Game Dynamics Out of Sync Michael Schapira (Yale University and UC Berkeley) Joint work with Aaron D. Jaggard and Rebecca N. Wright.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The role of compatibility in the diffusion of technologies in social networks Mohammad Mahdian Yahoo! Research Joint work with N. Immorlica, J. Kleinberg,
Advertisements

Ch. 12 Routing in Switched Networks
Approximate Nash Equilibria in interesting games Constantinos Daskalakis, U.C. Berkeley.
Routing Complexity of Faulty Networks Omer Angel Itai Benjamini Eran Ofek Udi Wieder The Weizmann Institute of Science.
An Introduction to Game Theory Part V: Extensive Games with Perfect Information Bernhard Nebel.
1 Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing Joan Feigenbaum Yale University Vijay Ramachandran Stevens Institute of Technology Michael Schapira The Hebrew.
Distributed Markov Chains P S Thiagarajan School of Computing, National University of Singapore Joint work with Madhavan Mukund, Sumit K Jha and Ratul.
Routing in a Parallel Computer. A network of processors is represented by graph G=(V,E), where |V| = N. Each processor has unique ID between 1 and N.
Fast Convergence of Selfish Re-Routing Eyal Even-Dar, Tel-Aviv University Yishay Mansour, Tel-Aviv University.
COMP 553: Algorithmic Game Theory Fall 2014 Yang Cai Lecture 21.
Congestion Games with Player- Specific Payoff Functions Igal Milchtaich, Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1993 Presentation.
Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Gregory Valiant, and Aviv Zohar.
Michael Schapira School of Computer Science and Engineering Hebrew University of Jerusalem Some Open Questions on the Borderline of Distributed Computing.
1 Interdomain Routing and Games Hagay Levin, Michael Schapira and Aviv Zohar The Hebrew University.
SCHOOL OF INFORMATION UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN si.umich.edu Searching for Stability in Interdomain Routing Rahul Sami (University of Michigan) Michael Schapira.
Towards a Logic for Wide-Area Internet Routing Nick Feamster and Hari Balakrishnan M.I.T. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Kunal.
Announcement  Slides and reference materials available at  Slides and reference materials available.
Putting BGP on the Right Path: A Case for Next-Hop Routing Michael Schapira (Yale University and UC Berkeley) Joint work with Yaping Zhu and Jennifer Rexford.
Planning under Uncertainty
STABLE PATH PROBLEM Presented by: Sangeetha A. J. Based on The Stable Path Problem and Interdomain Routing Timothy G. Griffin, Bruce Shepherd, Gordon Wilfong.
Game Theoretic and Economic Perspectives on Interdomain Routing Michael Schapira Yale University and UC Berkeley.
1 Best-Reply Mechanisms Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira and Aviv Zohar.
Mobile and Wireless Computing Institute for Computer Science, University of Freiburg Western Australian Interactive Virtual Environments Centre (IVEC)
1 Maximal Independent Set. 2 Independent Set (IS): In a graph, any set of nodes that are not adjacent.
BGP Safety with Spurious Updates Martin Suchara in collaboration with: Alex Fabrikant and Jennifer Rexford IEEE INFOCOM April 14, 2011.
Lecture 1 - Introduction 1.  Introduction to Game Theory  Basic Game Theory Examples  Strategic Games  More Game Theory Examples  Equilibrium  Mixed.
1 Introduction APEC 8205: Applied Game Theory. 2 Objectives Distinguishing Characteristics of a Game Common Elements of a Game Distinction Between Cooperative.
Beyond selfish routing: Network Formation Games. Network Formation Games NFGs model the various ways in which selfish agents might create/use networks.
Building Low-Diameter P2P Networks Eli Upfal Department of Computer Science Brown University Joint work with Gopal Pandurangan and Prabhakar Raghavan.
Interdomain Routing Establish routes between autonomous systems (ASes). Currently done with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). AT&T Qwest Comcast Verizon.
Distributed Computing with Adaptive Heuristics Michael Schapira Princeton Innovations in Computer Science 09 January 2011 Partially supported by NSF Aaron.
