ONR MURI: NexGeNetSci Hastily Formed Networks in Complex Humanitarian Disasters Brian Steckler Hastily Formed Networks Research Group Director Cebrowski Institute Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA First Year Review, August 27, 2009 With Dave Alderson

Theory Data Analysis Numerical Experiments Lab Experiments Field Exercises Real-World Operations First principles Rigorous math Algorithms Proofs Correct statistics Only as good as underlying data Simulation Synthetic, clean data Stylized Controlled Clean, real-world data Semi- Controlled Messy, real-world data Unpredictable After action reports in lieu of data Steckler Hastily Formed Networks

Why study disasters and disaster response? Layered view of society, enabled by networks Only see hidden structure and behavior (i.e., “what matters”) when things break Immediate relevance (domestic/international) – DHS/FEMA, DoD all trying to develop doctrine – NGOs, UN, international community – Interoperability issues across comm spectrum – Global concern that we’re on brink of one or more disasters of unparalleled scale and we don’t do well with disasters of any size Desperate need for theory – Interesting physical phenomena – Boundary of physical science and human behavior – Intersection with public policy Opportunities for data collection, modeling – Ongoing field experiments/exercises/real events – After action reports from real events

What is a disaster and how is it measured ? A recent Glossary of Emergency Management Terms lists 65 different definitions of “disaster” in the emergency management literature. Many of these definitions characterize a disaster in terms of the severity of the consequences (i.e., the impact) – e.g., the EM-DAT disaster database ( global disaster data since 1900) defines a disaster as having one or more of the following: 10 or more people killed 100 or more people affected declaration of a state of emergency call for international assistance Disasters involve severe impacts on life, property, or the environment.

Critical Infrastructures Information and Communications: PTN, TV/Radio, CATV, Internet, Satellite, Wireless Energy Systems: Electrical Power, Gas and Oil Production, Storage and Transport Physical Distribution: Transportation, Water Supply Systems, Sewage and Disposal Vital Human Services: Emergency, Government, Military Services Social Systems Different initiating events have similar consequences Initiating Event Earthquake Flood Slides Volcano Wave / Surge Wild Fires Wind Storm Accident Failure Attack Natural: Technological: Consequences Deaths Human Suffering Damage Social, Psychological Political Human Systems (social, economic, information, …)

deaths people affected reported disasters

What is a Hastily Formed Network (HFN)? A HFN Consists of Five Elements*: a network of people or technologies established rapidly from different communities, working together in a shared conversation space in which they plan, commit to, and execute actions to fulfill a large, urgent mission. HFN application areas: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Network-centric military operations Critical national/international infrastructure *P. Denning, Hastily Formed Networks, Communications of the ACM 49(4): 15-20, April 2006.

HA/DR SE Asian Tsunami (Jan-May 05) Hurricane Katrina (Sep-Oct 05) USNS Mercy Humanitarian Mission to SE Asia (Summer 06) USNS Comfort Latin/South America Humanitarian Mission (Summer 07) Myanmar - Cyclone Nargis (Summer 08) Net-Centric Ops DHS/DOD Golden Phoenix (07-08) - DOD/DHS Joint Radio Interoperability NPS COASTS (07-08) - Cooperative Operations and Applied Science& Technology Studies creates wireless field experiment opportunities in SE Asia NPS RELIEF Field Experiment / Demo Program - Research & Experimentation for Local & International Emergency & First Responders - Quarterly one-week events followed by week of wireless surveillance / targeting field demos NPS HFN Center: Live Ops and Field Experiments We have catalogued more than 80 DoD/DHS Military Ops + HA/DR focused exercises. (HFN Center Website:

Disaster Response: messy and hard ! Domestic Disaster Response Problems – Lots of players requiring significant coordination – New National Response Framework untested in large disaster – Shoestring budgets, poor spending choices – Problems with comms interoperability (voice, data, RF, etc.) – No universal standards: NIMS + ICS optional – Trained first responders can also be victims (e.g., pandemic) International Disaster Response Problems – Who is in charge (UN, NATO, regional orgs like ASEAN)? – Interoperability worse than in U.S. – larger scale – Too many online disaster mgmt or collaboration tools and portals – Politics of multi-national response to multi-national disasters – Lack of cooperation between NGO and gov’t/military communities Efforts to coordinate disaster response are studied as part of Emergency Management

What is Emergency Management? “…the coordinated and collaborative integration of all relevant stakeholders into the four phases of emergency management (mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) related to natural, technological, and intentional hazards.” – National Governors Association, 1978 Emergency Preparedness Project Final Report. "…the governmental function that coordinates and integrates all activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from or mitigate against threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism or other man-made disasters." – Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006" (Title VI of H.R. 5441) (now Public Law ) “…the managerial function charged with creating the framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters.” – Principles of Emergency Management, FEMA Emergency Management Institute, September 11, Emergency Management is mostly reactionary, not very scientific

The National Response Plan (NRP) for Disaster Management (pre-2008 doctrine) Source: FEMA Independent Study Course “Principles of Emergency Management”, February 2006.

