1 Measuring Governance: Possibilities and Pitfalls Presentation at the Center for Global Development Washington, D.C., December 1 st, 2006 Daniel Kaufmann,

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1 Measuring Governance: Possibilities and Pitfalls Presentation at the Center for Global Development Washington, D.C., December 1 st, 2006 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi The World Bank

2 A Decade of Measuring Governance Governance Matters V: Update on Worldwide Governance Indicators Project –updated indicators for 2005 –move to annual frequency –release of (almost) all underlying data sources Examples of uses of the WGI indicators Important lessons for users of all types of governance indicators: –measurement error is pervasive –different indicators serve different purposes –alternative indicators are complementary –links from policy actions to outcomes are complex

3 Worldwide Governance Indicators Project Defining Governance Broadly Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes –the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, –the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and –the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.

4 Worldwide Governance Indicators Project Six aggregate governance indicators covering 213 countries over past decade –Voice and Accountability –Political Stability/Absence of Violence –Government Effectiveness –Regulatory Quality –Rule of Law –Control of Corruption Based on 31 data sources from 25 organizations, capturing views of thousands of informed stakeholders Widely used by policymakers and researchers to study causes and consequences of good governance

Update of Worldwide Governance Indicators: Key Features Move to annual data –complement biannual data with annual data for 2003, 2005 –continue reporting data annually in future First-time access to data underlying aggregate indicators –hundreds of individual indicators over past decade –one of the largest on-line governance data resources at

6 Sources of Governance Data Cross-Country Surveys of Firms: Global Competitiveness Survey, World Business Environment Survey, World Competitiveness Yearbook, BEEPS Cross-Country Surveys of Individuals: Gallup International Voice of the People, Latinobarometro, Afrobarometer Expert Assessments from Commercial Risk Rating Agencies: DRI, PRS, EIU, World Markets Online, Merchant International Group, IJET Travel Consultancy, PERC Expert Assessments from NGOs, Think Tanks: Reporters Without Borders, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Amnesty International, Bertelsmann Foundation, Columbia University, International Research and Exchanges Board Expert Assessments from Governments, Multilaterals: World Bank CPIA, EBRD, AFDB, ADB, State Dept. Human Rights Report, Trafficking in Persons Report

7 Examples of Governance Questions 1.Expert assessment polls Government interfere w/ private investment? (RQ) How transparent and fair is the legal system? (RL) Risk of coup, civil war, org. crime, terrorism? (PV) How severe is the bureaucratic red tape? (RQ) What is risk of loss of FDI due to corruption? (CC) Freedom of the press, expression, association (VA) 2.Survey Responses % bribery “to get things done”? (CC) Transparent info given by government? (GE) % Management Time spent on red tape? (RQ) Access & quality of government services? (GE)

8 Why Aggregate Indicators? Basic Premise: individual data sources provide a noisy “signal” of broader concept of governance, e.g.: –trust in police  RULE OF LAW –freedom of press  VOICE & ACC’TBILITY –policy consistency  GOV’T EFFECTIVENESS Benefits of Aggregation aggregate indicators are more informative about broad concepts of governance – simple intuition of averaging... much broader country coverage than individual indicator generate explicit margins of error for country scores

9 Building Aggregate Governance Indicators Use Unobserved Components Model (UCM) to construct composite governance indicators, and margins of error for each country Estimate of governance: weighted average of observed scores for each country, re-scaled to common units Weights are proportional to precision of underlying data sources Precision depends on how strongly individual sources are correlated with each other Margins of error reflect (a) number of sources in which a country appears, and (b) the precision of those sources

10 Levels of Governance Worldwide, Estimates of governance for 213 countries Standard errors to assess the precision of the estimates –Rule of thumb: cross-country differences in governance significant if 90% confidence regions don’t overlap –Many small differences between countries not significant… –But many larger differences are statistically significant 70% of all comparisons based on aggregate indicator... but only 30% of all comparisons based on individual indicators Precision of governance indicators has improved over time with more, and better, data sources

11 Control of Corruption Selected Countries, 2005 Poor Governance Governance Level Margins of Error Good Governance Source for data: 'Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for ’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, September Note: Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, below 10 th percentile rank among all countries in the world; Light Red between 10 th and 25 th ; Orange, between 25 th and 50 th ; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th ; Dark Green above 90 th.

12 World Map: Government Effectiveness, 2005 Source for map: 'Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for ’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, September Colors assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red: country in bottom 10 th percentile rank (‘governance crisis’); Light Red: between 10 th and 25 th percentile rank; Orange: between 25 th and 50 th percentile rank; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th percentile rank; and Dark Green: between 90 th and 100 th percentile (exemplary governance). Estimates subject to margins of error.

13 World Map: Control of Corruption, 2005 Source for map: 'Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for ’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, September Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red: country is in the bottom 10 th percentile rank (‘governance crisis’); Light Red: between 10 th and 25 th percentile rank; Orange: between 25 th and 50 th percentile rank; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th percentile rank; and Dark Green: between 90 th and 100 th percentile (exemplary governance). Estimates subject to margins of error.