CISS Princeton, March Optimization via Communication Networks Matthew Andrews Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs.
Convergence Time to Nash Equilibria in Load Balancing Eyal Even-Dar, Tel-Aviv University Alex Kesselman, Tel-Aviv University Yishay Mansour, Tel-Aviv University.
When is it Best to Best-Reply? Michael Schapira (Yale University and UC Berkeley) Joint work with Noam Nisan (Hebrew U), Gregory Valiant (UC Berkeley)
Stable Internet Routing Without Global Coordination Jennifer Rexford AT&T Labs--Research
DANSS Colloquium By Prof. Danny Dolev Presented by Rica Gonen
Theory of Computing Lecture 22 MAS 714 Hartmut Klauck.
Stable Internet Routing Without Global Coordination Jennifer Rexford AT&T Labs--Research
Stable Internet Routing Without Global Coordination Jennifer Rexford AT&T Labs--Research Joint work with Lixin Gao.
Building a Strong Foundation for a Future Internet Jennifer Rexford ’91 Computer Science Department (and Electrical Engineering and the Center for IT Policy)
Towards a Logic for Wide- Area Internet Routing Nick Feamster Hari Balakrishnan.
Beyond Routing Games: Network (Formation) Games. Network Games (NG) NG model the various ways in which selfish users (i.e., players) strategically interact.
Transit price negotiation: repeated game approach Sogea 23 Mai 2007 Nancy, France D.Barth, J.Cohen, L.Echabbi and C.Hamlaoui
Bounding the Cost of Stability in Games with Restricted Interaction Reshef Meir, Yair Zick, Edith Elkind and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein COMSOC 2012 (to appear)
CS4231 Parallel and Distributed Algorithms AY 2006/2007 Semester 2 Lecture 10 Instructor: Haifeng YU.
Consensus and Its Impossibility in Asynchronous Systems.
Game Theory: introduction and applications to computer networks Game Theory: introduction and applications to computer networks Introduction Giovanni Neglia.
Aemen Lodhi (Georgia Tech) Amogh Dhamdhere (CAIDA)
Best Reply Mechanisms Justin Thaler and Victor Shnayder.
ACM SIGACT News Distributed Computing Column 9 Abstract This paper covers the distributed systems issues, concentrating on some problems related to distributed.
Michael Schapira Yale and UC Berkeley Joint work with P. Brighten Godfrey, Aviv Zohar and Scott Shenker.
Issues on the border of economics and computation נושאים בגבול כלכלה וחישוב Speaker: Dr. Michael Schapira Topic: Dynamics in Games (Part III) (Some slides.
EE 685 presentation Optimization Flow Control, I: Basic Algorithm and Convergence By Steven Low and David Lapsley.
Information Theory for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (ITMANET): The FLoWS Project Competitive Scheduling in Wireless Networks with Correlated Channel State Ozan.
Beyond selfish routing: Network Games. Network Games NGs model the various ways in which selfish agents strategically interact in using a network They.
Beyond selfish routing: Network Games. Network Games NGs model the various ways in which selfish users (i.e., players) strategically interact in using.
1 What is Game Theory About? r Analysis of situations where conflict of interests is present r Goal is to prescribe how conflicts can be resolved 2 2 r.
Designing Games for Distributed Optimization Na Li and Jason R. Marden IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp ,
4: Network Layer4a-1 Distance Vector Routing Algorithm iterative: r continues until no nodes exchange info. r self-terminating: no “signal” to stop asynchronous:
Fault tolerance and related issues in distributed computing Shmuel Zaks GSSI - Feb
Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources U. Endriss, N. Maudet, F. Sadri, and F. Toni Presented by: Marcus Shea.
1 Distributed Vertex Coloring. 2 Vertex Coloring: each vertex is assigned a color.
Krishnendu ChatterjeeFormal Methods Class1 MARKOV CHAINS.
Theory of Computational Complexity Probability and Computing Chapter Hikaru Inada Iwama and Ito lab M1.
(Inter)Network Protocols: Theory and Practice Lecture 3 Dr
New Characterizations in Turnstile Streams with Applications
Presented By Aaron Roth
5.4 T-joins and Postman Problems
Locality In Distributed Graph Algorithms
Presentation transcript:

