SybilGuard: Defending Against Sybil Attacks via Social Networks Haifeng Yu, Michael Kaminsky, Phillip B. Gibbons, and Abraham Flaxman Presented by Ryan.

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Presentation transcript:

SybilGuard: Defending Against Sybil Attacks via Social Networks Haifeng Yu, Michael Kaminsky, Phillip B. Gibbons, and Abraham Flaxman Presented by Ryan Carr Slides adapted from a presentation by Haifeng Yupresentation

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 2 Background: Sybil Attack  Sybil attack: Single user obtains many fake identities  Creating multiple accounts from different IP addresses  Sybil identities can become a large fraction of all identities  Out-vote honest users in collaborative tasks launch sybil attack honest malicious

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 3 Background: Defending Against Sybil Attack  Using a trusted central authority  Tie identities to actual human beings  Not always desirable  Can be hard to find such authority  Sensitive info may scare away users  Potential bottleneck and target of attack  Without a trusted central authority  Impossible unless using special assumptions [Douceur’02]  Resource challenges not sufficient -- adversary can have much more resources than typical user

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 4 SybilGuard Basic Insight: Leveraging Social Networks  Undirected graph  Nodes = identities  Edges = strong trust  e.g., colleagues, relatives Our Social Network Definition

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 5 SybilGuard Basic Insight malicious user honest nodes sybil nodes Observation: Adversary cannot create extra edges between honest nodes and sybil nodes attack edges  n honest users: One identity/node each  Malicious users: Multiple identities each (sybil nodes)‏ All Sybil nodes can collude Sybil nodes = The Adversary

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 6 SybilGuard Basic Insight honest nodes sybil nodes Disproportionally small cut disconnecting a large number of identities But cannot search for such cut via brute-force…

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 7 Outline  Motivation and SybilGuard basic insight  Overview of SybilGuard: Random routes  Properties of SybilGuard protocol  Evaluation results  Conclusions

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 8 Goal of Sybil Defense  Goal: Enable a verifier node to decide whether to accept another suspect node  Accept: Provide service to / receive service from  Idealized guarantee: An honest node accepts and only accepts other honest nodes  SybilGuard:  Bounds the number of sybil nodes accepted  Guarantees are with high probability  Approach: Acceptance based on random route intersection between verifier and suspect

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 9 Random Walk Review pick random edge d pick random edge c pick random edge e a bd e f c

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 10 Random 1 to 1 mapping between incoming edge and outgoing edge Random Route: Convergence a -> d b -> a c -> b d -> c d -> e e -> d f -> f a b c d e f randomized routing table Using routing table gives Convergence Property: Routes merge if crossing the same edge

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 11 Random Route: Back-traceable a -> d b -> a c -> b d -> c d -> e e -> d f -> f a b c d e f Using 1-1 mapping gives Back-traceable Property: Routes may be back-traced If we know the route traverses edge e, then we know the whole route

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 12 Random Route Intersection: Honest Nodes  Verifier accepts a suspect if the two routes intersect  Route length w:  W.h.p., verifier’s route stays within honest region  W.h.p., routes from two honest nodes intersect sybil nodeshonest nodes Verifier Suspect

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 13 Random Route Intersection: Sybil Nodes  SybilGuard bounds the number of accepted sybil nodes within g*w  g: Number of attack edges  w: Length of random routes  Next …  Convergence property to bound the number of intersections within g  Back-traceable property to bound the number of accepted sybil nodes per intersection within w

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 14 Bound # Intersections Within g  Convergence: Each attack edge gives one intersection At most g intersections with g attack edges sybil nodeshonest nodes Verifier Suspect must cross attack edge to intersect even if sybil nodes do not follow the protocol same intersection Intersection = (node, incoming edge

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 15 Bound # Sybil Nodes Accepted per Intersection within w  Back-traceable: Each intersection should correspond to routes from at most w honest nodes  Verifier accepts at most w nodes per intersection  Will not hurt honest nodes Verifier for a given intersection

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 16 Summary of SybilGuard Guarantees  Power of the adversary:  Unlimited number of colluding sybil nodes  Sybil nodes may not follow SybilGuard protocol  W.h.p., honest node accepts ≤ g*w sybil nodes  g: # of attack edges  w: Length of random route effective replication not much larger than n majority voting n byzantine consensus n/2n/2 Then apps can do If SybilGuard bounds # accepted sybil nodes within

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 17 Outline  Motivation and SybilGuard basic insight  Overview of SybilGuard: Random routes  Properties of SybilGuard protocol  Evaluation results  Conclusions

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 18 SybilGuard Protocol  Security:  Protocol ensures that nodes cannot lie about their random routes in the honest region  Decentralized:  No one has global view  Nodes only communicate with direct neighbors in the social network when doing random routes

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 19   Efficiency: Random routes are performed only once and then “remembered”   No more message exchanges needed unless the social network changes   Verifier incurs O(1) messages to verify a suspect   User and node dynamics:   Different from DHTs, node churn is a non-problem in SybilGuard …   See paper for all the details … SybilGuard Protocol (continued)‏

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 20 Outline  Motivation and SybilGuard basic insight  Overview of SybilGuard: Random routes  Properties of SybilGuard protocol  Evaluation results  Conclusions

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 21 Evaluation Results  Simulation based on synthetic social network model [Kleinberg’00] for 10 6, 10 4, 10 2 nodes  With 2500 attack edges (i.e., adversary has acquired 2500 social trust relationships):  Honest node accepts honest node with 99.8% prob  99.8% honest node properly bounds the number of accepted sybil nodes  See paper for full results …

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 22 Outline  Motivation and SybilGuard basic insight  Overview of SybilGuard: Random routes  Properties of SybilGuard protocol  Evaluation results  Conclusions

Haifeng Yu, Intel Research / CMU  National University of Singapore 23 Conclusions  Sybil attack: Serious threat to collaborative tasks in decentralized systems  SybilGuard: Fully decentralized defense protocol  Based on random routes on social networks  Effectiveness shown via simulation and analysis  Future work:  Implementation nearly finished  Evaluation using real and large-scale social networks

SybilGuard: Defending Against Sybil Attacks via Social Networks Haifeng Yu, Michael Kaminsky, Phillip Gibbons, Abraham Flaxman Full Technical Report available at: or Google “SybilGuard”