Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved. 0-13-239227-5 DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS.

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Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS Principles and Paradigms Second Edition ANDREW S. TANENBAUM MAARTEN VAN STEEN Chapter 9 Security

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Security Threats, Policies, and Mechanisms Types of security threats to consider: Interception Interruption Modification Fabrication

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Example: The Globus Security Architecture (1) 1.The environment consists of multiple administrative domains. 2.Local operations are subject to a local domain security policy only. 3.Global operations require the initiator to be known in each domain where the operation is carried out.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Example: The Globus Security Architecture (2) 4.Operations between entities in different domains require mutual authentication. 5.Global authentication replaces local authentication. 6.Controlling access to resources is subject to local security only. 7.Users can delegate rights to processes. 8.A group of processes in the same domain can share credentials.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Example: The Globus Security Architecture (2) Figure 9-1. The Globus security architecture.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Focus of Control (1) Figure 9-2. Three approaches for protection against security threats. (a) Protection against invalid operations

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Focus of Control (2) Figure 9-2. Three approaches for protection against security threats. (b) Protection against unauthorized invocations.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Focus of Control (3) Figure 9-2. Three approaches for protection against security threats. (c) Protection against unauthorized users.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Layering of Security Mechanisms (1) Figure 9-3. The logical organization of a distributed system into several layers.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Layering of Security Mechanisms (2) Figure 9-4. Several sites connected through a wide-area backbone service.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Distribution of Security Mechanisms Figure 9-5. The principle of RISSC as applied to secure distributed systems.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Cryptography (1) Figure 9-6. Intruders and eavesdroppers in communication.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Cryptography (2) Figure 9-7. Notation used in this chapter.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Symmetric Cryptosystems: DES (1) Figure 9-8. (a) The principle of DES.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Symmetric Cryptosystems: DES (2) Figure 9-8. (b) Outline of one encryption round.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Symmetric Cryptosystems: DES (3) Figure 9-9. Details of per-round key generation in DES.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Public-Key Cryptosystems: RSA Generating the private and public keys requires four steps: Choose two very large prime numbers, p and q. Compute n = p × q and z = (p − 1) × (q − 1). Choose a number d that is relatively prime to z. Compute the number e such that e × d = 1 mod z.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Hash Functions: MD5 (1) Figure The structure of MD5.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Hash Functions: MD5 (2) Figure The 16 iterations during the first round in a phase in MD5.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Authentication Based on a Shared Secret Key (1) Figure Authentication based on a shared secret key.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Authentication Based on a Shared Secret Key (2) Figure Authentication based on a shared secret key, but using three instead of five messages.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Authentication Based on a Shared Secret Key (3) Figure The reflection attack.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Authentication Using a Key Distribution Center (1) Figure The principle of using a KDC.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Authentication Using a Key Distribution Center (2) Figure Using a ticket and letting Alice set up a connection to Bob.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Authentication Using a Key Distribution Center (3) Figure The Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Authentication Using a Key Distribution Center (4) Figure Protection against malicious reuse of a previously generated session key in the Needham-Schroeder protocol.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Authentication Using a Key Distribution Center (5) Figure Mutual authentication in a public-key cryptosystem.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Digital Signatures (1) Figure Digital signing a message using public-key cryptography.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Digital Signatures (2) Figure Digitally signing a message using a message digest.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Secure Replicated Servers Figure Sharing a secret signature in a group of replicated servers.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Example: Kerberos (1) Figure Authentication in Kerberos.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Example: Kerberos (2) Figure Setting up a secure channel in Kerberos.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved General Issues in Access Control Figure General model of controlling access to objects.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Access Control Matrix (1) Figure Comparison between ACLs and capabilities for protecting objects. (a) Using an ACL.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Access Control Matrix (2) Figure Comparison between ACLs and capabilities for protecting objects. (b) Using capabilities.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Protection Domains Figure The hierarchical organization of protection domains as groups of users.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Firewalls Figure A common implementation of a firewall.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Protecting the Target (1) Figure The organization of a Java sandbox.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Protecting the Target (2) Figure (a) A sandbox. (b) A playground.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Protecting the Target (3) Figure The principle of using Java object references as capabilities.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Protecting the Target (4) Figure The principle of stack introspection.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Key Establishment Figure The principle of Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Key Distribution (1) Figure (a) Secret-key distribution. [see also Menezes et al. (1996)].

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Key Distribution (2) Figure (b) Public-key distribution [see also Menezes et al. (1996)].

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Secure Group Management Figure Securely admitting a new group member.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Capabilities and Attribute Certificates (1) Figure A capability in Amoeba.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Capabilities and Attribute Certificates (2) Figure Generation of a restricted capability from an owner capability.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Delegation (1) Figure The general structure of a proxy as used for delegation.

Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved Delegation (2) Figure Using a proxy to delegate and prove ownership of access rights.