Coye Cheshire & Andrew Fiore July 16, 2015 // Computer-Mediated Communication Information Pools.

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Coye Cheshire & Andrew Fiore July 16, 2015 // Computer-Mediated Communication Information Pools

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore1 Mark your calendars… Dr. Marc Smith Microsoft Research Thurs Nov 1st — Guest Lecturer

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore2 Class business Annotations … 1)Do them. 2) If you haven’t done them, do them.

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore3 Forms of Interaction in Social Dilemmas 2-person repeated PDN-person PD Public Good

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore4 Strategizing in repeated PD games  Consider two individuals who interact repeatedly over time 1)No mechanisms for enforceable commitments. 2)No way to be sure what the other will do on each ‘turn’. 3)No way to eliminate the other player or leave the interaction. 4)No way to change the other player’s payoffs. What strategy might you use if you had to play this game over and over again with others? Always Cooperate? Always Defect? Something more complicated, perhaps using past behavior?

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore5 C C C C C C C C C … versus D D D D D D D D D … Coop.Defect Coop. Defect A B 3 (R) 5 (T) 0 (S) 3 (R) 0 (S) 5 (T) 1 (P)

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore6 When are Social Dilemmas Useful in the Study of CMC? Standards Wars Online Tagging Systems (folksonomies), Collaborative Editing Systems Del.ic.ious Wherever we find mixed-motive situations and collective action…

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore7 Producing ‘Impossible Goods’  Peer-to-peer file swapping  Open-source software  Collective editing information systems

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore8  “Nearly anonymous people from around the world with no prior introduction independently request or contribute time and expertise and freely give the result away to anyone interested without payment or coercion”  Marc Smith (1999), referring to the Usenet Their info Your info My info

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore9 “Information Pool”

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore10 Group Size and Collective Goods The group size effect should be reversed if the value of the good does not decrease as individuals consume it (Marwell and Oliver 1993)

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore11 Information as a Public Good 1)Information can be consumed by many without losing value (Jointness of Supply or Non-Rival Goods) 2)When information is transferred or exchanged, this can often be done in replication.

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore12 Replication  ‘Replication’ is not synonymous with jointness of supply or rival/non-rival goods. book_of_knowledge.pdf Vs.

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore13 Digital Goods  “digital goods” significantly change the economics of exchange – including situations in which they are produced as a public good.

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore14 Information Pool Information Pools as “Group-Generalized Exchange”

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore15 + = Productive Exchange

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore16 Information Pools as “Productive Exchange”

7/16/2015Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore17 Producing ‘Impossible Goods’: Thinking About Classifying Information Pools Order  The process of production and exchange is well- defined and the outcome product is clearly specified Coordination  The roles of the various actors are clearly specified.