend to network routing Show more effective usage of coordination mechanism