14 World Map: Rule of Law, 2005 Source for map: 'Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for ’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, September Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red: country is in the bottom 10 th percentile rank (‘governance crisis’); Light Red: between 10 th and 25 th percentile rank; Orange: between 25 th and 50 th percentile rank; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th percentile rank; and Dark Green: between 90 th and 100 th percentile (exemplary governance). Estimates subject to margins of error.

15 Cross-Country Comparisons: Voice and Corruption

16 Changes Over Time in Governance Many changes in governance are small relative to margins of error – even over ten-year period But substantial improvements/worsening in some countries –Rule of Thumb: changes over time are significant if confidence intervals don’t overlap –One in three countries had significant (at 90% level) change in at least one dimension of governance Individual data sources suggest no evidence of improvements in worldwide averages of governance –important implication is that it is ok to look at relative changes

17 Major Deterioration (selected countries) Major Improvement (selected countries) Insignificant Change (selected countries) Changes in Control of Corruption, Changes were calculated on the basis of the differences in country estimates from 1996 and Classification for major deteriorations and improvements were based on 75% confidence interval. Source for data: 'Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for ’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, September

18 Changes were calculated on the basis of the differences in country estimates from 1996 and Classification for major deteriorations and improvements were based on 75% confidence interval. Source for data: 'Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for ’, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, September Major Deterioration (selected countries) Major Improvement (selected countries) Insignificant Change (selected countries) Changes in Voice & Accountability,

19 Application 1: Research Shows Large Development Dividend from Good Governance

20 Application 2: MCA Eligibility Criteria Control of Corruption, 2005 For this low income group: Share of countries where we are confident (at 75%) that WGI classifies them in the correct ‘half’: 0.71 (49 out of 69; the rest are in ‘yellow’ range).

21 Application 3: Challenging Afro-pessimism Wide diversity of governance performance in Africa –Botswana ranks better than Hungary or South Korea on Control of Corruption Examples of significant improvements as well as significant declines in governance in countries in Africa, e.g. since mid-1990s –VA improves significantly in Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal –CC improves significantly in Madagascar, Botswana –but Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire see significant declines across-the-board

22 Four Principles for Using Governance Indicators 1.All indicators have measurement error –rely on variety of data sources –benefit of aggregation across sources: reduces noise 2.Alternative types of indicators are complementary –subjective/perceptions vs. objective/statutory –aggregate vs. individual indicators 3.Different indicators are appropriate for different purposes –regular cross-national monitoring/research vs. detailed country diagnostics/country policy advice 4.Links from policy actions to outcomes are complex –“actionable” versus “action-worthy” indicators

23 1. All Indicators Have Measurement Error Governance is difficult to observe directly, so all available measures are only proxies, e.g. –Perceptions measures: Corruption in procurement? Confidence in the courts? Onerous regulation of entry for a new firm? –Objective/Statutory measures Do regulations stipulate competitive bidding in procurement? Do materials used correspond to materials paid for? How many procedures to fire a worker? WGI (unusually!) reports explicit margins of error –Yet margins of error are implicit in ‘objective’ and in individual subjective indicators – and they are large too

24 2. Alternative Indicators are Complementary: a. Subjective Versus Objective Measures Perceptions data are very useful even when objective measures exist –But often only type of cross-country data available (e.g. corruption) Perceptions matter directly! Perceptions data add insight over de jure measures when such objective measures exist, e.g. comparison of: statutory number days to start a business from Doing Business database (de jure) firms perceptions of ease of business entry from Global Competitiveness Survey (de facto) –two are weakly correlated in developing countries –prevalence of corruption explains much of gap between the two

25 Subjective and Objective Measures of Ease of Business Entry: OECD/NIC Sample Bad Good r = -0.51

26 Subjective and Objective Measures of Ease of Business Entry: Developing Country Sample Bad Good r = -0.24

27 2. Alternative Indicators are Complementary: (a) Subjective vs. Objective Measures, cont’d Objective indicators can be very specific, but interpretation can be ambiguous and imprecise –parliamentary vs. presidential system may matter for political outcomes, but not a “governance indicator” –does an anti-corruption commission exist? precise answers, ambiguous interpretation –also, errors of fact in many objective measures Perceptions data need not be vague or imprecise –“do you think corruption is a problem, yes or no?” vs. –“what percent of the total contract value do firms like yours typically have to pay in bribes to secure procurement contracts?” False dichotomy between subjective and objective measures is not helpful

28 Aside: test on biases -- Are Subjective/Perceptions Data Biased? Possible ideological biases (“right-wing” think tanks?) –test: are differences between expert assessments and surveys correlated with political orientation of government being rated? Mostly no. Cultural differences in what constitutes corruption? –test: expert assessments by outsiders should not be very correlated with surveys of domestic actors. But they are, typical correlation of experts with surveys of firms is 0.8 Perceptions of expert assessments tainted by “group- think”? –test: are expert assessments more correlated with each other than with surveys of firms? No, typically correlations are very similar