Incident timescales vary by disaster type….. Best means for mitigation depend on – amount of warning for an incident – duration of incident itself PreparationResponseRecovery

Incident timescales vary by disaster type minuteshours months earthquakes forest fires tornado hurricane flood minutes weeks months event duration event warning volcano tsunami drought epidemic extreme temp these timescales determine what types of mitigation are possible famine daysweeks hours days Can shape the evolution of the disaster itself Build resilience. Recover quickly. Evacuation

Lots of recent activity….still a mess! National Response Framework replaced NRP – Result of Katrina lessons learned – system overwhelmed and NRP not appropriate Renewed emphasis on exercises, training, certifications; NIMS/ICS promotion Hard look at industry solutions and managed service model versus buying/maintaining solutions locally Corporations getting onboard with increased focus on “corporate social responsibility” Proposals flooding system to access stimulus funds (not a pleasant process – too many strings attached) Can we take a more structured look at the problem?

HFN Basics: Building Comms Good News: we know how to solve using COTS technologies – No power – No fiber/copper infrastructure – No push-to-talk comms to speak of – Cellular svc mostly jammed / overwhelmed – SatPhone svc mostly jammed / overwhelmed – Not enough satellite equipment suites available – No Internet access (web, , VOIP) – No technical people resources available The Challenge: austere environment Details on the “9 Piece Puzzle” at

Bad News: In practice, comms are typically not the problem The real problem is the “human layer” that sits above the comms – Organizational – Cultural – Informational – Civil-military boundary Relevant research questions : Can we make sense of this mess? Is there an “architecture” for HFNs? How do we build more effective HFNs?

Component constraints System-level constraints What is the “design space” for an HFN? Constraints that deconstrain a constraint-based view of architecture Hard Limits Policies & Doctrine Recent experience suggests that the existing “architectures” are bad ones. Can we do better?

A Layered View of HFN Architecture The Conversation The “Conversation Space” “APPLICATIONLAYER” “NETWORKLAYER” “PHYSICALLAYER”

The Conversation “APPLICATIONLAYER” SPECIALIZED - Collaboration - Sit Awareness - Command/Control - Integration/Fusion SPECIALIZED - Collaboration - Sit Awareness - Command/Control - Integration/Fusion “NETWORKLAYER” “PHYSICALLAYER” VIDEO/IMAGERY - VTC - GIS - Layered Maps VIDEO/IMAGERY - VTC - GIS - Layered Maps VOICE - Push-to-talk - Cellular - VoIP - Sat Phone - Land Line VOICE - Push-to-talk - Cellular - VoIP - Sat Phone - Land Line TEXT - - chat - SMS TEXT - - chat - SMS WIRED - DSL - Cable WIRED - DSL - Cable WIRELESS LOCAL - WiFi - PAN - MAN WIRELESS LOCAL - WiFi - PAN - MAN WIRELESS LONG HAUL - WiMAX - Microwave - HF over IP WIRELESS LONG HAUL - WiMAX - Microwave - HF over IP REACHBACK - Satellite Broadband - VSAT - BGAN REACHBACK - Satellite Broadband - VSAT - BGAN POWER - Fossil Fuel - Renewable POWER - Fossil Fuel - Renewable HUMAN NEEDS - Shelter - Water - Fuel - Food HUMAN NEEDS - Shelter - Water - Fuel - Food PHYSICAL SECURITY - Force Protection - Access Authorization PHYSICAL SECURITY - Force Protection - Access Authorization OPERATIONS CENTER - NetSec - Command/Control - Leadership OPERATIONS CENTER - NetSec - Command/Control - Leadership HUMAN / COGNITIVE LAYER Social/Cultural Organizational Political Economic A Layered View of HFN Architecture

Modeling Human Behavior: The OODA Loop USAF Col John Boyd ( ) Descriptive model: continuous process of how individuals or organizations react to events Sensing, collecting data Analysis and synthesis of data to form a perspective Selecting a course of action Executing the course of action OBSERVE ORIENT DECIDE ACT Boyd’s argument: Survival depends on speed through loop Emphasis on drills and training to decrease response times

HFNs as “Network-Based OODA Loops” The OODA loop has been very influential culturally on DoD, and more recently DHS, in terms of training, drilling, etc – We know how to do OODA in single actor or tight C2 contexts, and we have doctrine to guide our behavior – Doing OODA among distributed, heterogeneous agents over a network is not understood – HFNs exemplify the challenges in OODA in a network context

HFNs as “Network-Based OODA Loops” (cont’d) As a conceptual framework, the OODA loop ties together existing research in network science – Distributed algorithms for sensing, building consensus, and taking action (e.g., synchronization, control of some other dynamical process) – Behavioral network science: our team’s experiments about how humans interact over networks Open research question: how to improve our ability to do OODA in a network context?

Ongoing Research Efforts Model existing doctrine for disaster response in terms of a constraint-based architecture for HFNs Extend behavioral network science experiments to field exercises (moving to the right…) Develop simple lab and/or field experiments that isolate tensions in HFN operations (moving left…) Participation in and analysis of field experiments, exercises, and real world disasters – Via deployment of HFN comms, data collection, interviews Questions ? Comments ? Theory Data Analysis Numerical Experiments Lab Experiments Field Exercises Real-World Operations