Managerial Economics-Charles W. Upton The Bertrand Model.

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Presentation transcript:

Managerial Economics-Charles W. Upton The Bertrand Model

Demand function is as shown. D

The Bertrand Model Demand function is as shown. Firm with lowest bid gets all the market. D

The Bertrand Model Demand function is as shown. Firm with lowest bid gets all the market. In case of tie, firms split market D

The Bertrand Model Demand function is as shown. Firm with lowest bid gets all the market. In case of tie, firms split market MC = 0 D

The Bertrand Model The Winning Bid is zero. To see why, suppose one firm bids $1. If the other firm bids 99¢, it gets it all. D

The Bertrand Model Implications It only takes two firms to get the competitive price.

The Bertrand Model When to use the Bertrand Model Suppose two firms are bidding on a project. The winner will get the entire project.

The Bertrand Model Two Models Cournot Bertrand When do we use each one?

The Bertrand Model When to use the Bertrand Model Suppose two firms are bidding on a project. The winner will get the entire project. This is a Bertrand Duopoly.

The Bertrand Model When to use the Bertrand Model Suppose two firms are bidding on a project. The winner will get the entire project. Two firms are trying to dominate a market. Each has sufficient manufacturing capacity to make all the product. Low bidder gets all the business.

The Bertrand Model When to use the Bertrand Model Suppose two firms are bidding on a project. The winner will get the entire project. Two firms are trying to dominate a market. Each has sufficient manufacturing capacity to make all the product. Low bidder gets the business. This is a Bertrand Duopoly.

The Bertrand Model When to use the Bertrand Model Suppose two firms are bidding on a project. The winner will get the entire project. Two firms are trying to dominate a market. Each has sufficient manufacturing capacity to make all the product. Low bidder gets the business. Two firms are trying to dominate a market, but one of the firms cannot produce enough to satisfy all the demand. This is not a Bertrand Duopoly.

The Bertrand Model End ©2003 Charles W. Upton