Game Dynamics Out of Sync Michael Schapira (Yale University and UC Berkeley) Joint work with Aaron D. Jaggard and Rebecca N. Wright

Motivation: Internet Routing Establish routes between Autonomous Systems (ASes). Currently handled by the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). AT&T Qwest Comcast Sprint

Internet Routing as a Game [Levin-S-Zohar] Internet routing is a game! –players = ASes –players’ types = preferences over routes –strategies = outgoing edges BGP = Best-Response Dynamics –each AS constantly selects its best available route to each destination –… until a “stable state” (= PNE) is reached.

But… Challenge I: No synchronization of players’ actions –players can best-reply simultaneously. –players can best-reply based on outdated information. Challenge II: Are players incentivized to follow best-response dynamics? –Can a player benefit from not best-replying? this talk [Nisan-S-Valiant-Zohar]

Game Dynamics and Asynchrony Dynamic environments –Internet protocols –large-scale markets –social networks –multi-processor computer architectures Game theory provides useful tools to analyze these interactions, but…. … has so far primarily concentrated on synchronous environments (simultaneous, sequential).

2,12,1 0,00,0 1,21,2 0,00,0 Row Player Column Player Illustration

2,12,1 0,00,0 1,21,2 0,00,0 Row Player Column Player

But… 2,12,1 0,00,0 1,21,2 0,00,0 Row Player Column Player

Model for asynchronous game dynamics Impossibility result Circumventing our impossibility result Complexity of asynchronous game dynamics Directions for future research Agenda

n nodes 1,…,n Node i has action space A i –A=A 1 … A n –A -i =A 1 … A i-1 A i+1 … A n Node i has reaction function f i :A → A i –f=(f 1,…,f n ) Simple Model: Nodes Interacting

Infinite sequence of discrete time steps t=1,… Initial state a 0, Schedule  :{1,…} → 2 [n] –fair schedule The (a 0,  )-dynamics –Start at the initial state a 0 –In each time step t let the nodes in  (t) react. Simple Model: Dynamics

Defn: an action profile a=(a 1,…,a n ) is a stable state if f i (a)=a i for all i. –that is, a is a fixed point of f. Defn: The system is convergent if the (a 0,  )-dynamics converges to a stable state for all choices of a 0 and (fair) . Simple Model: Convergence

Defn: f is node independent if, for each node i, f i :A -i → A i Thm: If f is node independent, and there exist multiple stable states, then the system is not convergent. Can be generalized to reaction functions that are –randomized –bounded-recall –non-stationary Guaranteed Convergence?

Internet protocols –Internet routing [Sami-S-Zohar] –congestion control [Godfrey-S-Zohar-Shenker] Best-response dynamics –with consistent tie-breaking –orthogonal to the results of Hart and Mas-Colell Diffusion of technologies in social networks –2 technologies {A,B}. Each node wants to be consistent with the majority of its neighbours. Circuit design Applications

Example 1: (node-dependent reactions) Each f i is such that for every a=(a 1,…,a n ) it holds that f i (a)=a i. “Tightness” of Our Result

Example 1: (node dependent reactions) Each f i is such that for every a=(a 1,…,a n ) it holds that f i (a)=a i. Example 2: (unbounded recall) –2 nodes, 1 and 2, each with action space {a,b}. –Node 2 wants to match node 1’s action. –Node 1 selects b if node 2 changed its action from a to b in the past, and a otherwise. –What happens at the initial state (b,a)? “Tightness” of Our Result

Thm: If f is node independent, and there exist multiple stable states, then the system is not convergent. Interesting connections to fundamental results in distributed computing theory. –the Fischer-Lynch-Patterson impossibility result for consensus protocols (1983) But, neither result is a special case of the other. Proving Our Result

