The Systems Assurance Group Dr Jaspal Sagoo Systems Assurance Group QinetiQ Trusted Information Management Malvern Technology Centre.

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Presentation transcript:

The Systems Assurance Group Dr Jaspal Sagoo Systems Assurance Group QinetiQ Trusted Information Management Malvern Technology Centre

2 QinetiQ Defence & Technology Security & Dual Use US

3 QTIM

4 Dependability of systems: –Safety, Security, fault tolerance Provide assurance that systems are dependable –Formal modelling and analysis CSP, Z, Model Checking, Theorem Proving, Refinement –Assessment of systems Safety analysis techniques Type of Work –Research –Project Support Defence Commercial The Systems Assurance Group

5 Systems Assurance Group Structure

6 Development and application of software analysis techniques Language development – development of ‘safe’ language subsets – typically considers Ada and C – new languages like C++, Java, SOAR and JACK Assessment tools – compliance analysis – Malporte analysis

7 Software Analysis Compliance analysis – shows ‘correctness’ of code wrt specification – translate informal spec into Z – refinement argument supported by formal proof assisted by a theorem prover

8 Overview of the Control Laws in Z (ClawZ) Process Refinement Z Discharge proof SPARK Ada Refinement Script Generator Superta c Z Producer Compliance Notation Tool ProofPower Verification Conditions Simulink Spec

9 Static code analysis Malporte (MALvern Predictor Of Run-Time Errors) –statically checks for integrity properties such as: Run-time errors Undefined behaviour Run-time exceptions –Checks Ada, C, C++ code Checks for error such as –Buffer over-runs –Divide by zero –Use of pointers and unions in C –Integer and floating point over/under flow

10 Used on … Numerours MoD projects such as Eurofighter Typhoon & Nimrod Secure webserver application Trial carried out with an automotive supplier Security analysis of SendMail server

11 Hazard identification and Safety case review –Generation of HAZOPs, PHA –Review of delivered safety evidence Safety case methods –development and use of tools to manage the integration of evidence from diverse sources –compilation of safety cases –Modular safety cases Advice to policy bodies on standards for safety critical systems –MoD’s review of standards –secretary of RTCA committee developing future Avionics standards –reports to the European Commission on the requirements for future air traffic management (Ariba) and healthcare standards Advice to MoD projects on high integrity software Safety Assurance

12 Security Assurance Security of Pervasive computing systems – FORWARD project funded by DTI –Authentication & key management –Securing blue tooth –Interoperability of devices –Quality of service Quantum Cryptography –ESPIRIT Framework VI –Development of techniques to produce security arguments Irish E-voting MAFTIA (Malicious & Accidental Fault Tolerant Internet Applications) –ESPIRIT Framework V –Verifying security mechanisms/schemes

13 Development and application of system analysis techniques Formal modelling and analysis of communicating systems – verification of security and safety properties – can be applied to legacy and COTS products Formal modelling and analysis techniques applied to digital hardware – verification of critical ASIC design – processor obsolescence issues – ASIC audits Assessment of the impact of emerging technology on system safety –the impact of neural networks and agent technology on system safety –effect of move to IMA on certification Robust System Of Systems (RSOS)

14 Student recruitment Firm foundations in traditional areas: – Computer Science – Formal techniques – Software Engineering