29 2. Alternative Indicators are Complementary: b. Aggregate versus Individual Indicators Aggregate indicators: –have broad country coverage (e.g. TI on corruption) –are more informative about broad concepts of governance –have (potentially) explicit margins of error Individual indicators: –are easier to interpret –are (potentially) easier to identify policy interventions Ideally use aggregate indicators that can be unbundled –Multi-source: WGI aggregate and individual indicators –Single-source: World Bank CPIA; and Global Integrity Index (GII)

30 Aggregate Governance Indicators for Chile

31 Unbundling WGI Aggregate Indicators – case of Chile Reporters Without Borders Reporters without Borders, headquartered in Paris, is an international organization dedicated to the protection of reporters and respect of press freedom in the world. In 2002, International Reporters Without Borders published its first worldwide press freedom index, compiled for 139 countries. The index was drawn up by asking journalists, researchers, and leagl legal experts worldwide to answer 50 questions about a whole range of press freedom violations.

32 Unbundling the Global Integrity Index Judiciary In law, is the independence of the judiciary guaranteed? Is the appointment process for high court judges effective? Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions? Can citizens access the judicial system? In law, is there a program to protect witnesses in corruption cases? Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases? Source: Global Integrity, Country coverage: 25

33 Aside: test on weights--On Weighting Individual Sources in the Aggregate Indicators Aggregate indicators need a weighting scheme: WGI gives more weight to sources that are more correlated with each other –makes sense if high correlations due to fact that they are measuring the same thing across countries –but what if high correlations are due to “group-think”? Alternative 1: Weight all sources equally –New indicators correlated with old at 0.99! –Reason is because sources tend to agree! Alternative 2: Weight types of sources equally –Surveys, NGOs, Commercial Experts, Gov’t Experts –New indicators correlated with old at 0.95! –Reason is because types of sources tend to agree!

34 3.Different Indicators for Different Purposes For particular institutions within a country: in-depth & disaggregated diagnostic instruments–e.g. PET & PEFAs For project within a country: specific project/sectoral in- country research indicators – e.g. on Iraq oil ‘discount’ in UN oil for food; infrastructure spending in Italy; audit of road materials vs. recorded spending in Indonesia Worldwide benchmarking & over time monitoring and cross-country research: aggregate governance indicators In-depth country-wide governance assessment (e.g. Kenya): complementarity between aggregate & detailed indicators & between subjective & objective (de jure and de facto) – for analysis country-wide and of specific institutions

35 Governance Assessment Illustration: Kenya in Comparative Perspective -- Control of Corruption Over Time, WGI Poor Governance Good Governance Source for data: 'Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for ’, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, ( Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10 th percentile rank; Light Red between 10 th and 25 th ; Orange, between 25 th and 50 th ; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th ; Dark Green above 90 th. Percentile rank reports the percentage of countries rating worse than Kenya. Country coverage ranges from a minimum of 166 in 1998 to 213 in

36 Governance Assessment: Unbundling extent of Bribery, Kenya, Share of Firms Report High Bribery Source: EOS firm survey, WEF Question: In your industry, how commonly firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with permits / utilities / taxation / awarding of public contracts / judiciary? (common…never occurs). High Bribery Low Bribery Bribery in:

37 4. Links from Policy Interventions to Governance Outcomes are Complex ‘Objective’ and easy measures may not matter most (or have normative ‘good governance’ interpretation), e.g. –existence of anticorruption commission? –turnover of civil servants? –proportion of population incarcerated? Risk of confusing reform reality and reform illusion (fiat) Across countries, different priorities & impact of different actions (vs. ‘template’)-- outcomes should also be measured Important to measure BOTH: i) “action-worthy” (vs. merely “actionable”) indicators, and, ii) outcome indicators – both of which often will also necessitate asking firms, citizens and experts

38 In concluding…. Winston Churchill, the arduous climb, and the ‘bumper sticker’…

39 Further Reading & Data Access Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón. 1999a. “Aggregating Governance Indicators.” WBPR No. 2195, Washington ____ 1999b. “Governance Matters.” WBPR No. 2196, Washington, DC ____ “Governance Matters II.”, Washington, DC Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay “Growth Without Governance”. Economia. 3(1):169–215 Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002” World Bank Economic Review. 18:253–287 ____ “Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996–2004” WBPR No Washington, DC ____ “Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996–2005” WBPR No September Washington, DC ____ “Measuring Governance Using Perceptions Data.” In Susan Rose- Ackerman (ed.), Handbook of Economic Corruption. Edward Elgar ____ “ The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project: Answering the Critics”, September 2006, World Bank ____ “Measuring Corruption: Myths vs. Realities.” Development Outreach, September 2006, World Bank Data & Papers Available at: