Environmental policy POLI 352A

Trading places? Strictness 1970s1980s1990s U.S. Europe

Diffuse v. concentrated effects Diffuse costsConcentrated costs Diffuse benefitsGST tax cutFree trade Environmental regulation Concentrated benefits Liberal immigration policy Cap on civil liability awards Costs Benefits

Organization of interests Why environmental interests have it tough: Far more diffuse than those who pay the costs of regulation –Diffuse groups less likely to vote on this issue Less likely to notice effects, prioritize the issue –Diffuse groups face greater collective action problems Greater incentives to free ride Harder to coordinate Less likely to identify common interests Business’s structural power

Organization of interests Paradox: U.S. in the 1970s Massive growth in environmental groups –None of Olson’s advantages Was Olson wrong? –Yes: More “green” mobilization than Olson would predict May reveal limits to his model and its assumptions –E.g., altruistic motives? –No: Can explain why most people did NOT join –No: Pro-environment groups far LESS organized then “anti-green” interests –No: Some green mobilzation may be explainable in Olsonian terms.

Organization of interests Mobilization of diffuse interests helped counter business power –Europe later than U.S.

Public opinion Willingness to pay higher taxes to prevent pollution (1995): Sweden77% Norway73% Netherlands69% U.S.64% Canada64% France 54% W. Germany49%

Public opinion The problem isn’t opinions… It’s attention –Environment as “valence” issue Environmental policy tracks public’s wandering attention –Media and events key –Europe’s focusing events in 1980s and 1990s  regulatory catchup and overtake Economic conditions important

Institutions: Presidential vs. parliamentary Which institutions respond best to diffuse interests? Parliamentary? –Few veto points  less access for narrow lobbies –Clear accountability  incentive to please voters Presidential? –Access points for placing new issues on agenda –More veto points to block rollbacks

Institutions: Presidential vs. parliamentary Parliamentarism “green” when executive wants to regulate –But risk of rollback (Thatcher) Presidentialism can be “green” when public’s attentive –When public cares, cross-party incentives to act –Helps environmental groups when party in power is pro-business (Reagan) –Access points for putting green issues on agenda Separation of powers  detailed legislation  judicial enforcement

Institutions: Electoral system PR helps single-issue parties win seats –Green Parties in Europe Why does this matter? –Don’t big parties in FPTP still have to act “green”? Biggest effect is on agenda –Critical for valence issues

Institutions: European Union PR Elections to European Parliament  Green Party representation Green leaders drag laggards forward Helps solve cross-national collective-action problems

Ideas Can look at on different levels: Scientific ideas –About dangers to ecosystems or human health Policy ideas –E.g., Pollution-credit trading

Policy feedback Possible policy feedback effects in environmental policy? Where involves: Physical irreversibility –e.g., Land use Policy encourages investments  new preferences? BUT much envir. policy may be quite reversible –Producers and beneficiaries weakly organized –Disappointed expectations invisible

Conclusion How full is Olson’s glass? Politics of a valence issue –Attention is key –Voter attention can overwhelm veto points Effect of veto points depends on status quo Institutions shape agendas and attention