The Dynamics Graph action vector a S =(a S 1,… a S n ) knowledge vector b S =(b S 1,… b S n ) State R knowledge transition i-transition State T State S 1.a T :=a S 2.b T :=a S 1.a R :=a S except a R i :=f i (b S ) 2.b R :=b S

The dynamics graph captures all dynamics. The scenario where –the initial state is a 0. –nodes 1 and 3 react simultaneously. –then nodes 2 and 3 react simultaneously. is captured as follows: Visualising Dynamics

The dynamics graph captures all dynamics. The scenario where –the initial state is a 0. –nodes 1 and 3 react simultaneously. –then nodes 2 and 3 react simultaneously. is captured as follows: Visualising Dynamics State S a S =b S =a 0

The dynamics graph captures all dynamics. The scenario where –the initial state is a 0. –nodes 1 and 3 react simultaneously. –then nodes 2 and 3 react simultaneously. is captured as follows: Visualising Dynamics State S a S =b S =a 0 1-transition 3-transitionk-transition

The dynamics graph captures all dynamics. The scenario where –the initial state is a 0. –nodes 1 and 3 react simultaneously. –then nodes 2 and 3 react simultaneously. is captured as follows: Visualising Dynamics State S a S =b S =a 0 1-transition 3-transitionk-transition 2-transition3-transitionk-transition

Defn: A state S in the dynamics graph is stable if every outgoing edge from S leads to S. Defn: A fair path in the dynamics graph is a path that (1) for each i, contains an i-transition; and (2) also contains a knowledge transition. Stability and Fairness

Defn: The attractor region of a stable state S are all states from which any (long enough) fair path reaches S. Attractor Regions

Claim: A fair cycle in the dynamics graph implies an oscillation in our model. Proposition: If there are multiple stable states then there are states in the dynamics graph that are not in any attractor region (“neutral states”). Proof Sketch (Cont.)

Colour each attractor region in a different colour – red, blue, etc. Colour the neutral states in purple. Colouring States

Key idea: We show that from every purple state there is a fair path that leads to another purple state. The number of purple states is finite and so this implies a fair cycle. Creating Oscillations

Lemma: There cannot be two edges leading from a purple state to two non-purple states that do not have the same colour. Intuition: We can swap the order of activations without affecting the outcome. Proof Sketch (Cont.)    ?  : different transitions

Fix a purple state p. Let R be a “maximal” fair path from p to another purple state. Proof Sketch (Cont.) p … … q R

Let  be a transition that is not on R. Observe that  at q takes us to a non- purple state. p … … q R  Proof Sketch (Cont.)

Because q is purple it must have a fair path to a non-purple non-red state. p … … q R  … … u Proof Sketch (Cont.)

Now, we prove that  at u must take us to a red state --- a contradiction! p … … q R  … … u  Proof Sketch (Cont.)

Our result holds for randomized reaction functions. –adversarially-chosen schedule What if the schedule is randomized? –our impossibility result breaks … –… but no general possibility result either Circumventing Our Impossibility Result: Randomness

Defn: A schedule  is r-fair if each node is activated at least once within every r consecutive time steps. Can we prove our impossibility result for schedules that are r-fair? If so, for what values of r? We present positive and negative results. Circumventing Our Impossibility Result: r-Fair Schedules

Thm: Determining if a system with n nodes, each with two actions, is convergent requires exponential communication (in n). The proof requires reaction functions to be of exponential size. Combinatorial proof: a “Snake in the Box” construction Complexity Results

What if the reaction functions can be succinctly described? Thm: Determining if a system with n nodes is convergent is PSPACE- Complete. Hence, there is no “short” characterization of asynchronous convergence! Complexity Results

Other notions of asynchrony Other reaction functions –fictitious play, regret minimization –Observation: regret minimization is much more resilient to asynchrony (different framework…). Other restrictions on schedules –random schedules –r-fair schedules –more Directions for Future Research

THANK YOU